THE AFTERMATH.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXVI, Issue 20229, 13 April 1929, Page 8

THE AFTERMATH.

BY THE EIGHT HON. WINSTON CHURCHItA.

CHURCHILL'S MEMOIRS. CAUSE OF GREAT WAR. GUILT AT GERMANY'S DOOR. A , VAST AND IGNOBLE PLAN.

(Cdpyricht.—By arrangement with the Times, London.) No. XII. There could have been no Great War If the rulers of Germany had not first declared Avar against Russia and immediately launched their armies upon the invasion and destruction of Fiance, trampling through Belgium on the way. The attempt to gain tho swift and 'decisive military triumph which then seemed sure was a definite conscious act and impulse transcending all other everts. Tho, only test by which human beings can judge war responsibility is Aggression; and the supreme proof of Aggression is Invasion. Capacity to invade a neighbour implies superior capacity to defend the native soil. The past has many instances of invasions for the purpose of forestalling a counter-invasion. Disputes as to responsibility for bringing about conditions which led to various wars are endless. But mankind will be wis6 in the future to take as the paramount criterion of war guilt the sending of the main armies of any State across its frontier line, and to declare that whoever does this puts himself irretrievably in the wrong. The violation of Luxemburg and Belgium by the German armies marching upon France will stare through the centuries from pages of history. Not a Matter of. Self-delence. The execution of this vast, elaborate war plan was believed by the German leaders to be necessary not only to the yictory of Germany, but to her safety; not only to her safety, but to her life. They therefore conceived themselves bound to carry it out from the moment that the Russian mobilisation and the terms of the Russian alliance with France compelled them to face the long-exam-ined .war on two fronts against superior but more slowly gathering forces. That this belief was sincerely held need not be questioned. It was not, however, well grounded. No one would have dared to attack the Central Powers. The strength of the German armies was so enormous, and tho conditions of modern •war at that time so favourable to the defensive, that Germany could—as events have proved—have afforded to wait with iron composure all attack upon her frontiers. Such an attack would nevei have taken place. If it had, it would have been dashed to pieces by the German ' armies, and the whole force of world opinion would have been turned against Russiai and France. There was, in fact, no need of selfpreservatiou for" the awful plunge which Germany took in consecjuence of the Russian mobilisation. Let it never be admitted that mobilisation involves war or justifies the other side in declaring war. Mobilisation justifies only counter-mobi-lisation and further parley. Question and an Answer. "Was this too high a test for the moral fibre of any Government, of any general staff, of any military nation ? Would it have required superhuman restraint for Germany not to have put her whole war-plan into operation after the Russian mobilisation had been ordered ? The answer is not in doubt. It ought not to have been beyond the virtue and courage of so strong a State and so great a people. But on the assumption—which we dispute—that mobilisation meant war, and —which we also dispute—that war meant the execution of the German war plan for , invading France through Belgium, with it£ terrible implications, was not this all the greater reason for prudence and patience while events still rested in the regions of diplomacy? What can be said of the levity with which Germany gave Austria a 1 free hand to take what action she wished against Serbia and promised German support without conditions, without even any warning of the danger to European peace, What can be sairl for the German rejection of Sir Edward Grey's proposal of July 26—before the Russian mobilisation had begun—for a European conference ? If the next step led inexorably, as we are told, to Germany feeling herself forced, fn self-preservation, to " hack her way through Belgium," was it not all the more important to prevent that step from being taken ? And here in a European conference was a simple and sure measure of preventing, or at the very least of delaying, the fatal exodus from the diplomatic field. Allies' Unyielding Spirit. The German Emperor was surprised and alarmed, and his military advisers were fiercely excited by the unyielding spirit which Germany encountered from the Triple Entente in the final ten days. This unyielding spirit had grown up over many j'ears, during which the sense of German preponderance and the fear of German aggression upon land and sea had increasingly dominated the dire -ing minds in France, Russia and G°eat Britain. The shadow had lain darkly over Europe since the beginning of the century. These -three Powers did not mean to' be separated and mastered one by one. Franco was bound by her treaty to Russia. Britain, under the growth of the German Navy, though legally free, was morally committed to stand by France if France were the victim of aggression. The. Triple Entente could never have attacked the Central Powers. It would have fallen to pieces at the first aggressive mo\e by any one of its members; but. its lesisting power in the face of attack/ was real and solidly founded. If Gfrmnriy would rorne In conference, there was no doubt that the Austro-Serhian quarrel could be settled, if Germany did not, attack, there would he no war i.he/had no right, to-attack. If she did, if would only show what sort, of neighbour ve had in the world and how wise We had heen to stand together. War Machine Takes Charge. The convulsive forces surging around the German Emperor, rigidly departmentahsed, awkwardly connected or even largely independent of one another, became, in tho crisis, impersonal and uncontrollable. '• Rational processes departed and the machine took charge. Through the confusion marched the ordered phalanx of the general staff bearing the great deeign. Ail was ready, and all would be ■ well—provided there was no hesitation at, the top. . The deepening of the Kiel Canal was finished, and tho fleet could move freely between the Baltic and the. North Sea. ffhe fifty million pound capital levy of 1913 1914 had filled tho arsenals with ammunition. The supplies of explosives were, assured bv the new process of extracting nitrogen from the air. The German armies were incomparable, and the Schlieffen war plan sure. By a coincidence the Goeben, too, was in the Mediterranean. William the Second was not the man to stand against this assault. Those who »u V V VIS , he SL to i ud S e h'm should first of thank God they were not placed in ins position. (To be continued daily.)' ft .