THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS FRIDAY, JANUARY 17, 1930. THE COMING CONFERENCE.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXVII, Issue 20465, 17 January 1930, Page 10

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS FRIDAY, JANUARY 17, 1930. THE COMING CONFERENCE.

I Events are moving fast in anticipation of the Five Powers Naval Conference to open on Tuesday. There is interest in the preparations being made to stage it, but the indications now appearing to show what proposals will - be made demand more serious consideration than the pageantry and formalities described in detail. As a reminder that the whole Empire will be represented at the conference the Prime Minister has met the Dominion delegates, who will be present. A curt official report says the interview was "satisfactorily concluded." A specific question has left it doubtful whether the Dominions have or have not agreed to the reduction of naval armaments which Britain will certainly offer to make. It is also an obscure point whether they were given an effective chance of expressing an opinion. If the worst pos sible construction is put on the official silence regarding this rather important question, coupled with the generous indications given of Britain's readiness to make concessions in naval strength, it is excusable to ask why the Dominions are to be present at all. Yet too much cannot be made of that. For, if any of the Dominions were to protest too violently against naval reductions, it would only be necessary to ask, quite quietly, who pays for the naval defence of the Empire, or bears the lion's share of its great cost, and the protests must die away. The Dominions may feel sentimental regret and practical apprehension if Britain seems likely to part, not only with the naval supremacy she maintained so long, but with a degree of strength ensuring the adequate protection of the Empire. Yet in theultimate they are without the right to speak strongly on the subject because of the many years in which they left the British taxpayer almost alone to provide what was, in effect, for the benefit of all. Even to this day it cannot be said the Empire, as a whole, contributes fairly, relative to population, resources and needs, to the cost of naval therefore, decisions for reduction, which also means retrenchment, are made in advance of Dominion agreement, it may cut across the policy of continuous effective consultation, but it cannot be indicted on anything more than theoretical grounds. It is well the blunt truth should be faced, and the opportunity has been given for doing this. Whatever the Dominions may feel, it is evident opinion in Great Britain is becoming aroused about the concessions the Government seems prepared to make in naval strength. It is nothing new that after having stood firm on 70 cruisers as an irreducible minimum at the ill-starred Geneva Conference, Britain is now prepared to say 50 will be enough. That was known long enough ago for it to have been commented on extensively. As one expert has remarked, Britain possessed 114 cruisers" in 1914 and found the number inadequate. If there are but 50, at least 12, according to an expert's review, will be refitting or refuelling at any given time, leaving 38 to act with the battle fleets, and also to patrol and protect 80,000 miles of trade routes. Of course, if the submarine is outlawed as a weapon of sea warfare, the position will be different; the prospect of that happening will be discussed later. Britain and the United States will unite in advocating this, as they did at Washington. This again is not new. What does come as a surprise, a complete and arresting surprise, is the possibility that Britain may be found advocating the abolition of the battleship. There is a certain plausibility about the proposal. If war has been renounced by all parties to I;he conference, and if all agree neither to build nor keep in commission any more battleships, why not quietly abolish them? It is seldom possible, in international affairs, to argue so simply toward a given objective. Everyone will not agree that the battleship has a wholly offensive value, without any defensive significance except in set action against other battleships. Finally, for Britain, the traditional naval Power of the world, to be making this proposal to nations which are neither reducing, nor proposing to reduce, huge standing armies still capable of invading even an island Power, will strike many people as going too far and too fast, as taking the initiative toward complete disarmament when nobody else has given substantial promise of proceeding very far along that road. In fact, it reads very much like a gesture in the face of the world. These proposals and suggestions can now be considered together in the endeavour to sum up the possibilities of the London Conference. Britain and the United States have agreed, it is understood, on cruiser parity between themselves, and will make the strength that will satisfy them the basis of a proposed treaty in which the other three will be allotted cruisers in the same ratio as battleships under the Washington Treaty. Japan will demand a higher ratio of cruisers, pleading greater need for this class of vessel. That has been already indicated. Franco will not be content to be placed on an equality with Italy, and Italy will not be prepared to accept a smaller allocation of cruiser strength than France. If between these demands, it is necessary to reconsider the British-American minimum already tentatively fixed, * will Britain be asked to accede to'a further whittling down? If so, if refusal will seem like wrecking the conference, will the Labour Government have the moral courage to hold out against the proposal? That is the crucial question. Again, linked up with cruiser strength is the proposed abolition of the submarine. Britain and America are agreed in demanding it and have certainly counted on gaining the point when they set the cruiser limit at 50. France is exceedingly unlikely to accept any limitation nn submarine strength, and cuiuiiu to reject the idea

of total abolition. There is no excuse, on the evidence, for ignoring that. If, then, unrestricted submarine construction remains possible, will Britain still be content with 50 cruisers when 114 proved inadequate against the German submarine menace? Again, will Britain make an amicable settlement of the cruiser problem for fear lest the conference fail ? If so, will it leave the Empire safe? Much hangs on the answers to these questions. As to battleships, position is still nebulous, and concrete suggestions must be awaited concerning this most momentous point. The mere preliminary discussion of the issues to be handled at the conference shows how its proceedings demand the attention of the whole Empire, "incurably maritime" as it is, in the Gladstonian phrase.