THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 3, 1937 JAPAN'S NEW CABINET

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXXIV, Issue 22643, 3 February 1937, Page 12

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 3, 1937 JAPAN'S NEW CABINET

When Japan changes guard —by producing a new Ministry—the rest of the world cannot afford to be merely curious onlookers. In the vast region known conveniently as the Pacific, where many national interests commingle dangerously, Japan's foreign policy is a vital factor in international developments ; and since most of the nations concerned have their governmental centres in Europe, where their political intercourse is at present far from happy, a clash of purposes in the Pacific can all too easily provoke trouble in both hemispheres. New Zealand, because of its own location and because of its integral association with Great Britain in the Empire, cannot be unaffected by critical happenings in Japanese politics and therefore ought not to be indifferent about the nature of the new Cabinet, formed by General Hayashi after, a momentous week of grave difficulty. The first indication of a crisis was an emergency meeting of the Cabinet of which Mr. Hi rota was Prime Minister. This meeting decided on a dissolution of the Diet, because of disunity in the Cabinet, but before this decision could be given effect there was an angry ' debate in the Lower House. The | Cabinet was openly accused of being i too strongly influenced by the Army. Mr. Hirota's protest provoked jeers, yet it was evident that among Opposition members was a vigorous minority unprepared to endorse the accusation. This was tantamount to siding with whatever criticism the Army had levelled at Mr. Hirota. He took matters into his own hands, going to the Emperor. The outcome was a decree suspending the Diet for two days, and Mr. Hirota was given a choice of three courses of action should the attack on him not subside: he could seek a further suspension, or tender the resignation of the Cabinet, or compromise by reconstructing it. Out of the confusion a series of significant events quickly came.

Members of the Cabinet failed to igree on the course to be adopted, .'n particular, General Count Termchi, Minister of War, was against my compromise, and issued through he War Office a challenging statenent announcing that the Army was lot able to co-operate with politicians, because they were "putting ntrigues before national welfare and blocking reform measures." An nsult to the Army, he said, had 3een uttered in the course of the lebate. He followed this official ltterance with a threat to resign f the Diet were not dissolved, and when all efforts to bring the disputants together had proved unavailing Mr. Hirota tendered the Cabinet's resignation. The Emperoi summoned General Ugaki, a formei Minister of War but not in favoui with those now dominating tht Army, and commanded him to forrr a Cabinet. This he undertook tc do, but had to abandon the task ir the face of uncompromising opposi tion by the War Office and the Army. The latter, under the Consti tution, has power to insist that the Minister of War—and this positior obtains also with - reference to the Navy and its Minister—shall be ar officer of high rank, active or retired approved by it. Three nominees as Minister of War, chosen in succes sion by General Ugaki, were sum marily rejected by the Army, anc he felt compelled to abandon his efforts to form a Ministry, at the same time surrendering his military rank as a protest against the Army's attitude. An old and triee campaigner, with a distinguishec record that includes a successfu Governorship of Korea, he ha! nevertheless been unacceptable t( the younger and less aristocratii group of officers now dominating the Army. Their opposition soon forcec him to stand aside. Next the Emperor consulted an "elder states man," Prince Saionji, far advancec in years, and presumably on hii advice summoned General Hayashi a former Minister of War, to forrr a Cabinet. He has succeeded, bul it is significant that he has had tc drop his first nominee for the Wai Ministry in favour of another General Nakamura, on whose ap pointment the Army was adamant and that his nominee as Minister of the Navy, Vice-Admiral Yonai, ii understood to have compelled the new Prime Minister to comply wit} conditions that include safeguarding the naval estimates. In other words the Army and Navy have won r definite political victory. This is always possible in the event of a disagreement between t parliamentary majority (as repre sented by Cabinet) and the high command of the fighting services Constitutionally the Diet has nc control over the organisation o either of them, and no right to with hold their appropriations excepl when an increase of expenditure if sought. Ministers are not respon sible to the Diet but to the Emperor and to him the Army and Navy have direct access. It is obvious, there fore, that in whatever other respects the Japanese parliamentary svsten is democratic it is not so where these services are concerned. There is < good deal of popular objection te this, but the objection is easily coun tered, under the sufficient cover o lawful action, by means that in mosl Western countries would be deemcic lawless and intolerably defiant. The new Cabinet is plainly under the thumbs of the Army and the Navy which have ari exalted but perilous view of their national duty. Thej are not wholly careless of othei national needs, but these are natur ally subordinated to those of defence and of a foreign policy aiming to wir for their country a position of inde pendence rather than one of inter national service. Their preseni triumph bodes ill for .agreements tc reduce armaments and promote universal collaboration.