DOMINION GOVERNORS.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXVIII, Issue 20924, 14 July 1931, Page 9

DOMINION GOVERNORS.

ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS. CASE OF NEW SOUTH WALES. CONSTITUTIONAL PRECEDENTS. by l. k. stcNxio, ix.ar. To those who consider a Colonial Governor a mere cipher, tho attitude adopted by Sir Philip Game must be startling. Mr. Lang, no doubt, would heartily agree with the statement of another colonial politician, that a Governor "holds a potty court and bids champagne flow under his roof, _ receives civic addresses and makes flattering replies, but has lost all power, not only of initiation, but of salutary control." , Fortunately, Mr. Lang is wrong, and if he had studied colonial history ho would know that he is wrong. In discussing the powers of a Governor of a self-governing Dominion, it is im-. portant to distinguish between GovernorsGeneral and Governors, for the former are in all respects the representatives of the Crown and not the agents of the British Government. It does not appear that the resolution of the Imperial Conference of 1926, whereby this change was effected, applies to a Governor of, for example, an Australian State. An important result of responsible government, a privilege which all the Dominions possess, is that the GovernorGeneral selects his Ministers from tho party having a majority in the elected House and that, generally speaking, he acts on the advice of such Ministers. It is on this last poirt that the controversy arises. The school which Mr. Lang at the moment adorns by his adherence claims that a Governor must invariably follow the advice tendered to him. Actions of Governors-General. Three times in the short history of the Commonwealth of Australia a Gov-ernor-General has not done this. Of course, the normal result of the Governor acting in this way is that his Ministers resign and the Governor seeks other advisers. So serious a step on bis part can be taken only when he considers that he is acting in the best interests of the Dominion as a whole, freed from any feeling of his own personal dislike for the policy of the Ministry concerned. A more famous example of a refusal to follow the advice of a Prime Minister is the conduct in 1926 of Viscount Byng, Governor-General of Canada, in refusing Mr. Mackenzie King a dissolution. Very high constitutional authorities consider that he acted with perfect propriety. Mr. Asquith, whose knowledge and experience of such matters were great, declared "that the Crown is not bound to take the advice of a particular Minister to put its subjects to the tumult and turmoil of a series of general elections, so long as it can find other Ministers who are prepared to give it a trial." On this principle Lord Byng's attempt to form a Ministry, led by Mr. Meighen, was justifiable. On the other hand, it has to be remembered that Mr. Asquith was speaking more particularly of Mr. Ramsay Mac Donald's request to the King for a dissolution, at a time when the Labour Ministry represented a minority in the House of Commons. The Liberal leader considered that the notion of a Prime Minister in such a position having a right to demand a dissolution was subversive of constitutional usage. However, His Majesty granted Mr. Mac Donald's request. It has been suggested that in the future in Great Britain the Crown, having this precedent in mind, will never refuse a dissolution sought by the Ministry of the day, and this has obvious application to a GovernorGeneral.

Powers of a Governor. The powers of a Governor, whether of a State or a Province possessing responsible Government, are nevertheless very important. The occasions on which their course of action has been independent arise in two connections—the right to dismiss a Minister and the right to refuse to make further appointments to a nominated Upper House. The right to dismiss a Minister is important, because Sir Philip Game has been asked to exercise this power with reference to Mr. Lang. A study of the precedents must have confirmed him in his refusal to take so drastic a step.

So far as the Crown is concerned, it may be assumed that the prerogative of dismissal will never be exercised, although there are not wanting those who say that some day it may be revived. In Canada two provincial Governors have dismissed their Ministries and have subsequently, after a storm of indignation, been recalled from office. Appointments to an Upper House. Two other instances of the use of the power of dismissal have been more fortunate, but on the whole it would seem that the power is so drastic and the danger of the Governor being embroiled in local politics so great that it is not likely to bs repeated. A Governor .would hesitate to rely on an official memorandum in his favour so old as 1878. If the power of dismissal has become of historical interest, the right to refuse to make further appointments to a nominated Upper House is very much a thing of practical politics. Sir Dudley de Chair refused the request of Mr. Lang to make further appointments to the Legislative Council after the Gilbertian situation had arisen of some, previous appointees going back on their promise to vote the Council out of existence. One gentleman at the hour of the critical division could not even be found. And now Mr. Lang has met another Governor who refuses to follow. Ministerial advice implicitly and accordingly shocks Mr. Lang's ideas of constitutional government. The question therefore arises whether a Governor is justified in rejecting further nominations made for the purpose of carrying there a measure which has the. support of the majority of the members of the elected House. Justifiable Refusal. According to a memorandum of the Secretary of State for the Colonies in 1892 to Lord Glasgow, Governor of New Zealand, the Governor is justified in refusing to make such appointments, "if the policy recommended to him is not only, in his view, erroneous in itself, but such as ho has solid grounds for behoving, from his local knowledge, would not be endorsed by the Legislature or by the constituencies." But very strong reasons must justify such a course. The widespread opposition in New South Wales to many of Mr. Lang's proposals has no doubt influenced the Governor in his course of action.

Finally, a Governor must, above all things, be impartial. If he makes himself the instrument of party politics ho degrades the dignity of the Crown. In Queensland in 1917, during the absence of the Governor, an ex-Minister was appointed Lieutenant-Governor and promptly created a sufficient nurnbei of Legislative Councillors to ensure the passing ,of two measures regarded in many quarters as confiscatory and approximating to Mr Lang's latest taxation bill. It was felt that the position of the Governor had been abused and no more striking object lesson can exist of the necessity of having, as the representative of the Crown in a selfgoverning Dominion, an able and impartial statesman.