THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS MONDAY, JULY 6, 1936 THE LEAGUE IN RETREAT

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXXIII, Issue 22463, 6 July 1936, Page 8

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS MONDAY, JULY 6, 1936 THE LEAGUE IN RETREAT

Armies seldom show to advantage in retreat, and the League Assembly suffers in this way as it tries to extricate itself from the conflict with Italy about aggression in East Africa. Dr. van Zeeland, from the chair, has seemingly done his best to impart a little dignity to the closing moments of the sorry business, but even his assertion that delegates have no reason to reproach themselves, that they must now give attention to the future, and that the League must continue, cannot hide the failure or hold out any great hope of living to fight better another day. This end of the Italo-Abyssinian dispute so far as the League is concerned—for what remains to be done cannot now be expected to alter the position—has not a single toifch of heroism. Some may be tempted to excuse the lack of this by saying that the League has no call to be heroic, that its job is to make peace, and therefore, when it finds itself beaten or likely to be. in an endeavour to teach an

to behave, it ought to desist at once. This argument would prove too much. If it have any force, it should prevent the League from ever siding with an oppressed nation unless sure of affording effectual relief. The Covenant was not written in terms so cowardly and absurd. On the contrary, it explicitly names the risks of such endeavour, and pledges its members to stand by each other to share the brunt of conflict. They have done so in this instance, Dr. van Zeeland says. That is going too far. Some of them have not been loyal to the Covenant. Had they all been, there would have been a different tale to tell. Signor Mussolini obviously counted on defections, and they have ignominiously happened. That proves his judgment to have been right. It proves also that, in a task of this sort, the League is no stronger than the fidelity of a number of its members, a number great or small as the case may be. What it does not prove is that one defection, or even a number of defections, ought to be followed by the defection of all the rest. To argue that unanimity in resistance of an aggressor is essential to the undertaking of it is to hand the career of the League over to the doubtful morality of the least civilised of its members.

This absolute way of putting the matter may arouse objection—although it is exactly in conformity with the Covenant —on the ground that it would commit a weak minor-

ity of the League to an impossible and therefore foolish effort. What if one or more among the powerful members stood out 1 What if, as in this very instance, some powerful member, powerful enough to make a considerable breach in the loyal front, showed itself to be fainthearted? This objection has taken the form of a care for " realities." The word is becoming a questionbegging one. Expressed simply, it means that the League should not try to do what it cannot do. That may seem to be common sense. Up to a point, it is. But the League was created to try to do what had never been done before—to provide by collective action a guarantee of secure peace for each and every nation. Its members are severally pledged to make every reasonable effort to accomplish this, whenever any occasion arises. They are not, in the view of their pledges under the Covenant, excused from the attempt even if it may be conspicuously difficult. However, this recourse to so-called "realities" as a basis of judgment on the possibility of success indicates a readiness to say " It cannot be done and therefore it ought not to be tried," and any single nation may thus hold aloof. This is to assume the point at issue—a veritable piece of ques-tion-begging. And the League will never get very far until all its members, or at least all its influential members, look at the matter in a way that regards a moral obligation as the first and most vital of the realities to be considered.

j Because this aspect has been overborne by other considerations, the Assembly's leave-taking of the ItaloAbyssinian dispute is disappointing and unpromising. A perusal of most of the speeches discovers a weak readiness to shelter under the difficulties. It has been left to a few smaller Powers to dissent. They can afford to, it may be said ; but this explanation, if intended to exculpate the greater Powers as having more at stake, reflects little credit upon them, and in effect confirms the view that moral rather than physical weakness is at .the root of the failure. "Timid" is the term applied to the decisions with which the .discussion has ended. In a cloud of words the Assembly retires fi-om the field. History records many epic retreats, but this is not one of them. It can easily be explained—in terms of fear: fear of war, fear for the League's existence, fear that unless this withdrawal be accomplished the whole scheme of collective action will crumble and vanish. Such explanation is to be respected as an appeal to expediency, and on that ground it can be understood. Yet, when the Assembly meets in September to "revise the Covenant in the light of this failure, to revise the Covenant in order to keep the League alive, it may have to admit that its greatest asset—the moral stamina of its members—has been so sadly injured in the present retreat that future rallying and advance will be without enthusiasm.