The Bridge Table.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXVIII, Issue 20922, 11 July 1931, Page 5 (Supplement)

The Bridge Table.

EXPLOITING ALL CHANCES.

Little problems of play crop tip in every hand one picks up at auction bridge, and the most important, perhaps, of all, is the £>ne confronting the declarer after the first lead, when ho sees his dummy for the first Aiinc, and sums up his chances of making game, or at least his contract, if game is out of the question. Here is an interesting hand, in which there were several different chances of success which might have been tried

Score, game-all, love-all. Z dealt and bid one no-trump, which Y raised to two. A led the queen of diamonds, which Z passed tip,' and A's second lead of the four brought the king. Surveying the hand for its possibilities of game, Z immediately saw that he had several chances of game,, but no certainty of nine tricks in any of them. There are three club tricks certain, four if they lie even,--two in spades, three if a finesse comes oS, two certain in diamonds, andjone, or, perhaps, two, in hearts if they can bo established before the diamonds. - Z saw all this, and determined to try the hearts as offering the greatest show of certainty for game if successful, and led the queen. A took with the king and led the knave of diamonds, which fell to Z's ace. Now, Z knows there are two remaining diamonds, and they may be both with A, who may also have the ace of hearts, and thus . make five tricks and save game right off. He took the double risk, and it came off against him. He got contract, but missed the rubber, which went to the opponents at next deal. , The Correct Play. -Now, where was Z wrong? Was it that he was unlucky to have picked the method which, purely by chance, went wrong ? . Or was there a plain certainty on the cards he saw. if he had only played them correctly ? The answer lies in the simple fact that he picked upon one particular chance out of three, and stuck to it when there was a bare possibility of its going wrong, while he had two other chances still to try. Z was right to start the hearts and see how they fell, besides reducing them /to one further lead later on to establish the needed trick, if found necessary, but at the fifth trick, v with""the- opponents two tricks in hand and two diamonds _ and the ace of hearts between them—possibly, and, as it actually happened, all in one hand—then was the time to try one of trhe other two possibilities, namely, clubs or spades. He should have led a small club, and taken with ace in dummy, refunding the queen. As both opponents would follow and might have one each left, ho leads his remaining small one to his own king, only to find both with B, and his small one no good. The situation has again to be reviewed. It will not do to lead the losing club to B in the hope that he will lead the spades down to dummy. B will certainly play a heart, and bring in those two diamonds. There is nothing for it but to try the spades. He can by now almost diagnose A with only two spades, and, as he did not discard one on the third lead of clubs, one of his two spades is probably the king. Z, therefore, plays his spades in the only way to make them all, and leads a small one, finessing the knave in dummy. The lead of the ace now drops the king and the queen and the nine both make, thus giving him nine tricks and game. It is easy enough, seeing all four hands, and many players might have started the spades first and j had no trouble. The point is that the J best play iS to exhaust all the possibilities of your hand, and so to plan your leads that you have a shot at all the chances open before -relinquishing the conduct of the hand to the opponents. A Curious Deal. Is it possible for a player to secure the play of a hand at two no-trumps, after one of his opponents has already bid. two no-trumps ? The answer, of course, is that it could only happen through an intervening underbid. For instance, suppose the dealer bids two no-trumps, next player passes, and ' dealer's partner bids three clubs, either through thinking it was majority play or through thinking his partner had said one no-trump. Now, the opponent on his left has several options open to him. He could stop the bidding, and have the hand played at two no-trumps by the dealer as the maker of jJie bid previous to the underbid. Cr he could , raise the club bid to four clubs,^, and either pass it, double it, or overbid it, or ho could treat the bid of three clubs as correct, and overcall it with two noi trumps, which is exactly what he did, and it led to the curious anomaly which is expressed by the original question. Whether he would not have been better advised to have made the dealer play the hand at two no-trumps would depend entirely on the score. If he could get two no-trumps, and- he was 10 on the slate in the rubber game, then he was right to secure the bid. If his side's score was nil, or if there was any dbubt about getting his confract, then he would do better to let the dealer try to get, eight tricks himself, and make 100 or 150 in penalties. s First Bid on Four Aces. . The only other question arising is as to what sort of hands were dealt to occasion such bidding. It could really only arise by reason of the dealer hold- ! ing the four aces, which, in some circles, is indicated by an original bid of two no-trumps, though quite often there is not another likely trick in the hand. Even with a blaze of kings and queens in his hand the next player would hardly ' bid three of anything, but ■it is quite • conceivable that the dealer's partner ' might have a hand which, looked more likely to succeed at three clubs than at 1 two no-trumps. Then comes the last > player, and, with clubs well held, and the other kings and queens- as well, he > thinks he can see eight certain tricks and game, and takes the chance offered. j Here is the deal: —

Score: Y, Z, nil; A, B, 10 in rubber game. Z deals, and bids two no-trumps. A, no bid. Y, three clubs. B, two notrumps. All pass (after the protracted argument). Nothing can prevent B from making his eight tricks and game.