THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS MONDAY, APRIL 18, 1938 ANGLO-ITALIAN AGREEMENT

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXXV, Issue 23015, 18 April 1938, Page 8

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS MONDAY, APRIL 18, 1938 ANGLO-ITALIAN AGREEMENT

For rapidity of negotiation and range of achievement, the AngloItalian pact is remarkable. Taken together, these two features make it almost if not quite unique as a friendly instrument of peace. They turn opposite ways—usually speed is dependent on narrowness of scope —yet neither has marred the other. Some things remain for final elucidation, chiefly the Spanish and Ethiopian questions, but even in these a beginning has been made. It is satisfactory to note that the British Government has repeated its insistence on a settlement of the Spanish question as a condition of the agreement's coming into force. This means that Italy's pledge to withdraw men and material must

lbe frankly honoured in proof of | good faith. To have been content I with anything short of this would | have thrown this vital question back j into the confusion of earlier inter- • national debate. As to the recogni- ! tion of Italy's sovereignty over 1 Ethiopia, this is so obviously a ! matter for consultation among j League States that reference to thern in concert is both logical and [ expedient. Britain's undertaking to I initiate in the League Council a discussion clarifying the position goes as far as any present undertaking should. Even had the outcome been certain, to assume this would have been wrong in principle, since the League has recorded a binding pronouncement; and in all probability, supposing Mr. Chamberlain to be ready to yield separately and at once to Signor Mussolini's demand, this would not have satisfied the latter, for he manifestly desires a general lifting of the combined refusal to condone Italian aggression. Minor details in the pact may not create difficulty. Its total effect is that of a promising step toward assured peace in Europe and in the world.

This wider aspect of an agreement formally and actually bilateral is justified. Among the factors in its promotion must be counted some more or less remote. Most intimate of all, except the wishes of the two* contracting parties, is Germany's recent challenge of peace in her seizure of Austria. Naturally, the German Government has been kept informed of proceedings in the negotiations. This taking of Germany into confidence, at all events on the part of Signor Mussolini—and it can be assumed that this had Mr. Chamberlain's cognisance and approval—was a useful precaution. But the claim of the Berliner Tageblatt that the agreement is proof of what can be realised on "the secure foundation of the Rome-Berlin axis" does not bear investigation. Rather is it clear that, by the military coup in Austria, Germany so violated the security of the axis that Italy was constrained to look elsewhere for friendship. German guns on the Brenner Pass must give Signor Mussolini more anxiety than comfort. His understanding with Heirr Hitler may be ostensibly intact, but there can be no mistaking the Nazi purpose of playiijg first fiddle in the European concert. It is the breach of the axis, not its creation, that has served the Anglo-Italian pact. Nevertheless, Herr Hitler may himself be induced by this pact to review his policy. He cannot afford now to be indifferent to the possibility of a tripartite agreement including Britain, Italy and France. Hence a new Four-Power Pact, composed of these three plus Germany, suggests itself as a likely development. No Anglo-Italian understanding in the Mediterranean can leave 1 France out of account for very : long. Hence, by way of Italy, British policy may succeed in a wider pacification of Europe. When the details of the AngloItalian agreement are perused, their comprehensive nature is impressive. They compass the whole stretch of waterway from Gibraltar to the Gulf of Aden, with adjacent territory at critical points all along the route. To both contracting Powers this waterway is crucially important. It has become increasingly so to Italy since her extension of empire to Abyssinia, and Britain cannot without risk of grave surrender of needs make the route by way of Capetown more than a subsidiary one. The idea of the Mediterranean's becoming an Italian lake must be resisted, whatever may be thought of Italy's requirements. Failing a friendly understanding by all Powers concerned, this question would continue as a vexation and a menace, and the only reasonable answer to it must begin with an Anglo-Italian pact of the sort now well on the way to conclusion. In spite of the German suggestion that the details df this agreement are less important for the future than is "the reality of Greater Germany," the AngloItalian protocol opens the most promising path; in other wordsi, a London Home axis offers the best available basis of peace. It is the first fruits of (lie policy upon which Mr. Chamberlain has set his mind. More benefits should follow ere long, contingent on a iinal settlement of points yet to be discusised. As a beginning, it. is to be hailed wjtji s;tji*ffif:tji!i), I'lie good reoep* i tion it has had in European capitals augurs weJL