THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 1, 1932 CHANGEFUL ASIA

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXIX, Issue 21328, 1 November 1932, Page 8

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 1, 1932 CHANGEFUL ASIA

Brjd'.yiT nts in Japan, including [ the prosecution and punishment o£ f many ConrLmiiniata, manifest a preval-j ence of s/xrial unrest that is typical,' more or liftss, of leading Asiatic coun-' tries. Until the present era, it was: en°.tom?.;r/ to speak of the unchang- , ing Bant, and the deacription was apt, Even jet, there are remnants of the characteristic repugnance to change of any sort, and they constitute an obstacle to reasonable progreaa; the fact that they are found chiefly among the illiterate majority, : i while suggestive of hope that with I the spread of education this obstacle will weaken, adds to the difficulty of making safe and orderly advance. But skilled and experienced obj servers are convinced that a sweeping movement is begun. That it is ! beset wiith dangers to the countries' | experiencing it and to the outer I world i«i agreed. In India, China and • Japan the risk of undisciplined up- j heaval iis plainly present, and the problem of .'riving thern from suicidal recklessness is acute. It is not the i same problem in each of these three lands, and the requisite solution cannot be applied in one way to thern all. There is, it is true, a common element of insurgent nationalism; , arid this has produced somewhat | similar reactions; but the circumstances of the three have been widely different, India has had the advantage of British tutelage ; indeed, the nationalist movement there is largely the outcome of British influence, en- ; couraging expectation of self-govern-j merit as a component unit of thc a Empire and assisting initial steps on the road to it. China has been stirred I by the impact of foreign commerce, | the scheme of Sun Yat-sen, and the effort of Soviet Bussia to establish dominance rather than alliance. .Japan, more independent than India and China, has developed an inner turmoil not less perilous than theirs, although leiss obvious, and side by side with the growth of parliamentary institutions approximating to a Western model has appeared an emotional tension like that threatening the stability of many European nations. The rnuin lines of this contemporary development can be followed in two of these countries with clear certainty. In India there have been more than a dozen years of political reform, beginning definitely with the experiment of 1919—not altogether happy, because of the diverse elements to be reconciled in social and religious thought and the presence of different systems of princely and provincial rule within the dependency. According to agreement, this tentative venture was reviewed after ten years, and the Simon Bcport, the Bound Table Conference of 1930-31, the subsequent commission of investigation, find the incomplete phase now in progress have all followed in pursuance of a plain intention. This sequence of steps is already historic. The issue is still in doubt, for the federal plan embracing all the political divisions has not been matched by an acceptance of its implications on the part of all social and religious sections. In the Hindu-Moslem antipathy, with the associated difficulty of the depressed classes, is a hindrance hamporing reform ; India can have suitable machinery of selfgovernment for the asking, but fear of its injudicious use cannot be lightly put aside, and until this fear lie stilled tlio details of the machinery call for patient planning. Meanwhile, unrest continues, emerging disquietirigly at intervals from a depth that constitutional schemes are unable to reach. The outlook is clouded, yet the main trouble is known. China presents a vastly different state of things, but the elements of the problem are within the range of foreign vision.Unlike India, China has suffered a setback in what promised to be a successful plan of reform initiated from within. The Kuomintang Party, starting well with the creed and policy of Sun Yat-sen, has become divided in its aims and. methods, and its vitality has been sapped. Chaos, created by the ambitions of rival war-lords, has supervened. Instead of popular unity there is a medley of purposes. Authority swung from Peking to Canton, and then to the Yangtse Valley, eventually halting at. Nanking. Reconstruction tarries, and there is an ever-present risk of another revolutionary rising.. Instability is everywhere. To turn from these two restless count ries to Japan, with the expectation of finding established order, is to be disappointed, as recent news eniphitsis.es. Discontent marks the rural areas; industrial strife is frc quent: the new parliamentary regime is understood to bo corrupt and is comparatively futile. Rival points of view are taken on national policy, one opening on an attractive possibility of working in close harmony with China, the other turning to a self-centred nationalism that deems China, a dangerous competitor. The "elder statesmen" favour a rapprochement that will unite the East in a system of mutual service ; the young bloods, especially in the army, are for national expansion according to a Fascist method. But this cleavage of purpose, full of peril, is not all. A Communist revolt threatens, in spite of every attempt to establish economic order. Thus far, in general terms, the Japanese situation can be confidently described, but the underlying facts are obscure, and the issue is problematical. There is growing an apprehension that a domestic crisis of first magnitude may be at hand, one that may suddenly alter the outlook in tho East. If it should come, contemporary Asia—and ihe Pacific—may suffer a change more sinister than any yet experienced.