"The Safeguards of Peace Have Broken down"

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXXIV, Issue 22628, 16 January 1937, Page 3 (Supplement)

"The Safeguards of Peace Have Broken down"

able lowering of the standard of living. Governments are constantly tempted to escape internal trouble by creating external diversions. "So swift has been the disintegration of the peace structure set up after the world war, and so bewildering is the resulting chaos, that any attempt to form a new international order is defeated from the beginning by the complexity of the task. In the absence of a recognised international code of conduct each power is proposing solutions unacceptable to others. "Both national policies and international groupings are constantly changing. The world is held together by an uneasy truce liable to collapse at any moment. And if war breaks out anywhere, the chances are that it will become world-wide. "Peace is indivisible. Should Germain', for example, attack Chechoslovakia, France and Soviet Russia are pledged to intervene. Once Russia is involved in a western war, Japan will be tempted to attack her in the east. And if Franco is in danger of being defeated by Germany, Great Britain, for all her desire to stand aloof, may yet be compelled to come to her aid in order to avert a German approach to the Channel coast. "Not a single State in Eastern l£urope would be able to keep out of the war, and Italy would almost certainly wade in to broaden her position in the Mediterranean and the Balkans. No matter where the first spark flies, the blaze could not be confined. Centres ol Unrest "There are three obvious centres of unrest: Germany, Italy and Japan. All of them are poor, ambitious, and ruled by autocratic regimes. They are convinced that they deserve a larger share of the world's riches than they possess at present. Each has a quickly growing population too largo to bo sustained, in tho absence of free international trade, by the available national resources. , "Germany is striving to recover her lost lands and colonics —or at least, to recover her pre-war position us the leading power in Europe. Italy has conquered Abyssinia and wants to gain supremacy in the Mediterranean. Japan is carving out an Empiro by successive encroachments on China and aspires to full control of 'East Asia.' Once the urge for expansion, the lust for greatness is awakened, there is no knowing where it might stop. "The aims of tho three (restless) countries have long outstripped both their legitimate grievances and their economic needs. "While the offensive of tho expandin" 1 powers is gathering force, the po"vers who desire to preserve what they can of the present international structure are disabled by dissbnsions. Tho United States has withdrawn into her shell, unwilling to extend the powerful help she might give both. "In Europe, France and England are constantly getting into each other's way in their efforts to rebuild the foundations of peace. France, absorbed by fear and distrust of Germany, puts her faith in pacts and alliances which, in tightening the pressure on Germany, increase tho danger of explosion. Britain and Germany "Britain, determined to prevent a division of Europe, on the pre-war model, into a German and an antiGerman camp, is inclined to trust Germany and to admit iier need for greater freedom of movement. Again, France is desperately holding on to her position in Eastern and South-Eastern En rope, which she values both as a safeguard against German designs on I her and aa the basis of her leading j

cc\\77 AR is near. With every new crisis in international relations the area of disturbance grows wider, distrust sinks deeper,' confidence becomes more difficult to restore. Tho Italo-Abys-Binian war, the ro-occupation of the Hhineland, the Spanish civil war came near to causing a general conflagration. Tho next flash may be the signal. It is Zero Hour."

So writes Richard Fretind in "Zero Hour," a book from the Methuen press, which has been written and published so expeditiously that it includes internationa'. facts of as recent date as August last. The author was born an Austrian, brought up a German "and anglicised by many year's sojourn in England where I found a second home and a third nationality." lie is a professional journalist who for lone has been engaged in the study of international affairs and he claims that the Play of fortune lias given him an outlook as ncarlv free of national prejudice! as any man can attain. His book, however, has been designed aj a survey of world ati'airs as they present themselves to Great Britain. Gone is War Weariness "The ' safeguards of peace have oroken down," proceeds the author. uono is the war-weariness which for some fifteen years after tho Armistice national aspirations. The afcat general disarmament has ptyce to a general armament race, peace treaties have been riddled violations; regional security pacts ® u ch as the Locarno and Washington J are no more; world-wide P'edges to abstain from war have been S r °ken bv more than one power. The fragile of Nations no longer inspires . Peaceable with confidence nor the with awe. economic nationalism, arising out of Sft r dissensions and aggravated by ber ? anc ' a ' crisis, has led, in a num°f countries, to an almost unbear-

