THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS THURSDAY, MAY 7, 1936 URGENT QUESTIONS

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXXIII, Issue 22412, 7 May 1936, Page 10

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS THURSDAY, MAY 7, 1936 URGENT QUESTIONS

Italy's entry into Addis Ababa raises more questions than it answers. For Abyssinia it appears to mean the end of resistance, although no word of surrender has been uttered as yet by the Ministers to whom the Emperor committed responsibility when he sought sanctuary outside the country. Marshal Badoglio may find that much has to be done before Abyssinia is in secure possession. That is a question to which he must try to find an answer satisfactory to Italy. No doubt he has instructions to lose no time before achieving the victory that the flight of the Emperor has made less difficult. The governors of the various provinces may or may not assist him to find the answer, and the impending rainy season has co be counted on their ■side if they decide to hinder him. To the people of Italy and to

the world Signor Mussolini has declared that the war is ended and that Abyssinia is for ever Italian. But even words so resounding need the crucial confirmation of deeds. It is "a Roman peace," according to him, that is to be established —a peace imposed by force of arms —and if any serious measure of opposition is still offered this peace may prove to be elusive. Let it be supposed, however, that the war is actually ended and this Roman peace established ; there remain questions that cannot be escaped. "During thirty centuries of history Italy has lived many memorable hours," Mussolini has said, "but this is certainly one of the most solemn." Solemn? The word is apt. Even in the moment of national rejoicing he has remembered inevitable questions pressing for early answer, and away from the plaudits he has spoken, to an interviewer, with significant gravity. Two ways are open to him, and neither promises release from care. He may elect to assert sovereignty over Abyssinia regardless of the attitude of other nations or to take steps at once to earn and cultivate, if he can, their goodwill. Choice of the first will invite trouble. A hint of it comes from Washington, where the question of recognition of Italian sovereignty over Abyssinia has been pointedly raised —to be met by a cautious reticence save for the assertion that the Administration adheres to the Stimson policy, enunciated when Japan took militant action in Manchuria, of non-recog-nition of territories acquired by force. European States committed by their co-operation in the League to regard Italy's conquest of Abyssinia as a lawless proceeding are logically bound to share this American attitude. They would utterly stultify themselves if, having been defied by Italy, they were immediately to grant recognition of Italian fiovereignty in the conquered region, and a refusal of recognition may entail disabilities that Italy cannot afford to ignore. That this consideration is not merely academic Signor Mussolini himself has given proof. To his people he has said, naturally enough, "We are ready to defend our smashing victories with the same intrepid determination as that with which we won them," but in a subsequent calm review of the position he has been at pains to declare his desire now to merit other nations' goodwill. He chooses the second road.

This road, however, is not without difficulties—for him any more than for others. It entails a retracing of the steps that took Italy away from co-operation with other League nations, and this means placing himself again in their hands. Since they cannot unconditionally condone Italy'B lawlessness, he must make some concessions. He has begun well by doing more than assure other nations that he will not injure their interests and that Italy has no further colonial ambitions. He has expressed his conviction that the League must continue and his readiness to help in its reorganisation. Even so, the path ahead is difficult. By defying the League to an -extreme limit, and by succeeding in his defiance, he has raised questions too awkward for easy answer. Can it acknowledge a war of conquest as a good title to territory previously recognised as the rightful possession of another nation 1 ? If so, may not other aggressors be encouraged to hope that by similar success they can justify their lawlessness? What then becomes of the League and of every sort of hope of collective security? Can any reorganisation of such means to peace be worth anything at. all, if a premium is put on successful breaches of its fundamental principles? In spite of Signor Mussolini's smooth speech, it is to be feared that he may make demands that will vitiate all efforts to achieve a profitable international understanding. The way back to cooperation, justly and amicably practised, is beset with serious obstacles.