TOLERANCE.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXVI, Issue 20426, 30 November 1929, Page 1 (Supplement)

TOLERANCE.

ITS VARIED PRACTICE.

BY LLEWELYN LEE.

P. G. Wodehouso will divide humanity into two classes if it suits his purpose. You will find yourself arbitrarily classed with your neighbour if you both take coffee for supper, and severed from your brother becauso ho doesn't. Probably Mr. Wodehouso will make everything

right in his next story by making beerdrinking the determinant of tho cleavage, But if hc doesn't, you have the alterna

tivc of rofusing to accept his dictum and continue to live fraternally. Mr. Wodehouso is not unique. Psychologists display groat ingenuity in discovering fresh planes of cleavage in the mass of humanity. You aro classified according to your mind. If you aro nou an extravcrt, then you are ari introvert; iE not a visualiser, then a non-visualiser;

if not a gerometer, then an analyst. Being aware of these precedents of Mr. Wodehouso and tho psychologists, I am emboldened to divido humanity according

to ability or inability for suffering fools gladly. Some can. Some cannot. Of course, it is understood that a fool is any person whom you dislike or despise, or, in short, any person whom you think a fool. If you think he is one, then he is one. The fact that othei people have standards different from yours explains the non-existence of fools as a class, universally recognised. . Some people pride themselves on their inability to suffer fools gladly. Though conscious of their superiority, they can appreciate it the more if they can make others conscious of it also. So they avoid the society of those whom they dislike, thus deserving to bo described by that word, so harsh, hard, and ""coinpromising—the word snob. And ami i what satisfaction and feeling of moral rsctitude does the average person apply tho opprobrious term, and, if he has been slighted in any way, might even permit himself a slight hiss on the sibilant. We cannot call a man a thief unless ho steals, or a liar unless he lies; but wq can call him a snob if we dislike him. Others, again, can suffer fools gladly.

No Easy Matter. This then, is the classification. _ But the separation of sheep from goats is not, an easy matter, for many of the goats appear, at a cursory glance, ]ust like sheep. 1 refer to those, not numerically few, who pride themselves on their ability to suffer fools gladly. . When people pride themselves on their virtues, then the value of those virtues goes down accordinglv. Subjectively, that is to say, not objectively, for, whatever the motive a good deol is a good deed if we consider only its results. But the conscious virtue of peoplo fraternising with those whom they hold in contempt, merely for the sake of being " sociable is as bad as the conscious snobbery of the people who refuse to do this. Worse; because conscious virtue is merely snobbery under a cloak, and a hidden fault is invariably worse than a manifest one. Snobbishness is not a , matter of behaviour but an attitude of mind. These people mix freely with their infenorstluit delightful word—and are careful to avoid the patronising manner. iney deliberately adopt the mannerisms speech and topics of conversation of tho people with whom they mix, and thus earn their esteem. ' Any one of them is known as " a good sport," always with a word for everyone and not like that stuck-up fellow Brown. j '

Intellectual Snobbery. The'form of snobbery that I am considering is intellectual. Religious and social snobbery is prevalent and lias little or nothing to do jutn individuals as individuals. One is born into a certain social class, and in nine cases out of ten one stays there. In religion it is practically the same. We accept the religion of our fathers. Thtse distinctions matter to no one but the social aspirant and the religious fanatic. They are not pernicious except in so tar as all distinctions are pernicious. But tno intellectual snobbery that exists within class and within every class is the cause o£ the superiority complex and the inferiority complex, from ono or other of which most people suffer. One could not be required to prove ihe multifariousness of the types of mind, or if the division into types seems a littlo too definite, the inequality of minds. Tlie difference that exists between the minds of an imbecile and an Einstein is so marked that it is axiomatic. _ Similarly, the difference between Jones mind and Brown's mind, though less marked, is just as real. It is the unawaveness of this difference that is the cause of intolerance, a pleasantor term than intellectual sno bery. Brown and Jones begin with the same working hypothesis and draw different conclusions. Both are reasonable men, so they look for flaws in their reasoning They find none. Given so and so then the conclusion must _be thus. Brown and Jones make ineffectual attempts to convince the other, and tliey each conclude, quite reasonably, that the other is a fool, and, being a fool, is a person to bo suffered or not according to their respective dispositions. Neither makes any attempt to understand the mind of the other. Not that it would be any use if they did. It is quite impossible for a person of one typo of mind to understand, in the fullest sense of the term, the mind of another type. Strango Distinctions.

It is easy to talk glibly of tolerance when we arc not. required at the moment to practise it. For some antipathies avo so dfeep-rooted that they might be considered as part of our make-up and could not therefore bo easily ignored. But we are too prone to consider our likes and dislikes as part of ourselves, inherent as it were. We pride ourselves upon them, even hug them to us, with feelings of proprietorship. We dislike a man because he is mean or because his speaking voice is loud or because lie plays practical jokes or becauso he has flat feet. Wo cannot prevent ourselves from disliking meanness, shouting, practical jokes and flat feet. But v,e can prevent ourselves from disliking people merely because they happen to possess one or more of these detestable qua ities. We condemn a man because he drinks orgambles to excess, forgetful that perhaps wo eat to excess or gossip to excess. Considered in tho abstract thero could bo no great difference between the vice ot eating and tho vice of drinking. Only in their effects is tho difference apparent. Drinking is universally considered the worse, becauso its effects aro obvious. A man accused of drunkenness frequently appears in the law courts. If he has thrashed his wife lie is fined, imprisoned, or let off with a caution. But if a man regularly over eats, becomes liverish, choleric, sulky, and quarrelsome, his wife can have no compensation, merely because he refrains from thrashing her. Yet the gourmand would contend that he is superior to the drunkard and the consensus of public opinion would justify, him in this contention. . . , . , I once read an article in defenco ot intolerance. It is intolerance (so I gathered) that keeps the world up to the mark, moderately free of vice, and, in brief, inhabitable. If we tolerated everything, then chaos would replace our cosmos. So tho majority, being omniscient and omnipotent, tell the minority what they have to do. Stealing _is not looked upon with favour, so the thief has to do his stealing clandestinely. No doubt this writer was right and tolerance is a foolish dream. But, if intolerance is going to bo the rule, why mako fish of ono and fowl of another. Why imprison the thief and allow the man who plays practical jokes to roam at large'(