THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 14, 1931. AN ARMAMENTS TRUCE.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXVIII, Issue 20977, 14 September 1931, Page 8

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 14, 1931. AN ARMAMENTS TRUCE.

The proposal that there shall be "a real and effective truce in armaments," from now until the end of the Disarmament Conference, calls for serious consideration. In making the proposal at the League Assembly, Signor Grandi has doubtless spoken with the voice of Mussolini, a voice that has been wont to talk in terms of big guns even when the political atmosphere was not seriously disturbed. His country has not been extravagantly eager to share international means of cutting down war budgets ; it held aloof from the Geneva naval conference summoned at the instance of President Coolidge, and at London last year it joined France in a hampering reluctance to enter into a general undertaking of reduction or even limitation. Little profit, however, can come from speculation as to the cause of Italy's change of front, for there is no apparent reason why, with a supremely important conference on the subject less than three months away, this particular country should want to antedate its possible benefits. Had the suggestion come from Britain or Germany there would have been no reason for surprise, and their welcoming of it, through the spokesmanship of Lord Cecil and Dr. Curtius, will ensure a sympathetic hearing by the Assembly. France, on the other hand, has shown no enthusiasm for the proposal—an attitude to be provisionally explained by its emanation from li;aly, just now almost as much the object of French suspicion as Germany has so long been. These opposing attitudes in the reception of the proposal hold between them the wisdom with which it should be viewed: the idea, whatever its country of origin, merits cordial approval for the spirit presumed to actuate it, but it cannot be reasonably accepted until it is given what the Times calls "concrete interpretation."

One thing of promise already emerges from the national comment on the subject—whatever be the fate of the Italian proposal for an immediate truce, there will be no general welcome for any suggestion that the Disarmament Conference should be postponed. Britain, France and Germany will not hear of postponement. This removes the risk that the suggested arms truce, by providing a temporary substitute for the anticipated disarmament treaty of next year, might rob the world of a unique international achievement. Sometimes the good is the enemy of the best. Geneva is reassuringly set on doing the best. A tentative truce of arms, it should be remembered, would not necessarily apply to either Russia or the United States, if it were instituted by the League, whereas both of them are pledged to participation in the Disarmament Conference. Their non-observance of the truce—Russia's agreement, if invited, would need to have more than a Note from its present Government to justify the confidence of other Powers —would vitiate it: the worldwide treaty expected next year is designed to have sanctions from which no signatory can callously escape. The question remains, then, whether the tentative truce can be of real value, in view of the forthcoming conference. In one way, it can : its arrangement can usefully evidence and foster the spirit of peace, and thus contribute to the desirable atmosphere of frank friendship without which the conference will disastrously fail. This would be no light gain, yet it is not enough to justify offhand endorsement of the proposal. Supposing it be genuinely accepted by the Powers in the League and outside of it, there will still be necessary a considerable amount of technical definition as to what it means. It is to affect all forces—land, sea and air—together with adjuncts such as fortifications, arsenals, military roads and railways, naval bases, shipbuilding yards, docks, some types of aircraft associated partly with civil aviation, and so on. To define its application is a task that the Assembly must commit to experts for deliberate investigation. It may be suggested that the data collected and collated by the League's disarmament commission, for use by the coming conference, is available. It is, but the problem involved in the suggested truce is not the problem for which this material was obtained. Its budgetary details relate, it is true, to current outlay, yet their treatment envisages a special application to the future in progressive diminution. That is very different from a sudden cessation of expenditure now, with a possible resumption at the end of the conference, which may be twelve months ahead, for one forecast of its duration was six months at least. Moreover, there are economic considerations of great moment. It would be idle to suggest that an immediate benefit would be got by stopping expenditure on construction, military establishments and other sorts of armament outlay, and turning this composite fund into peaceful channels. That idea is splendid but it is not economics. Such an immediate dislocation of finance, operative for about a year, would have no scope for salutary recovery—-that takes much time—and the results might be hurtful. The proposal calls for close technical examination in all its bearings, lest its acceptance, as a mere makeshift, should damage by abrupt interference the very interests that the conference is designed to serve.