Startling Survey of World Affairs

CAN THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS BE REVIVED?

position on the Continent as a whole. 1 Britain, on tlie other hand, would willingly allow Germany to gain prominent, even controlling, infiucnco in the east and south-east of Europe; hoping that this diversion would relieve Germany's 'prison complex' and ease the European tension. "Moreover, France is willing to support Italy in return for Italian support against Germany; while Britain, both for national and international reasons, would restrain Italian aggressive designs. "It is til's fundamental disagreement between France and England which has prevented the formation ol' a-durable new order in Europe ever since the Great War. It is this disagreement which has caused the downfall of the League. It is this disagreement, finally, which is foiling the present effort to create a new order out of the European chaos. Shaken Balance In Far East "France has strengthened the floodgates by alliances; but it is too late to hem in Germany, just as it is too late to outstare Italy or to placate Japan by soothing words. Perhaps it is even too late for a constructive effort to bring Germany back into the League and to adjust the European balance. Assuming that Britain could bring herself to make such an effort—so far she has done little beyond propitiating the raging passions by gestures of mediation —she is more than likely to find France inflexibly obstructive.

"Similar dissensions are crippling every effort to restore the shaken balance* in the Far East, where Japan steadily enlarges her Empire, while Anglo-American co-operation is made difficult by mutual distrust, and Soviet Russia is feared by all. "If war is to bo averted, means must bo found to ease the internal tension in Germany, Italy and Japan by broadening their export markets and making substantial sacrifices to their amour propre. Vet these conditions are most unlikely to be fulfilled. After the collapse of the idealistic effort to create something like a world conscience in the form of the League, there is nothing left but national egoism.

"Not a single nation is prepared today to risk nionov or security, tar less to surrender possessions, markets or interests, for the sake of forestalling an international eruption. The forces of peace are paralysed. The forces of war are inexorable." Looking Forward ]t is impossible to deal more with the body of the book than to say that it puts a vast amount of knowledge into some 250 pages and will be particularly useful for reference. The chapters' headings which are as follow indicate its scope: —The German Vision; Germany in Europe; Driving Forces (German); Halance in the Baltic; The Danubian Tangle; Mediterranean Crisis; Around the Suez Canal; India and Her Neighbours; Japan in the Ascendant; Rival Policies in the Far Fast; The Condition of China; Japan in Perspective; America in Dry Dock; Fmpire (Russia); The Lion and the Unicorn. He concludes in a chapter entitled Looking Forward.

In the present confusion, when old treaties are gone and new treaties in the making, a forecast of international events would not only be unwise but impossible, writes Mr. Freund. "There is not a single great power that has made up its mind how to react to the new situation. In nearly every capital alternative policies are being prepared for distinctly contradictory possibilities. "A searching of hearts is going on in England and France; Germany, Italy and Japan have paused for reflection. The United States has newly withdrawn from the international stage, leaving an empty place still to be filled. The Soviet Union broods mysteriously in her unaccustomed guise of self-suffi-ciency. No substitute has yet been found for tho defunct Locarno Pact; the League of Nations is undergoing a-crisis which may result, with equal probability, in its deniiso or revival. "In Europe, tho initiative lies with Germany. She has removed the financial and military restrictions of the Versailles Treaty, but its territorial pro-

