THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS MONDAY, MAY 28, 1928. EUROPE AND THE BALTIC.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXV, Issue 19957, 28 May 1928, Page 8

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS MONDAY, MAY 28, 1928. EUROPE AND THE BALTIC.

The little republic of Lithuania, a triangular stretch of territory toward the head of the Baltic, bordered by Poland, Latvia and East Prussia, has again shown dissatisfaction with the frontier settlement which gives to Poland the city and district of Vilna. The new development is dramatic in nature, for Vilna is proclaimed the capital of Lithuania. Officially it is Polish ground. The act, therefore, is one of defiance not only to the much more powerful neighbour of the little State, but to all the European Powers accepting the decision of the Ambassadors' Conference of 1923, which awarded Vilna to Poland. Accompanying the gesture is a constitutional change which makes the President a dictator, transfers to him all the powers previously belonging to Parliament, and reduces the functions of the Legislature entirely to one of giving the dictator advice. Exactly what this move means it is difficult to say. In. October last it was proposed to hold a referendum, asking the people of Lithuania to approve an amendment to the constitution making Vilna the capital. Acute friction with Poland over the treatment each had meted out to minorities of the other race arose. Lithuania abandoned the vote, and until the present little has been heard of the capital question. Its reappearance, in its present drastic form can be traced to the failure of that conference which broke up about ten days ago, after a fruitless attempt to restore normal relations between Poland and Lithuania. Agreement to abandon the formal state of war, existing for seven years, was reached at Geneva in December, on the urging of the League of Nations. Still relations have not been satisfactorily adjusted. Therefore the gesture over Vilna is not incomprehensible, but the accompanying move in domestic politics is not so easily understood. The two incidents, taken together, point to restiveness on the Baltic shore, where agreement and tranquillity would be better for Europe. Before the war, there were only four States bordering upon the Baltic —Denmark, ' Sweden, Germany and Russia. Now there are nine, the original four, with the addition of Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. The two lastnamed are concerned in disputes which destroy the stability of relations that had existed around this sea for many years. Even when Germany and Russia faced one another after the peace of Europe had crashed into ruins in 1914, it was not over any Baltic dispute. The new adjustment of boundaries has left the seeds of grave dissension. When Poland was created an independent State, she was given access to the sea by what is usually called the "Polish corridor," which cuts East Prussia off from the rest of Germany. A strong case can be made for giving this to Poland, but, whatever its merits, it has not been accepted as final by Germany. Here is one disturbing factor. Poland is embroiled with Lithuania over Vilna. To complete the vicious circle, Lithuania seized and holds the port of Memel and surrounding territory, regarded by Germany as an integral part of East Prussia. Thus Germany has a grievance against both Poland and Lithuania, and these two are at odds with each other. The prospect of the Bid tic remaining a tranquil sea is not wholly a good one. Germany's sense of injury is very broadly a European question, for it affects the Treaty of Versailles. The Polish-Lithuanian dispute is not so wide in its implications, but it has features of European importance. Of the nine Baltic States, Sweden and Denmark can be disregarded as safe and satisfied. Germany cherishes grievances, Russia is an incalculable factor. The remaining five have many interests in common. A mutual pact of guarantee by all five, a common policy in international affairs, and such economic co-operation among them as circumstances permitted, has been suggested as an ideal arrangement, giving all a greater sense of security than they can now enjoy, and allowing them to devote more complete attention to the problems of independent existence, not yet fully solved. True, in a Europe which is supposed to have said farewell to war, which supports the League of Nations, such j

a regional pact ought to be unnecessary. It has not been found so by other nations more securely placed. Besides, Russia, not a member of the League of Nations, is a near and enigmatic neighbour, looming large over all of them. Attempts to form a Baltic League have been made. Poland tried in 1922. Lithuania necessarily was not included in the negotiations, a serious drawback in the geographical circumstances existing. The scheme failed, one reason being that Poland wishes to involve the others in wider obligations than those which strictly copcerned the Baltic States. The attempt renewed on a more acceptable scale might have a better fate in the future. Even if it did, the company would not be complete without Lithuania. Until there is some settlement over Vilna, Lithuania will not bargain with Poland. Thus a movement which could be very much in the interests of Europe is hampered because a dispute for which Europe must accept some responsibility drags on wearily. How far it is from adjustment the defiant gesture of Lithuania in nominating Vilna as her capital shows.