THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS WEDNESDAY, JUNE 26, 1935 GERMANY AND SUBMARINES

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXXII, Issue 22145, 26 June 1935, Page 10

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS WEDNESDAY, JUNE 26, 1935 GERMANY AND SUBMARINES

A pledge concerning the use of submarines is being sought by Britain from Germany in connection with the naval agreement still under discussion. The requested pledge includes an undertaking that German submarines will not attack British merchantmen. Further, it' is being asked that British vessels in distant seas shall be immune from attack by the German Navy. Both requests relate to the Empire's marine security, about which anxiety is felt as a result of Germany's programme of naval construction. This programme, as embodied in the agreement and explained by the representatives of the German Government, allows large latitude in the matter of submarines. While, "in principle," Germany is prepared to accept a ratio of 35 to 100 in reference to the British Navv in the total of all categories, this is not to apply in practice to submarines: she reserves the right to possess a tonnage equal to that of the Empire, and although promising that this German submarine tonnage shall not usually exceed 45 per cent she will avail herself of the right to a higher percentage "in the event of a situation arising which in her opinion makes it necessary." That is, when principle is reduced to expedient practice, Germany will (1) build submarines in preference to other craft, (2) ordinary be content with a total submarine tonnage equal to 45 per cent of the Empire's (3) increase that tonnage indefinitely whenever, in her own judgment, circumstances necessitate addition to it. No wonder the British' Government is asking for something beyond this. It is one of the points crying out for review after the first flush of satisfaction with the agreement. The German Government's spokesman declines, with good reason, to answer without consulting his superiors; offering only an intimation of German willingness to abide by any international agreement—an offer of little worth so far as submarines are meant. No concluded treaty touches the question to any purpose. At Washington j (1921-22) the British proposal for j "the total and final abolition of sub- j marines" had no support, even from ! the United States, and the best that j could there be done was to draft an inoperative agreement on limits to a submarine's right of attack on a merchant vessel. At London (1930) certain meagre restrictions on the displacement and gun-calibre of submarines were framed. Both the Washington and the London treaties are now without prospective utility, and apparently German enthusiasm to forgo submarine warfare is not fervent.

This German clinging to submarines is a disappointing feature of the naval agreement. When Mr. MacDonald, as Prime Minister, commented on the German Government's deliberate breach of the peace treaty by determining to have submarines, he said "The German decision to build submarines is ominous," and suggested that its gravity could not be minimised. Behind his serious words were years of sinister history: the inhuman conduct of the U-boats in the course of the World War was unanimously execrated at Washington, in "spite of a prevalent disinclination to ban submarines altogether, and whenever discussion takes place on this kind of belligerent craft memory will involuntarily hark back to that frightfulness. Britain suffered unforgettably through' it, and nothing so moved Americans to make common cause with the Allies as its shameful excess in the unwarned sinking of the Lusitania, an unarmed passenger ship, with the loss of nearly 1200 lives, of men, women and children, including 124 citizens of the United States. For Germany to set about the creation of another such naval unit was an extreme challenge of the peace treaty, in spite of all that may be advanced in extenuation. Submarines are not primarily a means of defence, and the arguments employed at Washington in favour of this use have since b<?en overthrown by expert testimony. They are of little avail in the protection of surface vessels. Why, then, did Germany resolve on their construction 1 Part of the answer, it has been suggested, is supplied by Hitler s anger when the League condemned Germany''3 conscription decree; he immediately took the most portentous step of defiance. But this answer does not explain all the facts now known These submarines were already on order, and their dimensions indicated that they were _to be used chiefly as training units. They were vessels of 250 tons surface displacement, with a speed of 17 knots and a cruising endurance at low speed of 4000 miles; effective enough for some exploits, but not comparable with those made the subject of limiting clauses in the London Treaty armament in proportion, including guns of 5.1 inch calibre. Evidence has been forthcoming to prove that this was the beginning of a construction programme of considerable dimensions.

No doubt, as the negotiations proceed. the German Government will point out that Russia has undertaken mass production of submarines, the German allegation—no exact figures are available—being that the Soviet Government has built

more than 40. of medium size, in the last two years. Probably it will also be urged that other Baltic Powers Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Poland, Latvia, Esthonia and Finland all possess submarines, to a total of nearly 60. But the argument may be expected to go further, including the number of such craft, already built or being completed, owned by Powers of wider sea-range: France, 109; United States, 89; Japan, 68; Italy, 66 ; Great Britain, 61. Claiming "equality" as essential, the German Government may well affect amazement at its own moderation in view of these figures, and make light of the evident activity in preparing submarine equipment that has been going on for some time in German factories and in calling up ex-service men as trainers in the U-boat schools. These matters will be of supreme moment when the Anglo-German agreement is made the basis of further naval negotiations of general extent. In the meantime, without explicit reference to them, there is ample warrant for Britain's asking for the particular pledge in connection with the peaceful service of the Empire's mercantile marine.