THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 14, 1933 THE MONROE DOCTRINE

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXX, Issue 21596, 14 September 1933, Page 8

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 14, 1933 THE MONROE DOCTRINE

Ax interesting reference to Monroe Doctrine has been mad 6 by a Canadian delegate to the Toronto conference now considering the relations of the countries composing the British Empire. He has advanced the view that Canada is inclined to depend in a greater degree for protection upon this doctrine than upon the British Navy. His declaration is rather surprising. It certainly raises questions that call for discussion. Whether it truly represents the great body of Canadian opinion is to be doubted. Probably some of tho implications of his statement would not be generally endorsed by Canadians. Do they regard themselves as so snugly under the ving of the United States that it is a matter of indifference to them whether the defences of the Empire are efficient? Are the terms of the doctrine capable of interpretation in a way giving Canada security under that wing? Can they hold themselves unconcerned with happenings that may threaten the Mother Country, vitally involved in the' affairs of Europe 1 Have their political rights, as well as duties, a paramount-if not sole relationship to the American hemisphere? Unless far-reaching qualifications are made, to say that Canada looks to the Monroe Doctrine for protection is fantastic, and to cite it, as has sometimes been done in the name of the United States, in justification of irresponsibility toward the fato of the Old World, would be utterly un-British. On verbal grounds merely, Canadians may deem their land within the scope of the doctrine, for the whole of "the American continents" was expressly intended to be covered by it; but to base argument for their opinion on phraseology dictated by the circumstances of more than a oentury ago would be fallacious. The doctrine was framed primarily for' the national purposes of the United States. There was a fear that the freedom and independence won would be tendangered by encroachments of European Powers in other parts of the American hemisphere, and on that principle,the doctrine was promulgated to to "any portion of this hemisphere." However, it would be stretching language beyond fact and reason to assert that a menace to the United States would or could now be exerted by way of Canada and that the United Statcß must therefore resent under arms any political development in Canada arising from the Old World.

Laborious efforts have been made in recent times to annotate and expoufid the doctrine, announced by President Monroe in his message to Congress in December, 1823. These efforts have been obviously inspired by a wish to cut away anachronisms and make the declaration fit modern facts. These legal disquisitions have been far from convincing; they explain away so much that what is left is too slender to support the principles they seek to justify as of perennial worth. It was a very different world that gave birth to that message to Congress. In South America, revolted Spanish colonies represented a risk of violent reassertion of Spain's original sovereignty and influence. The Holy Alliance—Austria, Prussia, Russia — was seeking to enforce the divine right of kings. In their determination "to put an end to the system of representative government" these Powers were joined by France. The French restoration of Ferdinand Vll.'s rule in Spain was frankly meant to be followed by the "overthrow of the new Governments erected out of the old colonies of Spain in South America; on the north-west of North America, Russia was aggressive. Naturally the United States became alarmed, and the situation produced the famous protest against the designs of "the allied Powers," with • its refusal to brook "future colonisation by any European Powers" and its pronouncement of aloofness from "the wars of the European Powers in matters relating to themselves." Unless and until American rights were invaded or seriously menaced, those Powers could go their own way. But the world was wide then. Oceans were still barriers, in great measure. Both the need and the practicability of the doctrine —as logically rather than legally consideredhave been reduced to vanishing point. To trust in it as a means of protection is quite absurd—little better than fighting shadows with shadows.

Should Canada decide to rely on the outgrown Monroe Doctrine for defence, there ought to be a> related decision to cut adrift from all political association with the Old World and consequently with the Mother Country, for the doctrine is thus twofold. In his "farewell address," Washington laid down the principles to which the framers of it appealed. "The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations," he said, "is, in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little political connection as possible. . . .

Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none, or a very remote relation. Hence therefore it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves, by artificial ties, in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics, or the ordinary combinations or collisions of her friendships or enmities." Jefferson, advising Monroe, said "Our first and fundamental maxim should bo never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe; our second, never to suffer Europe to intermeddle with cis-Atlantic affnirs." On this double foundation the doctrine was built. Its twin principles are logically inseparable. But facts have played quaint pranks with the logic. History and geography make sport of it. True, it survives, but only as museum specimens survive. Once upon a time the doctrine had value. Nevertheless, "Time makes ancient good uncouth," as a famous American poet has it, and Canada is likely to realise this if ever the doctrine is put to the test as a bulwark., \ I