HAIG'S WAR DIARIES

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXXII, Issue 22197, 26 August 1935, Page 5

HAIG'S WAR DIARIES

By A. Duff Cooper—Copyright to the New Zf.aland Herald.

DEADLOCK ON WESTERN FRONT PLANNING FIRST OFFENSIVE

WITH the opening of the year 1915 the melancholy conviction began to force itself upon the minds of those who were responsible for the conduct of the war that the hope of an early decision on the Western Front no longer existed. Simultaneously there arose among the military and civil authorities on either side two conflicting schools of military strategy. On the one hand there wore those who, with whatever forbodings, gravely accepted the grim prospect of a long strugglo in the main arena, entailing slaughter and sacrifice beyond anything previously contemplated, and only terminating when one of the protagonists was reduced to accepting whatever terms were dictated. There were, on the other hand, some who refused to admit to their minds so fearful a conclusion. Wars had not been so mercilessly fought out in the past; why should the present one prove an exception? Genius could find out a way, closed to the purblind vision of military experts, which would take the professional strategists by surprise and prove a sure and easy road to victory. For the next four years these rival schools of thought strove with one another for predominance in the councils of war. The majority of the trained soldiers leaned toward the former theory, but a large number of the more active-minded politicians adopted the latter. Thev knew enough of tlie subject to be aware that the main principle in strategy is to turn the opponent's think. Assuming that this was no longer possible on the line that was held from

March probably would find us ready, and the ground in a fit state for attacking over it. "He said General Jotl're had written suggesting the same move as 1 was engaged in preparing. "1 said 1 hoped that Gough would not be taken away for a division while I was i.n the midst of organising this operation. He agreed and said he would see my wish would have lull consideration." But on the following day Gough was to obey a more imperious summons. Visiting his old battalion of the Rifle Brigade in the vicinity of the front line, he was struck by a stray bullet and two days later he was dead. It was a loss to Haig, not only of a wise counsellor, but also of a dear friend. The next morning Sir William Robertson camo to discuss the date of the offensive. "Ho told me that the French Parliament was pressing that General Joffre should gain ground and do something." That vague demand for undefined action was to come with increasing regularity from more than one Parliament during the next four years and was to be varied only by criticism of such action as the demand produced. "Sir John has decided that we must do something about March 7, and 'it must be an offensive on a big scale.' I replied that owing to the water-logged state of the ground March 10 would be the very earliest date for my main attack, and even then we had only the means to carry out a small operation." Haig's prognostication proved exact. Henceforward, March 10 was the date toward which he worked, and the date on which the attack was delivered. Preparations went on with increasing intensity as the date approached. Every day Haig visited the officers upon whom the principal responsibility would rest and impressed upon them above everything the importance of

the North Sea to the Swiss frontier, they argued that it was necessary to go beyond these limits and by winning a decisive victory in the east render tho position of tho Central Powers in the west no longer tenable. There could be little doubt which of the two contending theories would recommend itself to the mind of Sir Douglas Haig. Bv nature orthodox-, his profound studies of military history and science had strengthened his belief in the main tenets of military theory laid down by the great writers and practised by the great captains of the past. When, therefore, it was suggested to him that Great Britain's military effort should be directed toward more than one theatre of war, he had no hesitation in forming his opinion of such a proposal. The first that he heard of it was at a conference with the Com-mander-in-Chief on January 4. "Sir John French read a letter from K. in which the latter hinted that the new army might be used better elsewhere than on the French frontier. A suggestion has been made of co-opera-ting with Italy and Greece. "I said that we ought not to divide our military force, but concentrate on the decisi r e point which is on this frontier against the German main army. With more guns and ammunition and more troops, the Allies were bound in the end to defeat the Germans and break through." To this opinion he steadfastly adhered for tho next four years. Battle Suggestions Early in February, Haig was asked to submit to G.H.Q. suggestions for an offensive, and he sent in his reply on the 12th. He recommended that:— "(a) The First Army be reinforced with a corps and all available heavy guns and howitzers. "(b) Neuve Chapclle bo attacked—(bombard and storm). "(c) Efforts should at once bo made to enlarge the gap thus made in the enemy's line by capturing tho Bois du Biez and pushing forward to Aubers village and ridge, and if possible to Fromelles village with tho object of reaching the line Klies-Hcrlies. "(d) The French should be invited to co-operate by moving from the southwest toward Haisnes and against tho south of La Bassoe." A few days later these proposals received the approval of Sir John French, and Haig learned subsequently that they coincided with striking similarity with a plan of attack independently put forward by General Joffro. Tho forthcoming battle was to be tho first of those long-prepared, carefully co-ordinated offensives which were to prove the principal feature of tho war. And as it was the first, so also it proved the model upon which all tho others were moulded. It has been claimed that if Napoleon had been present ho would have found another and a better way, hut Napoleon was not present and the principal Generals of the two greatest militnty nations on the Continent could discover little during the next four years that had not been thought of by Douglas Haig in making his preparations for this the first of tho great offensives. Henceforth every day was dovotcd to tho task of preparation. There were continual conferences with Corps Commanders, continual inquiries as to tho needs of the different divisions, as to the most suitable location for artillery and us to the lie of the land and the state of the ground. "The C.G 8. (Hobertson) came to see me about one o'clock to tell me that full approval had been given by the C.-in-C. for the operations which I had suggested, so I could push on now as fast as possible. "In reply to his questions as to possible date, I said that all depended on tho weather. The rain of last Sunday flooded the country again, and threw operations back a week. But I said the end of the second week in