visions remain to be tackled. If the established methods of German post-war policy are followed, she will give preference to those of her aims which can be put forward with a claim to justice and equity: the return of Danzig and the former German colonies, the closer control of Austria, and the formal separation of the League Covenant from the Versailles Treaty. "Jievond these aims, there lies a vague scheme of recovery of lost provinces and new conquests which is simultaneously upheld and denied bv the German Leader. Of these, tho Polish Corridor, Memel, and the Soviet Ukraine arc the most prominent. It should be noted that Germany has undertaken not to attack Poland, and has offered to sign a non-aggression pact with Lithuania (Memel), while refusing to sign a similar pact with Soviet Russia. Germany's Armed Forces "Meanwhile Germany is rapidly perfecting her armed forces. It is generally assumed that she will need at least another year to bring them up to war standard. In diplomacy, Germany has established friendly relations with Hungary, and to a lessor extent, with Poland and Yugoslavia. She has recently come to terms with Austria, and has entered into close diplomatic collaboration with Italy. There is a possibility—though by no means a certainty —that in certain circumstances Germany's co-operation with all or some of these powers may crystallise into an Entente which would stretch as a powerful belt across Furopo irom the Baltic to the Mediterranean. "This grouping, of which only the nebulous outlines are yet visible, has often been referred to as a bloc of Fascist powers. No doubt there is a certain affinity among dictatorial governments as against democracies, but it would not do to exaggerate the importance of this community of outlook in international affairs. A common Fascist outlook did not prevent Italy, two years ago, from mobilising her army "against Germany; a profound dissimilaritv of outlook did not prevent France and Italy, in 193."), from drawing close to one another; and it should be added that Italy's relations with Soviet Russia are excellent. "Nor would England bo held back by her abhorrence of dictatorships from a friendly understanding with Germany if that seemed desirable to her for international reasons. At present, at any rate, the German-Italian collaboration has not gone beyond mutual sup-

port in negotiations with tho Western powers. Whether they will join hands in the future will depend entirely upon considerations of their respective foreign policies. "On the other side of the picture is France, allied to Soviet .Russia, and anxiously striving to invigorate her alliances with Poland and the three States of the Little Entente. Whether she will succeed will depend largely on the resilience of her financial strength and tho estimate which her allies will make of her political and military stability." (The French-Poland understanding was tightened last week by a loan to Roland by Franco for defence.) France on the Defensive "It is clear that France is on tho defensive. Her hegemony in Europe has disappeared, and she is now struggling to maintain a position of prominence. Her foreign policy is based, as it has been since tho war, on the need to ensure her own safety against a German attack. She fears that Germany, if given a free hand to expand in Central and Eastern Europe, will make use of her gains in that quarter to return to the attack on France. "For the same reason French policy is unlikely to abandon tho effort to maintain friendly relations with Italy. In her heart France still believes that Germany could be turned from the path of expansion by a show of strength on the part of the Western powers, hut England is not prepared to lend herself to this procedure.

"Great Britain is striving to avert a hardening of tho two Continental groups. For this purpose she has been playing an exceedingly complicated game: She has guaranteed tho French and Belgian frontiers against a German attack; she has helped Germany to remove the fetters of the Versailles Treaty she has tried hard and patiently to retain tho friendship of Italy; and she has attempted to transform tho imperfect League of tho post-war years into an elloctivo instrument of conciliation and adjustment. The game collapsed last year for lack of skill on tho part of the chief player. But it must be resumed. In the Mediterranean

