THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS TUESDAY, AUGUST 27, 1935 MUSSOLINI'S CASE

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXXII, Issue 22198, 27 August 1935, Page 8

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS TUESDAY, AUGUST 27, 1935 MUSSOLINI'S CASE

The case that Italy will present to the League Council next week is said to have been made public, at least as to its main features, in a press interview accorded by Signor Mussolini. It is possible to anticipate that case without giving credence to all the details reported. Some of them are so wide of the facts that even Mussolini's desire to prove that he is right would scarcely betray him into so extravagant a statement. Nevertheless, when these details are neglected enough remains in accord with his previous utters.nces to enable readers to judge his attitude. This residue, not inconsiderable, is worth study. It reveals him as unbending in his determination to ignore foreign opinion of his purpose to crush Abyssinian opposition, and his acknowledged motives, while complex, resolve themselves into the simple aim of making Italy dominant in East Africa. If he can do this with British and French approval, and therefore with endorsement by the League—expressed or tacit —well and good ; but as he can cherish no reasonable hope of this he proceeds, in characteristic fashion, to issue threats of military measures against opponents, even if these act in conformity with a League decision. It is evident, however, that he is not insensible of the risks he runs in defying an adverse foreign judgment. This realisation emerges from his reiterated claim that Italy is merely bent on "a colonial expedition," justified by a need for oversea settlement of Italians unable to enjoy economic welfare in their own country or elsewhere in Italy's African possessions. This intention, he asserts, can be realised without injury to Abyssinia : indeed, he claims that it will confer a benefit by creating order where order has never existed. In arguing so he has taken a leaf out of Japan s book when defending before the League Council her campaign in Manchuria, and no doubt expects to use that precedent effectually when the rights and wrongs of his contention are traversed at Geneva. This is his mail} thesis, to be possibly developed by the associated instance's and illustrations now credited to him, but advanced with a show of reason even without their citation.

There is an effective answer to this line of argument. When Abyssinia was admitted to League membership in 1923 Italy was one of the sponsors for the application and then her spokesman officially enlarged on the strides Abyssinia had taken toward full status as a civilised nation. It is true that Abyssinia's progress, particularly in the extirpation of slavery, has not gone the whole length of success, but on the League files is evidence of sympathetic appreciation of the difficulties faced and the considerable advance made. If it should take the Italian people, as Mussolini now says, 50 years to "civilise Abyssinia," the prophesied slowness of the process may be as reasonably attributed to disabilities on the part of the Italians, never conspicuously successful in such a task, as to innate defects in the Abyssinians. And the proposed methods of subdual to order, which include —according to Italian testimony—a summary vengeance for the defeat suffered 40 years ago at Adowa, hardly comport with the beneficent purpose now professed. But these considerations, inescapable though they are, are aside from the outstanding fact that Italy is bound by a succession of explicit treaties to respect the political integrity and independence of Abyssinia. Supposing conditions to have materially altered since these covenants were solemnly made, they surely ought to be honoured, and could be ma.de a basis of modified policy, if need be, instead of being abruptly thrust aside by one of their contracting parties in a -sudden and solitary aggression. When Mussolini declares "We cannot draw back now" he disregards the fact that his own wordn have inflamed Italy and his own plans have precipitately placed Italy on the offensive. Abyssinia has been, and still is, consistently eager for League adjudication, whereas Italy, at almost every point, has evaded this. The inference is obvious.

Among the signs of Mussolini's nervousness about the League's view is his emphasis on the need for French support of his case, a fact sufficiently plain without his calling attention to it. He manifests a like anxiety with reference to the origin of the dispute in December last when, near the wells of Walwal, a sanguinary clash occurred. This incident is to be subject of a report by a commission to the League Council, and from the sworn testimony of British officials as eye-witnesses of what took place Mussolini is aware that Italy may be severely blamed. It is to this risk he refers when he says he is sending a delegation to the Council meeting, with "documents and photographs" disproving the anticipated charge. If, as seems highly probable, the finding is condemnatory, the rest of his case will be weakened. Yet, should Italy be exculpated, this will not condone the campaign of overwhelming reprisals he has initiated. As a member of the League, Italy was bound to proceed by other means to have the alleged grievance ventilated and to abide by the finding of the appropriate tribunal. Evasion of this, in the face of Abyssinia's willingness to accept such adjudication, has put Italy in the wrong, and Mussolini's case is not improved but damaged by the elaborate plans for violent national redress. Apparently, in a dread of sanctions thwarting these plans, he declares that even a vote of censure will cause Italy to leave the League, thus trying to browbeat the Council before it meets. Foreign observers are almost compelled to read into this a virtual confession of guilt,, ~,