"TRUTH ABOUT JUTLAND"

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXIV, Issue 19727, 29 August 1927, Page 6

"TRUTH ABOUT JUTLAND"

ADMIRAL HAKPER'S BOOK. SUPPORT FOR EARL JELLICOE BROADSIDE FOR HIS CRITICS. FAMOUS SIGNAL OF BEATTY. The more partisan a person is, the more likely 'is he to style his contribution to the controversy as the truth about it. Rear-Admiral J. E. T. Harper, who has written "The Truth About Jutland*," certainly is strongly partisan on the side- of the Jellieoe school arid, while his work will not be the last word upon the greatest fleet action since steam succeeded sail, one feels that he has' good reason for being partisan and that his choice of title is justified. He answers a number of writers who have been as hotly partisan on the side of the Beatty school, and not only gives broadside for broadside, but makes it clear that many of the opposing broadsides >vent. wide of the mark. In a word, he shows that critics of Lord Jellieoe have sometimes been inaccurate as to fact, their deductions therefore sometimes being faulty. Questions for Experts. The heart of the whole matter, of course, is'whether the test of Jutland revealed weaknesses in tactics and strategy, training and ship construction. It certainly did reveal weaknesses in ship construction, which have since been corrected, but with this, the whole question of naval doctrine is one-for experts alone. For instance, only experts may decide whether or no the test proved that the handling of a battlS fleet as a single unit, seven miles long, made it a weapon that was not .sufficiently flexible for such a battle. Leaving these matters to experts, the nation still has a wide field of interest in the general conduct of the battle, an interest that has been stimulated by the controversy that has arisen. Because of this, Admiral Harper's short book will be widely read. Fortunately, it is in language that the lay mind can readily understand. It is not fogged by technical terms, and for that reasoh its effect will be to remove a number of misconceptions from the public mind. Modern Warfare Visualised. Among other things, it rids the reader of the influence of Trafalgar from his judgments. 'I Trafalgar is not mentioned, but there is no doubt that the ordinary mortal has been endeavouring to contrast modern naval warfare with that of the days of Nelson. He knows about the range of modern heavy guns, but perhaps he has failed to grasp the fact that the speed supplied by steam and the range of modern guns have given paramount importance to visibility. With the story of Trafalgar unconsciously influencing his mind, the ordinary man may ask: Why did the German fleet disappear ? Why was there not a fight to a finish? Admiral Harper's "book answers these questions. As to such matters as the famous "Follow me" signal from Beatty, the widelypublished message which caused many people to think that Beatty was the man with the "Nelson touch" and that Jellieoe was the over-cautious strategist, it is just as well to know the exact text of the message which Admiral Beatty sent, that at the time his battle-cruisers were farther away from the German battleships, than Jellicoe's battleships, and that although Jellieoe, believing that Beatty possessed some knowledge that had not reached the Iron Duke, gave orders to follow this "lead," the first battleship of the line, knowing better as to the. situation, exercised discretion to disregard them. Positions of the Fleet. The actual message* sent at 7.50 p.m. was: "Submit van of battleships follow battle cruisers. We can cut off whole of enemy's battle fleet." It was, of course, sent in cipher. "Considerable prominence has been given to this signal in the press," says Admiral Harper. "More especially was this the case immediately after the publication of the official despatches. It may, therefore, be equitable to refer to it in some detail. As our battle fleet was not in sight from the Lion (Admiral Beatty's flagship), it is not clear how Beatty could know in what direction it was then steering. This could have been quickly ascertained by a visual signal to one of the ships bridging the gap. Such a signal was made by Beatty at 8.15 p.m., so why not at 7.50 p.m. also? Again, it is not clear what 'cutting off' is. referred to. There is no suggestion that part of the enemy could be cut off from the main force, but that the whole battle fleet could be cut off. Presumably, therefore, it refers to cutting off the enemy from his base. "The position, course and speed of our battle fleet could not have been improved upon for this purpose. As a fact, at the time the signal originated, the van of the battle fleet was steering the same course as the Lion; was practically following the battle cruisers—if anything the van was a little on the Lion's starboard quarter —and it was also nearer the enemy than was the Lion. An alteration in the course to follow the battle cruisers, at the moment the signal was made, would therefore have caused the van to converge less on the enemy's course than it was actually doing. The message sent was, therefore,' quite unnecessary and likely to mislead the Commander-in-Chief. Effect of the Signal. "This cipher message, which was timed 7.50 p.m., was received in the Iron Duke at 7.04 p.m., and must have led Jellieoe, who would not have seen it until it had .been deciphered some minutes later, to conclude that the battle cruisers, which he could not see, were steering a very different course to that of the battle fleet. Jellieoe at once signalled to the King George V., the van ship, to follow the j battle cruisers, and this order was received by Admiral Jerram at 8.7 p.m. "Meanwhile, at 8 p.m., the batue fleet, had altered course to the west four more points toward the enemy. The signal for this alteration was made by flags, and also by wireless, so it would be received without delay by all ships. The battle cruisers did not, however, turn at once, but for the next quarter of an hour continued on a south-west course. They then altered course to west, toward the enemy, conforming to the movement of the battle fleet. The receipt of the signal to follow the battle cruisers must have puzzled Jerram, because they were not in sight from the King George V. They could not be on his starboard side, because our batile fleet was in that direction and any alteration to port would have led the first division of the battle fleet farther •from the enemy. Jerram, therefore, did the best thing possible and continued on his course." Thus one of the popular misconceptions of the battle is removed. The general impression' of the book is that both admirals fought exactly on the principles that had been laid down, that they did their best in a night of great confusion for which lack of information was mainly responsible (in this regard Admiral Harpe • severely criticises cruiser and destroyer. commanders), and that Admiral Beatty, carrying oniv a fraction of the responsibility of Admiral Jellieoe, had no more of the "Nelson touch" than had the Commander-in-Chief and less of his judgment. , (* *' The Truth About Jutland," RearAdimxal J. F T. Harper. C.8., M.V.0.; John Murray, London.) ]