THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS MONDAY, OCTOBER 8, 1934 ITALY'S FOREIGN POLICY

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXXI, Issue 21925, 8 October 1934, Page 8

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS MONDAY, OCTOBER 8, 1934 ITALY'S FOREIGN POLICY

In this time of clashing national policies no decisions are more crucial than those of Italy, which are, in point of fact, the decisions of Signor Mussolini. His speech at Milan on foreign affairs is consequently to be given heed as of more than ordinary importance. It touches many subjects now creating general anxiety. Beyond them are others, but in his perspective they are relatively negligible : he thinks usually iin terms of Europe and particularly that part of Europe in which his own country is geographically and politically set. Some allowance must !be made for this fact when assessing the value of his comments and declarations. The Far East must be included in every complete prognosis of early developments ; the aims and methods of the Soviet* Government count for much ; the part being played, or not played, 'by the United States, is a factor to be noted; and British folk need make no apology for believing that their Homeland and its offspring can yet exercise a power in the world. But to Mussolini's point of view it can be conceded that the range to which, it is specifically limited at the moment covers the zone of urgent interests. If the troubles of Europe can be remedied the rest can be put right with much less difficulty, iand these troubles of Europe relate chiefly to problems of concern to Italy. Some of them are more palpable than others, but all are deepiseated iin fears and hopes, friendships and animosities, long enduring, although the war partially changed their character. Its redrawing of the map of Europe, meant as that redrawing was to achieve peace through justice, gave new turns to national thought, and some of these ,are as intensely Contentious as ever. They are mainly occupied with the question of treaty revision. German pressure for this has aroused an antipathy of fear in France, and the French attitude is endorsed by the i&ountnies of' the Little Entente—•Czecho Slovakia, Rumania and Yugoslavia—now making a claim to be treated in combination as another great Power in Europe. Because Italy is known to favour treaty revision, with its consequent likelihood of altering boundaries, the Little Entente is restive, and the Yugoslavian action of which Mussolini complains is prompted by a desire to assume a bold front. His resentment naturally takes a serious tone. This resentment, however, is fortunately accompanied by a moderate statement —moderate in spite of the colourful expression to which he is addicted—ori the European situation as he views it. Those asking for an avowal of Italy's intentions will be reassured by his words—all except the rabid Nazi leaders in Germany. Their designs on Austria have not been abandoned, ft is unlikely that they ever will be. The racial basis of the Nazi programme is the asserted right to attach to the Reich all Germans across the border as well as to keep Germany for the Germans. Hence the deliberate and vigorous purpose of adding Austria to German territory, a I purpose so heroically opposed by Dollfuss that the angered Nazi leaders took steps that brought about, whether or no they intended this, the assassination of the courageous little Chancellor. Against; this purpose of German dominance over Austria Mussolini has been unswervingly set, probably, because of his objection to the encroachment of another and inferior brand of Fascism as near as • the actual Italian fronter; he does not relish the idea of having Hitler as a next-door neighbour. His influence in this matter has done much to safeguard the peace of Europe; a Nazi Austria incorporated in Germany would jeopardise many adjacent national interests, reduce the possibilities of an amicable settlement of the questions disturbing the Danubian and Balkan regions, and add greatly to French apprehensions. But Mussolini has, not unnaturally, been charged with designs to make Austria an Italian protectorate. II: this were his intention, the upshot would certainly be provocative. France, Poland, the Little Entente and other countries would have almost as much reason for alarm as from Austria's absorption by Germany. Mussolini's emphatic disavowal of any such intention should allay disquiet and enable international assistance of Austria to proceed without dislocation. As things are, Austria is a chief fric-tion-point in Europe, and an Italian assurance that Austrian independence will be upheld is just now more, valuable than anything else in European affairs could be. Important in their own way, although less definite, are Signor Mussolini's announcements with reference to Germany, France and Switzerland. Refusing to countenance the Nazi policy of dominating Austria, he is nevertheless the friend of all legitimate German endeavours to achieve national prosperity. In this he shares the opinion, axiomatic in all reasonable discussion of European affairs, that a weak and impoverished Germany means a serious slowing of general economic recovery. There is nothing i'resh in this, but the facts call for a restatement of it. Hitler's handling of Germany'a economic plight has been disastrous. His promises have not } been fulfilled. To every claim of im-

provement a pathetic answer has been forthcoming in official, admissions whenever details! of foreign indebtedness—quite apart from reparations —have been the subject of investigation. The outlook is grave, and it is made worse by some of the national activities associated with the Nazi programme of racial aggression. The decision to keep Germany aloof from international fraternity is aggravating the evil; the pacts made with neighbours cannot compensate for the breach made by withdrawal from the League. In this situation, produced almost wholly by German folly, there in a danger of offhand readiness to let Germany go o'n down the lonely lane until worse happens. Mussolini's caveat against that is timely,, whatever be the difficulty of giving it practical force in Germany's present mood. His declaration concerning improvement in Franco-Italian relations is still more apposite. If this be so, the constant risk of quarrel between France and Italy may soon be reduced sufficiently to admit a working agreement among the chief European Powers. Competition between these two in Mediterranean policies has long been a menace to general peace; it vitiated the London naval treaty and has embarrassed other attempts to reach amicable understanding. Should Mussolini's forecast be realised, within a few weeks the prospect of peace in Europe will have brightened and his talk of rifles decorated with bayonets be forgotten.