THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 1932. QUESTIONS IN THE FAR EAST.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXIX, Issue 21116, 25 February 1932, Page 10

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 1932. QUESTIONS IN THE FAR EAST.

The questions raised by the quarrel between China and Japan are far more complex and searching than the British.Labour manifesto recognises. In that statement, addressed to both the League and the British Government, the facts of the case are handled inadequately, and consequently what is propounded as the right course for the League and the Government to take lacks the force it is assumed to have. Briefly summarised, the manifesto declares Japan to be wholly and solely to blame, and asks that she be forthwith disciplined by the League, either on its own initiative or under pressure from the British Government. This assumes to be true much that has yet to be the subject of more thorough inquiry than the framers of the manifesto can have made, and it deems possible a course of action about which those better qualified to speak own themselves to be in doubt. The Labour manifesto has rushed in where eminent statesmen of the world are fearing to tread. Possibly they have been excessively hesitant, and there is little doubt that, had those empowered to pledge their Governments to a. definite policy been alert from the beginning of this trouble, it would have, been quelled, and a satisfactory solution of its provocative problems been 011 a fair way to application, long before this. But why have they delayed? Not from lack of interest; they have been deeply concerned. Professor Gilbert Murray gives the explanation: "public opinion in the great nations vacillated and was misrepresented, the weapon of moral pressure did not fully act, and hence came great delay." An illuminating sidelight on the lack of clear and unanimous thought by the leading Powers is provided by the obvious sympathy in the United States for China. Does that rest on a disinterested view of the facts, or is it more sentimental than intelligent ? Little love has been lost between Japan and the United States. The trend of international events in recent years has been placing these nations in a relationship of jealousy and antagonism. There is a prevalent although not universal readiness in British minds to think well of Japan. Again, the rapid growth of nationalism in China has attracted tlio cordial admiration of many in every oilier organised nation. China started later than Japan in the race for status and prosperity and set out under a handicap ; to think kindly of the cripple competitor is inevitable in most onlookers. Yet again, in a struggle like the present, China, appears to be—in spite, of some happenings—the under-dog; therefore pity and help are easily evoked. Nevertheless, the under-dog may have been in the wrong. To take an unprejudiced view of the struggle is inherently difficult, and nothing but the elucidation of facts can suffice to guide rational judgment. It may be true that Japan has violated treaty obligations, but so, apparently, has China. The same difficulty arises when pledges to the concert of Powers, in the League or out of it, are' considered : China is not guiltless. That Japan has established a virtual protectorate in Manchuria, a step for which there is no documentary warrant, seems undeniable, and it may be forcibly argued that she could have got redress for wrongs and guarantees of rights by peaceable negotiation with China or application to the League. This argument, however, assumes that China had willingness and ability to grant the redress and guarantees—an assumption quite groundless—and that the League was able to insist, as events are proving it to be unable, on Japan's attainment of what has been claimed as due. Thus far, the question of the rights and wrongs of the quarrel does not enter. All that, it is necessary to remember is that Japan, right or wrong, wants security—a desire about which few Y/estern nations can afford to be scornful. If neither China nor the League could guarantee that security, in the matter of treaty covenants in Manchuria, what other course was left open than to use forcible means? This is not to justify everything that Japan has done. As Viscount Grey of Falloden has put it, "Japan has a very strong case about Manchuria," and he emphasises the experience Japan has had of shameful deprivation by European Powers of gains won there years ago. Naturally, after the recent refusal of China and Russia to acknowledge the Briand-Kellogg Pact in their Manchurian feud over the Chinese Eastern Railway, the Japanese Government has not been very trustful of its acceptance by cither of them in reference to other differences in that region. Deeming her case strong, Japan is not wholly to blame in turning from sweet reasonableness about treaties to less pleasant measures. Her plight, whether her case was strong or slender, was made worse by that chronic incapacity of China which necessitated —to quote Lord Grey again when speaking in December —the sending of troops to Shanghai to protect foreign interests there against lawlessness which China was unable to put down. When • thesethings are noted, it seems idle to blame Japan for reluctance to put her case unreservedly and unconditionally in the League's hands. She has jeopardised her case, from one point of view, by taking the law into her own hands, but what if her adversary was unscrupulous and no court could show competence to dispense and enforce justice? There is nothing in this way of looking at things to justify regarding it as a plea that Japan is right and China wrong; it. merely takes account of the complexity of the issues involved in the struggle and of the necessity to probe the reasons leading to Japan's strong and apparently wilful measures.