THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS THURSDAY, AUGUST 29, 1935 ITALY AND SANCTIONS

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXXII, Issue 22200, 29 August 1935, Page 10

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS THURSDAY, AUGUST 29, 1935 ITALY AND SANCTIONS

Official thought, in all three nations most responsibly concerned about the chief business of the League Council next week, is still centred on the question of sanctions. The maximum action to which Britain is likely then to be committed is said to be the proposing, in certain conditions, that there be a refusal to supply Italy with raw materials and credits. Even this, however, it is hoped may be avoided by a joint Franco-British resolution, in spite of some political pressure in both France and Britain for an agreement hampering the consignment to Italy of essential supplies. Neither country is happy about the prospect of facing the necessity, in terms of the League Covenant, of imposing an economic boycott in the event of a finding that Italy merits drastic treatment as an aggressor. Signor Mussolini—who is Italy—is understood to have said that, if sanctions in any form are imposed, Italy will leave the League, and that sanctions in an extreme form will be resisted with all Italy's force by land, sea and air. All three nations assume—even Italy, in spite of Mussolini's bold words about his case against Abyssinia—that the finding of the Council will be adverse to that case, and thus inevitably lead to discussion of recommendations to Governments on the measures of restraint to be unitedly adopted. Mussolini's reported reference to three possible degrees of sanctions — moral, economic and military—touches the question closely. "Sanction" is a wide word. Properly, as in its current general use, it covers a, reward as well as a penalty, and popular usage inclines to employ it to mean practical, authoritative approval. In a legal context it has tended to go the other way, and in international law it has become a synonym for punishment applied by a group of States to compel the obedience of its members. Thus it is a handy word to express in brief the provisions of the League Covenant for exerting pressure on an aggressor to desist from unwarranted assault. Even in this use it is still wide, wider even than the three degrees of Mussolini's reference. It goes all the way from "public opinion" in a vague sense to the waging of war.

The most extreme form had not to wait for the coming of the League Covenant and its somewhat indefinite envisaging of an international effort to enforce peace. War had before been waged in concert against an aggressor, and the fear of such concerted action had been the safeguard of some nations in fear of unpleasant neighbours. There had grown, too, an influence of the milder form of sanctions; a national desire to stand well in the eyes of the world became evident, along with the progress of the ideal of peace and the associated material advantage of friendly commercial relations. To be able to look themselves and others in the face, either for soul satisfaction or for the benefit of good repute as a basis of trade, was given increasing consideration. It was an inevitable development accompanying the arrival of wider and speedier communications, and in accordance with their varying degrees of contact nations shaped their policies to comply with it—'save for an occasional harking back to the old bad order, not yet entirely outgrown. In the .League this development has reached corporate shape, far from perfect but in a definite embodiment. It is weak yet, because itlacks universal acceptance and the earlier nationalism tends to revert to type; nevertheless, there is ground for hope that it will survive and strengthen. For this time of transition the League doubtless represents the best that can be done, but the besetting difficulties of its peace programme are realised when, as now, a State in membership menaces the whole fabric of collective security by determining to go its own way in compelling the subservience of another. The League stands, because of its arising ahead of a perfected moral sense in peoples, for a contractual use of sanctions. Landmarks of the ethical immaturity are its Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance, the Geneva Protocol and some of the Locarno Pacts. These, whether brought to acceptable shape or not, were all framed on the obvious necessity to fashion means to ensure a keeping of the peace by those that might not want to keep it. Of their order are the articles of the League Covenant providing sanctions, and the whole range of these—from the vote of censure that Mussolini will violently resent, up through the severance of diplomatic relations and the imposing of economic boycott, to the extreme of belligerent pressure —betoken the persisting need to have, peace " with teeth in it" as the only practicable sort.

It has been impressively argued that the only reasonable view of sanctions is one that allows of their being flexible in operation, that they ought to be provided in organic connection with the enlarging Society of Nations and applied varyingly as this progress proceeds. Satisfactorily sound in theory, this view has only academic interest at present. Had the League become universal, or even continued to hold the allegiance of a majority of the Great Powers, the ideal employment of sanctions would have been easily practicable. But thinking has now to be done, and done quickly, in terms of hard facts. There is no widespread ethical appreciation of peace, it must be confessed ; dread of war ought not to be mistaken for that. Therefore, pending the growth of such deep regard for universal amity, and with a care that the growth of it be not impeded, the other dominant Powers in the League are set an embarrassing task by Italy's declaration of resentful anger at the suggestion of sanctions of any sort. The question remains perplexing, in spite of the language of the Covenant, and only the probability that, after all, Mussolini will value the goodwill of the world as profitable for Italy, prevents despair of a peaceful outcome. He may realise that there is a powerful form of sanction not to be countered by even all Italy's force by land, sea and air.