THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 8, 1933 GENEVA AND MANCHURIA

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXX, Issue 21411, 8 February 1933, Page 8

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 8, 1933 GENEVA AND MANCHURIA

In both East and West the SinoJapanese quarrel is rapidly reaching a decisive phase. Tokio persists in measures to oppose dislodgment from Manchuria; Japanese troops are concentrating for a massed advance into the Manchukuo province of Jehol, where a large force of Chinese regulars is reported to be stationed. Thus the stage is set for war on a serious scale. In Geneva the final steps of diplomatic intervention are being taken. If they fail, if the terms of suggested settlement be unwelcome to either disputant, the battle will be joined in Manchuria, for neither of them is now disposed to yield an inch at the arbitrary bidding of the League. On the nature of that bidding hangs the issue of peace or war. Already its nature is partly revealed. The drafting sub-committee of the Committee of Nineteen, this sub-committee being representative of Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Sweden, Spain, Czecho-Slovakia and Switzerland, has unanimously agreed on the non-recognition c>f Manchukuo; and the full committee has informed the Japanese delegation that its Government's latest proposals are unsuitable as a basis for conciliation. This means an endorsement of the findings of the Lytton Report and an immediate submission to the League Assembly of a plan of action in the event of the findings being unacceptable to the parties in conflict. It means, further, that the other nations of the world will have speedily to decide whether, and if so by what means, they will vindicate their adherence to the League Covenant, the Briand-Kellogg Pact and the Washington Nine-Power Treaty, all of which are vitally threatened by the quarrel. They cannot stand idly by, should the spirit and purport of these various undertakings be manifestly violated, without surrendering practically every principle enunciated since 1919. At this critical juncture, it behoves them all to weigh carefully the pronouncements of the Lytton Report. On matters of fact, the report traced the unhappy degeneration of China since the revolution that abolished monarchy in 1911 —"political upheavals, civil wars, social and economic unrest, with resulting weakness of the central Government"—but pleaded that patience should be extended to the "political, social, intellectual and moral disorder" that had "become a danger to peace." It commented adversely, although avoiding the question of international law involved, on the embittering Chinese boycott of Japanese trade in so far as this hostility may have been organised or countenanced by the Nanking Government. These things, although intimately related fo the issue in Manchuria, are of less relevance now than the findings on events there. The vested rights of Japan were definitely acknowledged by the commission, and it avowed its recognition of "the great importance. of Manchuria in the economic development of Japan." On this point it thanked the Japanese Government for "a clear and valuable statement of the vital interests of their country in Manchuria." Concerning the clash on September 18, 1931, when an explosion occurred on the South Manchuria Railway— Japanese property—followed by military operations by Japan, it did not exclude the hypothesis that the Japanese officers on the spot thought they were acting in selfdefence ; but it condemned the operations as going beyond the zone of legitimate action. For this extreme activity, however, it largely blamed the shooting, by Chinese soldiers, in an out-of-the way region of Manchuria, of Captain Nakamura of the Japanese Army, some time before. Faults on both sides, with condemnation of Japan for excessive zeal in reprisals designed to strengthen command of a region wider than the treaty rights covered —this was the burden of the report in dealing with earlier incidents. It is the emergence of the independent republic of Manchukuo, however, that has become the centre of implacable controversy, and on this the report found that "the Japanese General Staff realised from the start, or at least in a short time, the use which could be made of such an autonomy movement ; in consequence, they provided assistance and gave direction to the organisers of the movement." The commission was satisfied that a number of factors contributed to the creation of Manchukuo, but "the two which, in combination, were most effective, and without which the new State could not have been formed, were the presence of Japanese troops and the activities of Japanese officials, both civil and military." It held the opinion that the maintenance and recognition of Manchukuo would be unsatisfactory: "it is opposed to the interests of China, it disregards the wishes of the people of Manchuria, and it is at least questionable whether it would ultimately serve the permanent interests of Japan." It considered reasonable, nevertheless, Japan's demand for a more stable and satisfactory government than China had been able to establish in the region. Its suggestions included "the grant of a large measure of autonomy in Manchuria." The report was unpalatable to both disputants, for reasons that can be easily understood, in spite of its impressive reasoning and the detail with which it expounded the provisions of treaties to give effect to its proposals for the future of Manchuria. China, no less than Japan, found occasion of offence as soon as she discovered that Geneva was disposed to be critical. It is doubtful whether the recommendations of the Committee of Nineteen will wholly placate her. By the time the Assembly can be convoked to deal with its report it may be too, late to avert her armed confronting of Japan in the area of quarrel..