making it plain to every subordinate exactly what his own part was to bo. Each evening he would enter in his diary the opinion ho had formed of tho character and capacity of tho officers lie had interviewed. The last general conference with regard to the forthcoming attack took place on March 5. Haig's new Chief of General Staff, General I?. Butler, who had succeeded Gough accompanied him, and also General Mercer, his Chief of Koyal Artillery. There were present as well as the three Corps Commanders and their principal staff officers, the Commanders of the 7th, Bth and of the Meerut Divisions—a total of 24. "The following is a summary of my remarks: — "1. We were embarking on a serious offensive movement with the object of breaking the German line. There is no idea of merely taking a trench here or a trench there. "My object is to surprise tho Germans, and push forward to the AubcrsHauto Pommerau ridge with as little delay as possible, and exploit the success gained by pushing forward mounted troops as quickly as possible, so as to threaten La Bassee from tho N.E., in which direction there arc now no forti-. fications. Offensive the Keynote "Tho keynote of all the work is offensive action. Bombing parties must act offensively, trying to get forward on to the flanks. Infantry will advance first to enemy's front trenches, then beyond the village, next to Bois du Biez and Aubers ridge. Commanders must therefore consider the employment of their reserves so as to maintain tho forward movement. . . . "2. At the same time the principles of securing tho ground already gained must not be overlooked. "Any one of the following lines may be required to bo held to meet a coun-ter-attack. "(a) Tho main lino of enemy's trenches. "(b) Line Port Arthur-eastern edge of Neuve Chapelle-moatod grange. "(c) The eastern edge of tho Bois du Biez-Alibers. "3. It may be necessary to advance the operations to a date before tho'lOth, either on account of the French situation on our right, or on account of the Germans anticipating us by attacking first. "With reference to this: "(a) Gradually concentrate corps further forward so as to bo able to act at once. "(b) Should our lino near Neuve Chapclle bo attacked, divisional and brigade commanders must be ready to defeat tho attack and then push forward at once on the heels of tho retreating enemy. . . . "4. Tho Ist Corps and 7th Division must be ready to push in at any period oven on the first morning of tho attack. Arrangements must bo made for artillery support with a view to this eventuality. " Tho naturo of the artillery bombardment was discussed, and after hearing all sides I decided that the total period of bombardment is to bo forty minutes. ILawlinson and Davics (commanding Bth Division) thought it would be well to stop for the day after reaching the east edge of the village. " I said ' No ' The effect of the fire of Ibis great mass of artillery which we must use must be most demoralising, consequently our advineo must he as rapid as possible, in order to take full advantage of the surprise and temporary demoralisation caused by such a sudden and heavy bombardment. " If we delay the enemy will be given time to bring up reserves of all kinds, including guns; consequently, if we delay, we must have a fresh bombardment!" To-morrow's Instalment describes the Battle of Neuve Ohapelle.