THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS SATURDAY, JANUARY 7, 1928. AMERICAN PEACE PLAN.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXV, Issue 19838, 7 January 1928, Page 8

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS SATURDAY, JANUARY 7, 1928. AMERICAN PEACE PLAN.

Though the French Government is now reported to be more favourably disposed toward the American proposal for a treaty to "outlaw war," the general reception it has been given will probably have convinced the originators of the plan that its achievement is not so simple as at first appeared. The United States and France are parties to a treaty of arbitration. It has presumably been fully Successful during its term of existence, which is now about to expire. The renewal of it, in even more absolute terms, should not be difficult, for the two nations can please themselves about the mutual undertakings, affecting only themselves, into which they may enter. When it is proposed to make the pact "multilateral," to gather signatures to it like those put to a popular testimonial, the United States begins to learn a lesson membership of the League of Nations would have taught long ago. The United States has held aloof, and officially seems uninformed regarding not only the steps already taken by other nations toward stabilising peace, but the difficulties they have encountered. America has had one great success, the Washington Conference on Naval Disarmament. Its success and the positive results following it must have conveyed a mistaken idea that there are short and easy ways to the ideal of disarmament and peace pacts. The Washington Conference was called at an especially favourable moment, and dealt with a subject on which the nations concerned were ready in advance to agree without much difficulty. It was a legitimate triumph for American leadership, but if it encouraged too much optimism it could lead to nothing but disappointment. So far as the American proposals to France are limited to the use of arbitration, they are practical enough, though, as has been said, the reservations are such that little is left as the subject for arbitration. Even when it is suggested that France and the United States shall become signatories to a pact renouncing war as part of the national policy, assuming it is limited to the two of them, its difficulties should not be insuperable. Backed by specific pledges to employ arbitration for the settlement of disputes, it sounds perfectly feasible. To offer such a proposal, clothed in sweeping generalities, for acceptance by all the principal nations, is to ignore the great body of preliminary work already done by other agencies in the effort to reach an identical point, and to ignore also the progress they have made. It has already been remarked in detail and with emphasis that Mr. Kellogg offers nothing beyond a milder declaration than the one already accepted by members of the League of Nations last September. Those who belong to the League, subscribing to a pledge which says specifically that aggressive wars should be absolutely prohibited, are also signatories to an instrument which proposes certain means for implementing that pledge. The League of Nations has never appealed to America ,as an effective agency for promoting world peace or outlawing war. Yet, in one way, an immensely important way, the League takes a much more practical view of what can be done for outlawing war than appears in the American proposals. It accepts the need for sanctions. Not only has it striven to draft pledges for the pacific settlement of international disputes, it has drawn up rules by which pledgebreakers shall be effectively dealt with when they disregard their obligations. The solemn undertakings entered into by all signatories to the Covenant of the League are not easily reconciled with adhesion to Mr. Kellogg's plan for the outlawry of all war, as M. Briand himself has noted. When that is recognised a new factor enters at once.

It would be a poor compliment to America to assume that Mr. Kellogg wishes as many nations as possible to adhere to his declaration of principle without taking any steps to give it practical effect. He speaks of a draft treaty being drawn up for submission to the other nations interested. Assume that such a treaty could be framed to avoid conflict with obligations adherence to the League involves; assume for the moment that it would not threaten to supersede the League of Nations in its most important function. Will such a treaty provide that a breach of its undertakings by any party to it shalj be the signal for concerted action against the offender by the rest? If not, it is difficult to see where its practical worth exists. If so, what becomes of the Americani

determination to , avoid "entangling alliances"? To anyone else there is no real reason why the United States should not assume such obligations, and carry them out if necessary. Yet the United States cannot admit it without stultifying herself for the earlier refusal to enter the League of Nations. When the argument reaches this stage it appears as though Mr. Kellogg had proposed something more difficult for himself and his country to carry out than he has realised. Such a treaty, widely signed and ratified, with the United States wholeheartedly an adherent, would be a great advance on anything yet secured by the nations for the avoidance of wars. Yet, because the United States once helped largely to inspire and shape a similar plan, embodied in the League Covenant, then withdrew at the eleventh hour, there is no good warranty for being optimistic about the eventual fate of Mr. Kellogg's proposals. The cautious reception his Note has been given is not necessarily due to cynicism or indifference to the cause of peace. Past experience shows that practical measures for the avoidance of war are difficult to devise, and more difficult for the United States than for those to whom it has appealed through the Note to France.