FRENCH REBUKES HAIG

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXXII, Issue 22193, 21 August 1935, Page 15

FRENCH REBUKES HAIG

SUBSEQUENT APOLOGY MADE

KITCHENER TO THE RESCUE BT DUFF COOPEE HAIG realised with regret that his infantry -would not be in a condition to take the field until they had a few hours' rest in order to recover from the incredible exertions of the last few days. But he was most anxious to lend our French Allies such assistance as was in his power in the pending attack on the exposed flank of the German south-west of St. Quentin. Accordingly he despatched the following message to G.H.Q.: " Reference request by General Lanrezac for support of our First Corps on left of attack which begins at 5.30 a.m. to-morrow, I replied that infantry must have day's rest but that support by the whole firtillery and machineguns of the corps with suitable infantry escort could be given provided Field-Marshal approves. " Infantry would be ready to support to-morrow evening and in any case could join in pursuit. " Please telephone Sir John French's instructions. I consider infantry will be able to go forward after twentyfour hours' rest."

Having sent off the message at 7 p.m., Haig invited Captain Helbronner to dine with him while'awaiting the reply. It was not slow in coming and was to the following effect: " Commander-in-Chief does not approve of any active operations on the part of our First Corps to-morrow and has already ordered a halt for one day's rest."

Opportunity Lost To a further request that he might be authorised to give merely artillery support, the reply came: " The Com-mander-in-Chief repeats the order that no active operations of any arm except of a defensive nature will be undertaken to-morrow."

So the first opportunity for successful co-operation between the Allies was missed. On the following day General Lanzerac scored a considerable success, hut no British troops took part in the action and no British regiment can include the Battle of Guise among its battle honours.

August 29 was designed to be a day of rest for the British, but it did not prove one for the Commander of the First Corps. At 5 a.m. he was aroused by the following message from G.H.Q., " Please be good enough to inform C.-in-C. how it was that any confidential promise of support of First Corps was made to General Lanzerac or why any official exchange of ideas was initiated without authority from headquarters." To this hasty and ill-tempered protest conveyed by telegraph Haig replied in a confidential letter dated 7 a.m.: "I do not understand what you mean. I have 'initiated no official exchange of ideas.' " G.H.Q. not having secured from the French roads for the retirement of my corps, I had for my own safety to enter into relations with the nearest French force on my right. As far as it was possible 1 have maintained touch with the left of these French troops—and due to the presence of this corps their left has been protected ever since we left Maubeuge. Haig's Devastating Keply "My corps in its present position still protects their left, and if the enemy advances from St. Quentin southwards, I shall have for my own safety to deploy guns, etc., without asking for.the authority of G.H.Q. to do so. " The extrication of this corps from the false position in which it was placed still demands the greatest exertion from us all, and my sole objective is to secure its retreat with honour to our arms. I, therefore, beg you will not give credit to such allegations as the one under reference without first ascertaining whether it is true or not." This reply was devastating and left French with no alternative but to apologise, which he did verbally at their next meeting. This took place on the afternoon of the same day, Haig being compelled to drive thirty-five miles on a bad and hilly road, and back again, in order to attend a conference at Compiegne, where it was decided that the retreat must be continued. The next day the retreat continued and Corps Headquarters that night were in a chateau two miles southwest of Soissons. It was anticipated that the Germans would make a great effort on September 1 to commemorate in a suitable manner the victory of Sedan. In point of fact, although the fighting was sever'? and the losses of the 4th (Guards) Brigade in a heroic rearguard action were very heavy, the end of the day, during which a further stage in

the retreat had been accomplished, seemed to leave the situation materially unaltered. But three events of first-class importance for the future conduct of the "war had actually taken place. French, as has been seen from his action on the night, of August 28, had reached a state of mind in -which he could only think of the preservation of his own force. He had abandoned any immediate intention of further co-opera-tion with his Allies and decided to retire altogether from the fighting line, to retreat to the south of the Seine and with his base at La Rochelle to await future developments.

Kitchener was horrified at French's decision, and the British Cabinet shared his dismay. In the very early morning, therefore, of September 1, he left London for Paris, where he met French in the course of the day. The result of their conversation was that French abandoned his previously declared purpose of quitting the fighting line, and agreed to conform to the best of his cbilities to the -wishes of Joffre and the movements of the French Army.

On the previous day the extreme right Tving of the invading host, the First German Army, under Kluck, definitely altered the line of their advance from a southern to a southeasterly direction. German Plan Miscarries

It is said that Schlieffen, the originator of the plan of campaign, exclaimed on his death-bed, " It must come to a fight. Only make the right wing strong," and we have seen how strong it was when the British Army first encountered it on August 23. But Moltke, the German Commander-in-Chief, instead of strengthening had weakened it. In spite of the victory at Tannenberg on August 28, no troops had been transferred from the eastern to the western front; in spite of the failure of the First and Second French Armies in their attacks on the left of the German line, no reinforcements had been sent to the right. The result was that that strong right fist was no longer so firmly clenched. And so the original grand conception of the vast sweeping movement that was to have brought the extreme right to the south of the Seine and to have included Paris in its huge embrace was abandoned in favour o? a little stab that seemed for the moment to promise an easier and swifter victory.

A further important decision was taken on September 1, which was to have some influence on the events to come. Joffre decided to reinforce the troops defending Paris, which he did to the extent of incorporating the whole of the Sixth Army and one corps of the Third Army with its garrison; and at the same time he advised the Government to leave for Bordeaux. Canny Scots

They did so on the following day. The result was that on September 2 General Gallieni, the Military Governor of Paris, had fewer politicians at his elbow and more troops under his command.

For four more days the long retreat continued. At Faremoutiers, three miles south-west of Coulommiers, the "night passed quietly except for attack by troops of Uhlans on an outpost of the Black Watch near Aulnoy. Canny Scots, they had stretched a strand of barbed wire across the main road so that when the German horsemen charged down and tried to gallop through the picket in the dark the horses tripped up, eight Uhlans were killed and the officer was captured." On September 5 troops marched as usual at 3 a.m. in a south-westerly direction toward Melun. The day was cooler and there was more life in the men. At the village of Maries Haig paused for breakfast, which he had with bis staff in an orchard adjoining the church. It was while he was sitting there under the trees that Major Dawnay arrived with a message from the Com-mander-in-Chief. It contained the information, long-desired, that on the morrow the Allied Forces were to turn on their pursuers. "The Army on September 6 will advance eastwards with a view to attacking." Long Ordeal Over "No words," wrote Haig, " could have been more welcome to the troops. For thirteen days, broken only by a short rest at St. Gobain, the First Corps had retreated without a check and had fought a continuous series of rearguard actions, some of them serious, " The total distance covered was not less than 160 miles and there was not a man in the force who had not covered considerably more than this distance. "The total losses in action throughout this period were 81 officers and 2180 non-commissioned officers and men. " These figures, however, give no idea of the demands which were made upon the force under my command. The actual fighting was the least of our difficulties." But now at last the retreat was over, the bitter pilgrimage had reached its bourne, and that night the Army slept, with the thought of battle and the hope of victory in their hearts. To-morrow further extracts from the diaries will tell of Haig's part in the Battle o! the Marne