UNION MEMBERSHIP

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXXI, Issue 21845, 6 July 1934, Page 13

UNION MEMBERSHIP

POWER OF EXCLUSION PROVISION IN RULES WELLINGTON APPEAL CASE [BY TELEGRAPH —PRESS ASSOCIATION] WELLINGTON, Thursday The Court of Appeal to-day beard an appeal by tbe Wellington Waterside Workers' Industrial Union against a decision of Mr. Justice Heed, given at Wellington 011 May 23, in an action brought by William Henry Hargreaves, of Wellington, a waterside worker. Hargreaves had applied for admission to membership of the union, but had been refused admission in April of this year. Alleging that he found it almost impossible to obtain work on the waterfront in view of his lack of membership, he brought an action against the union, claiming a writ of mandamus to compel it to enrol him, and £SO damages in respect of the loss which he had sustained. The union relied on rules which purported to vest 111 the executive an absolute discretion to refuse membership to any applicant. The action was heard in Wellington on May 15, and in his judgment, Mr. Justice Reed held that Hargreaves was entitled to the writ of mandamus asked for, and also awarded him £3O damages. Two Questions Involved Broadly, the questions involved in the appeal are whether the union is entitled to provide by its rules that in the unfettered discretion of its executive a person can be excluded from membership, and whether, if a person is so excluded, he is entitled to damages therefor. Mr. M. Gresson (Christchurch) is appearing for the appellant union, and Messrs. Cooke and Shorland for the respondent.

Opening the case for the appellant union, Mr. Gresson stated that there were two questions for decision by the Court—firstly, whether it was intra vires the powers of a union i - egistered under the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act, 1925, to have a membership rule providing that admission to the union should-be subject to the consent of the executive of the union; and, secondly, whether, if the respondent was wrongly excluded from membership, damages could be recovered against the union when no award was in existence, and the preference to unionists did not, therefore, in law, exist, although there was, in fact, preference to unionists.

The Act provided that the rules of the union should provide for, inter alia, a register of members and the mode in which and the terms on which persons should become or cease to be members. Court Reserves Decision Counsel submitted that the provision requiring the approval of the executive was a condition precedent to admission, and, therefore, a term as required by the Act. The trial Judge, he said, was misled in his decision through considering that the rule under the Act was analogous to a by-law. By-laws had to be notified to the public and must be certain and reasonable, but the rules of an industrial union might be as unreasonable as the union desired, provided they did not go outside the scope of the Act and were approved by the registrar. For the respondent Mr. Cooke submitted, firstly, that no terms had been prescribed by the rules, and secondly, that in any event the purpose and object of the statute showed that a rule which conferred power of arbitrary exclusion of an applicant of good character who was engaged in the industry in respect of which the union was registered was ultra vires. A worker was completely at the mercy of the uniou. which might deprive him of hi? natural right to work.

Mr. Shorlnnd contended the evidence showed that the employers, in fact, employed only unionists if such were available. Consequently respondent had suffered damage as a result of his wrongful exclusion from the union. Replying, Mr. Gresson stressed his main submission that approval by the union executive was a term of membership within the meaning of the statute. The only legal right of a worker was to request an emplqyer to utilise his services, and that right had not been infringed by the action of the union executive. The Court reserved decision