THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS MONDAY, FEBRUARY 7, 1938 JAPAN'S NAVAL THREAT

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXXV, Issue 22956, 7 February 1938, Page 8

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS MONDAY, FEBRUARY 7, 1938 JAPAN'S NAVAL THREAT

Japan's threat to build a navy bigger than any afloat has been suddenly and seriously challenged. Identical Notes from Britain and the United States have asked questions so pertinent, and have set so limited a time for their precise answer, that the Japanese Government must soon reply in detail or else be placed openly, by its own choice, in the wrong. It is understood that France will join Britain and America in pressing the inquiries. An official of the Japanese Admiralty has expressed, with almost Western terseness, his derision of the challenge, flatly asserting that he sees no reason why Japan should change the policy on which she has embarked. He significantly offers no denial of the foreign interpretation of the general rumours about the policy. This silence can be taken at full value. It has long been evident that Japan is determined to take her own course in naval programmes. She exercised some time ago her undoubted right, as a signatory of the Washington Treaty of 1922, and the London Treaty of 1930, to end these agreements on limitation. She was set on

attaining equality, at least, with Britain and America. To be done with ratios and to be left entirely unrestricted in quantitative measures of strength were undisguised resolves. When the next London Naval Conference was called, there was strong reason to expect that Japan would not co-operate. She sent a delegation, but so effectually tied its hands that a comparative failure of the conference was certain. It met on December 5, 1935, and closed in the following March, its work made of little value by the Japanese insistence on "a common upper limit," which was merely a euphemism for quantitative equality. However, out of the wreck was fashioned a new limitation treaty; not an ideal instrument, but one sufficiently serviceable in just the sort of emergency Japan's militant policy has created. In an obvious attempt to torpedo the conference, the Japanese delegation, under rigid instructions from Tokio, demanded discussion of their "common upper limit" before any other subject was taken. The other four Powers represented—Britain, France, Italy and the United States —were indisposed to do more than allow a ventilation of the idea; they were agreed in declaring it unacceptable. Thereupon, on January 15, the Japanese delegation formally withdrew, leaving the rest' to get On as best they cduld. The motive "of the withdrawal was naively expressed by Admiral Nagano. "The allocation of an inferior ratio," he said, "is so detrimental to our national prestige that it is bound to produce serious repercussions in our country, being a source of permanent and profound discontent to our people." By national prestige he clearly meant the ambition to pursue a policy of dominance in East Asia. His appended reference to "security of national defence" was hardly relevant, for by the treaties of 1922 and 1930 Japan was assured complete security in her own and adjacent waters; the covenants precluding fortification of foreign naval bases within effective striking distance of her was worth more than unmeasured liberty to build great capital ships. A recognition of this fact bears directly on the apprehension with which other Powers now view the substantial reports of Japan's intention to possess a navy capable of menacing other nations, although not required for defence. They have been- compelled to call to their aid the treaty that Japan refused to subscribe. Using the method adopted in 1930, when France and Italy declined to be bound by the earlier London Treaty and thus created a risk of Mediterranean conflict involving other Powers, the three signatories of the treaty of 1936—Italy held aloof then for political reasons slenderly connected with naval questions—inserted an "escape" or "escalator" clause. By this any of them was given a precautionary emergency freedom to build beyond the qualitative limits—displacement tonnage, calibre of guns, chiefly, in the several categories—should construction by a non-treaty Power threaten one or all of them. This clause, and its associated formula for the reciprocal giving of information about programmes of building, are now called into operation. The action taken by Britain and the United States is described today as parallel, not joint, although there is complete internal evidence of collaboration. This distinction is essential, for by the terms of the 1936 treaty each signatory was empowered to act separately; had joint action been prescribed, the emergency clause would have conferred no real right on any single Power to take extraordinary steps in a new situation menacing itself alone. But, in the present instance, conformity to the formula of individual precaution is of far less interest and importance than the fact of consultation. Two, and probably three, of the negotiators of the treaty have exercised in unison their individual right. If anything can influence Japan to desist from recklessly pursuing a course manifestly intended to accomplish more than national security, for its extension would hold to ransom all European Powers having interests in the Orient and a large part of the Pacific, these pointed inquiries should have that result. Above all, it is heartening to find Britain and America, with the probable help of France, agreed on action calculated to counter a truculent disregard of international peace.