CONTRACT BRIDGE

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXXIII, Issue 22405, 29 April 1936, Page 7

CONTRACT BRIDGE

SAYING THE GAME BIDDING STRATEGY BT FINESSE An interesting bidding situation i which frequently occurs is one where : the choice lies between overbidding your 1 own hand as a sacrifice, or letting the : opponents play the hand at a contract 1 which you think with ordinary luck 1 can be defeated. Most players know the [ situation, and it is very often a very ' knotty one. You don't like to quit as your hand looks so good, and maybe, - after all, the opponents have a freakish ( distribution, and can mnko it. There are innumerable instances where one course would have been right, and plenty of others where it has turned out disadvanttfgeously. The student of psychology, however, can often make capital out of his correct deductions, in this way. When an opponent shows an early wijlingness to 1 "6ave," the astute bidder should be ready to give him every inducement to do so. For this purpose the ideal situation is to bid up to game as quickly and as confidently as possible, as though entertaining no doubt that the game is certain; the opponents aro more likely to make an unsound bid as a sacrifice to save a game which may, - after all, be non-existent. An Illustrative Deal The following deal is an illustration of very clever strategical bidding, which unfortunately came undone; but it was good strategy nevertheless. The hand was played in a duplicate tournament where numerous dodges are often re- ( sorted to in order to get a good matchpoint score: — West, dealer, Neither side vulnerable.

Jacoby, holding the South hand made up his mind at once that the best prospect for a good score was to try to induce the opponents to "save" a probably non-existent North-South game. It was perfectly possiblo that the preponderance of the spades outside South's hand were held by East and West. If they could be induced to try and save at four spades instead of five diamonds South could handle the effort very well. The first step in his campaign was to disclose to his opponents his conviction that a North-South game was sure and that there might be a slam. The extremely psychic cue bid in West's suit served his purpose admirably, as well as indicating that South assumed captaincy for his sido. East, after having dutifully passed on the first round cannot resist the effort to find out whether the spade suit is available for a save before the bidding gets too high. A Logical Consequence South's four heart bid was the logical consequence of his previous phychic bid: he is hoping the fourheart bid will get by undoubled. And how can West fail to make the assist to four spades, as a possible save, and the possible chance of making the contract? The inexperienced North player, however, failed to realise South's masterly cue bid was a command to let South make the choice between doubling an adverse overbid and going on for game or slam. East suddenly perceived what was going on and doubled to forestall a possible fivespade bid by West. The swing through North's failure to give South a chance at the four spades was about 2000 points. The nameless East player who was nearly the goat, but luckily turned out to be the hero of the deal, was very much impressed by Jacoby's stratagem. In a later session of the same tournament he was able to consummate a similar swindle. He sat South in the following deal: North, dealer, North-South vulnerable.

The bidding:— North East South West Pass pass 1 N.T. pass 2 0 pass 2 <9 2 A 3 pass 4 4 A pas* pass double pass pass pass South could not shut his eyes to the fact that West evidently held a long strong suit that he was hoping to make against the no-trump bid. With little prospect of going game in any declaration, South therefore decided to try to induce West to save. But West would surely not overbid a three no-trump contract or o five-diamond try. It would be necessary to convince West that North-South probably had a game in hearts. Appropriate Personalities It must be recorded that South took account of the fact that the personalities around the table were exactly right for the contemplated swindle. North was conservative and could be counted on not to become unduly excited by the holding of strong support for a secondary suit bid by South. East was an extremely stoical player who could be counted on not to warn West of his impending doom. Finally, West was a forward player who could be counted on not to bo over-timid in saving. After South's three-heart bid West could not risk passing. South's subsequent four-heart bid was the logical consequence of the manoeuvre. Obviously, this bid is made possiblo only by the position of the bidding hands. West will have to make up his mind whether to save before East has had a chance to double the hearts, and, of course, South was lucky that his assist to three hearts had gone by East without a double. West, with a hand of such good prospects, can hardly be blamed for falling into the trap. Rather strange bidding, you would say, and I can hardly recommend it for the uninitiated.