THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 15, 1938 JAPAN'S EVASIVE REPLY

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXXV, Issue 22963, 15 February 1938, Page 10

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 15, 1938 JAPAN'S EVASIVE REPLY

The Japanese Government's reply to the British, American and French Notes is more than a refusal to supply particulars of her programme of naval construction. Had it been a blunt refusal, unaccompanied by argument, it would have been more impressive. Its qualities call to mind the advice offered to a group of newly - appointed Justices of the Peace by a learned Judge: "If you ever have to try a case, give a judgment and stick to it, but don't give any reasons." Probably the Japanese Government, eager to manifest a parity of right to expound a national policy—a right it certainly possesses—was tempted to multiply words, and in so doing was foolishly careless in. their choice. Having already placed itself deliberately outside all treaty obligations to regard naval construction as a matter of international concern, it could well have reiterated this decision and stopped at that. Instead, it has presented the world with a remarkable opportunity of probing its thought, in spite of its evident wish to evade such an' Outcome. First to be noted is the declaration that Japan has no intention of possessing a navy capable of menacing other countries—she is merely trying to ensure her national safety with armaments comparatively small. How does this square with facts that she cannot hide and makes no pretence to hide? Japan has openly employed her naval resources to menace China, and with equal frankness has announced her purpose of increasing ' this use of them. Is China not among the "other countries" whose security is to be considerately respected? Even one exception has an ominous meaning, for all concerned. Besides, Japan's candid determination to have naval armaments at least as extensive and powerful as those of any other nation hardly accords with this profession to be content with armaments comparatively small. Her reply, it is true, gives this comparison special reference to the armaments of "such great Powers as Britain and America." Incidentally this implies a strength capable of striking terror throughout the Orient, but it directly admits a purpose related to the British Empire and the United States, from whom Japan must, she says, keep her plans a close secret. Are these Powers threatening her? Would she not have been guaranteed complete immunity from effectual attack by them had she refrained from denouncing and destroying the naval treaties thus made a dead letter? The blame for this changed position, whatever it means, lies wholly and solely at her own door, and she can bring about the restoration of the old order, or a better one, if she will. It is idle to say that Britain and America, each with "a colossal armament programme," are thereby "causing considerable apprehension in other countries," when she has this blame and this opportunity. Further, the British increase has had a palpably restraining effect on bellicose nations in Europe, and both thisi increase and any contemplated by America cannot, in the light of facts, be reasonably interpreted as foreboding a reckless breach of international peace. Their increases are openly discussed by them, at all events, and cannot very well be made an excuse for Japanese secrecy.

It is perfectly reasonable, in spite of the Japanese protestations, to regard this secrecy as sinister. Japan would have been first and loudest in complaint if Britain or America had acted so. Nor is Japan's alleged offer, to discuss disarmament, of any value so long as she persists in demanding, as she did at the London Conference in 1930, that quantitative limitation, with "a common upper limit," be first accepted. The reasons then prevailing against so useless a procedure, at variance with all accomplished at Washington in 1921-22 and at London since then, are cogent still. A real desire for disarmament would make Japan willing to tread again the only promising path, or at least to confer upon that possibility instead of presenting an obstructive ultimatum. As to other assertions in her reply, the fact that she was not a signatory to the last London Treaty does not vitiate the action of its signatories in asking for details of her programme when they agree to put the "escalator" clause into operation, and exchange of information is certainly an essential element in disarmament discussion. Close scrutiny of the reply discovers, without difficulty, that Japan—for national prestige, as Admiral Nagano frankly owned when the Japanese delegation withdrew from the last conference —is determined to go her own way. Her professions of peaceful intent are not conspicuously genuine, and until they are Britain and America have no alternative to watchfulness against her. She has furnished lately reasons more than enough to justify their anxiety. An American suggestion of union of purpose with other democracies in the safeguarding of peace has support in unpleasant facts. To these facts the Japanese Government's reply has made a disappointingly ominous addition.,