THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS MONDAY, APRIL 13, 1936 COLLECTIVE ACTION

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXXIII, Issue 22392, 13 April 1936, Page 8

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS MONDAY, APRIL 13, 1936 COLLECTIVE ACTION

The news from Geneva in the last few days serves to illustrate the difficulties of maintaining the system of collective action. When early in October Italy broke the Leaguo Covenant by commencing hostilities against Abyssinia, it was comparatively easy to secure virtual unanimity in condemnation of the aggressor. There was some falling away when it came to the application of sanctions, and a notable lack of support by all other League members of British preparations in the Mediterranean to meet the threat of Italian retaliation. That failure of collective action was only remedied after a very critical phase had been passed in December. Sir Samuel Hoare was forced to issue the warning that, iinless there were more active co-operation in pressure and in preparations by other States, collective security would vanish and the League dissolve. Even at that, a decision on oil sanctions had to be postponed and it is still being postponed. The two leading League members, Britain and France, have differed all along on the severity of the measures to be taken against Italy. The British view is that there is a clear case against Italy and therefore for the application of effective sanctions against the aggressor. The French are not inclined to push the matter to extremes and plead all sorts of extenuations on behalf of the aggressor. Before accusing France too roundly, Britain should note that the positions are exactly reversed when it comes to Germany and the Rhiineland. Here France is all for observing the letter of the law, the taking of positive action, and the application of sanctions. Here, also, it is Britain that is holding back and advocating moderation.

How this conflict of interests is delaying agreement and therefore action at Geneva has been all too plainly revealed in the discussions of the past few days. Renewed attention has been given to the possibilities of conciliation in the Abyssinian affair, and once again it has been proved that the way of the peacemaker is hard. For Britain Mr. Eden has proposed that hostilities should cease when peace negotiations are started. M. Flandin, for France, counters this with the condition that the cessation of hostilities should be accompanied by the lifting of sanctions. No doubt he is well aware that it would be difficult to re-impose them. At the same time Mr. Eden's proposal can be construed as favouring Abyssinia, as giving the Emperor relief from the relentless pressure of the Italian armies and a breathing 'space in which to rally and reform his shattered forces. A further difference has arisen as to whether; as Mr. Eden still insists, the negotiations / should take place within the framework of the League. That was M. Flandin's original proposal, although France, with some other members, now appears to see more hope of a settlement outside the League. The point is more important than it may seem. A peace negotiated by the League would have to pay respect to League principles, and there is at present little hope of Italy agreeing to that kind of settlement. She has just reasserted that she intends to make a conqueror's terms with Abyssinia. France would therefore be justified in arguing that conciliation cannot at present be achieved through the agency of the League. Anxious as he is for peace, and conscious, also, that peace is a primary considex-ation of the League, Mr. Eden is aware that the sort of settlement that may be possible now would involve the sacrifice of all the principles and ideals Brftam has stood for, at considerable risk to herself, in the past few months. Italy would be allowed to make off with the plunder, might would have triumphed over right, collective action would have yielded to force, and its agent, the League of Nations, be dealt a mortal blow. The suspicion that the League had been quietly shelved in framing the Hoare-Laval plan was enough to condemn it in the eyes of the British public and of most of the world. So Mr. Eden insists on working within the framework of the League. No doubt he is aware that no peace is possible on these lines at present. The League cannot sacrifice its Abyssinian protege to Italian force and Italy will not be content with less. But the negotiations, although sterile, would serve to fexpose the aggressor and reinforce the case for the application of sanctions severe enough to paralyse his action and vindicate the principles of international law and order for which the League stands. Whether Mr. Eden is justified in still hoping for a successful outcome from the application of sanctions or whether, as was suggested in the House of Commons, he is prolonging a ghastly war by "leading the Abyssinians up the garden path," is a question whose answer rests with Geneva. Even at this distance, however, it is clear that the essential condition of collective action is unanimity among League members, a condition that has been shown in the last six months to be difficult to maintain in practice.