membership of the League of Nations is the best method of doing so, " 'lt is not that we ignore the fact that there are to-day great differences between nations, but that we believe that these differences can be adjusted without resort to war.! The League of Nations, in fact, is the only agency by which Great Britain can avert a mortal crisis in Europe if she is to remain free of direct participation in Continental alignments. But it is obvious that the League can serve that purpose only if Germany is brought baclv into its fold. That is the immediate task of England. "If the League can be revived and transformed into a closer likeness of its orig nal conception, it may still be possible to ward oft a war. But the test of 1935 has shown that the League, even in tiio hour of its greatest strength, was not quite strong enough to supplant national ambitions and national policies. Its very strength was derived from the fact that its ideals coincided with British national policy; and its downfall was caused by the fact that they collided with tho interests of France. "If tho lesson is taken to heart, the League will in future be used more as an Instrument of adjustment than as a weapon for coercion. This, presumably, will bo the gist of tho proposals made by the British Government when the position comes to be is viewed at Geneva. .. . Increasing the Chances "The future turns on the question whether Germany can be trusted to keep her promise not to resort to war," continues the author. "In the words of the British questionnaire sent to Berlin on May 8, IMG: 'Does Germany now consider that a point has been reached at which she can signify that she recognises and intends to respect the existing territorial and political status of Europe, except in so far as this might be subsequently modified by free negotiation and agreement? No answer has ever been given to that question, which still hangs over Europe as a momentous mark of interrogation. "If Germany means to keep the peace, and remains capable of doing so, Britain is increasing the chances of peace by easing the pressure on Germany. If, on tho other hand, Germany is either set 011 or drifting into war, then Britain would be doing the greatest possible disservice to Europe by refusing to support the trench policy of preventive defence. "lu tho last resort the choice is a matter of personal faith. This much can be safely assumed: Germany, for all the bravado of Hitler's Mein Kampf, is not pursuing a deep-laid and clearcut plan to burst her boundaries as soon as her strength permits. 'Die boundless ambition of her rulers and the social and financial tension brought about by tho Nazi dictatorship may, however, cause an explosion against .which tho

"No other Continental policy is possible for Britain. Threatened by Italy in tho Mediterranean and in .Africa, she must secure friendly relations with Germany. In order to gain tho co-operation of France in her efforts at European conciliation she must maintain her promise to protect tho Franco-Germau frontier against a German attack. In order to forestall a German-Italian entente she must reconcile Italy. 'The British people,' said Mr. Eden in a programmatic speech, 'are _ singleminded in their desire to live in peace with the world. They believe that to found their foreign policy upon their

pledged word of her Leader may be aU insufficient barrier. The men "ho d©» eide between peace and war in Germany are no fools; whatever the interna.! pressure, they will be guided by theic estimate of external opportunities. "If such opportunities are denied them —and this will depend on Britain's attitude —they may Judge the odds against them too nigh. On the other hand, there is much to be said for a policy of encouraging the better side or the 'German soul by friendliness and conciliation. "Less than ever can British policy leave the Continent alone. It must continue to strive for a conciliation o£ opposing national ambitions in Europe —not, perhaps, by joining the barricades against the attackers of the status quo, but by working for a new; law in European relations. If the effort breaks down, as it will surely break down if French policy prevails, England cannot hope to stand aloof of the ultimate catastrophe. Japan and China "In the Far East, the second centre of eruption, the crisis is approaching rather more slowly. Japan is advancing inexorably to carve out her Empire from the prostrate body of China. Sha is determined to drive the Western Powers from the entire region of tha Western Pacific. She is driven forward by a mystic impulse which takes no account of financial obstacles. But she ia isolated, ami the danger of a war with the Soviet Union in which Japan must be uncertain of the result makes her step heavy.

"There may yet be time for Britain to reach an amicable compromise with Japan. If that should prove impossible, tension is bound to increase until an explosion takes place; either in the form of a Chinese national rising, or by an unexpected outbreak of SovietJapanese hostilities, or, again, by a sudden Japanese thrust against the strongholds of Britain and the United States. The chances are that Japan will defer her final assault until the tempest breaks in Europe. "If ever Russia should be involved in war on her western frontier..Japan will be strongly tempted to attack Russia in the East. An understanding" between Japan and Germany in regard to the timing of their respective plana is, indeed, always a latent possibility which disturbs the sleep of the Soviet rulers. "Wherever we follow the volcania belt of the political world to-day, but especially in the three mast dangerous volcanoes of Central Europe, the flJediterranean, and the Far East, it is Great Britain, and she alone, who can yet prevent a disaster if it can be pre* vented at all. It is a noble responsibility which cannot be shirked except at tna grave risk of losing the greatest Jumpiro of all time,"