THE DARDANELLES.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXIV, Issue 19632, 10 May 1927, Page 12

THE DARDANELLES.

MEMOIRS OF THE CAMPAIGN REPORT TO THE CABINET. NEW PLAN OF ATTACK. ' LANDING NORTH OF BULAIR. BY A3HMEAD BART LETT No. vn. At one o'clock on June 11, I received a message from Winston to go to Downing Street to meet the Prime Minister. I was admitted into the sacred council chamber, where for 200 years all great decisions, which have made or marred us, have been taken. Only the Prime Minister and Winston were present. Mr. Asquith, locking as if he had not a care in the world, his face beaming with good nature and benevolence toward all mankind, received me most kindly. Winston produced the maps, and we went over with him the Echeme we had worked out on the previous night. He followed al! the points raised $ with the interest of a professional strategist, and agreed with everything we suggested. He finally expressed himself in favour of a landing at Enos, or just north of Bulair. Putting his finger on the narrow neck of the peninsula, he said, ''lt seems to be the on.'y natural thing to do." We then talked about the possible entry of the Bulgarians into the war, •whereupon he threw up his hands exclaiming with the only emotion he had shown: •'Yes, if we could only get them to come in all would be well." Ho asked me a great number of questions, and when I ■was about to leave, he said: "I wish you would draw me up a short and concise memorandum on the whole situation and let me havo it some time this evening. There is a Cabinet Council to-morrow, and I -would like to have it by me. I would also like you to be present to answer any questions which may bo put to you." I lunched with Lady Hamilton, wife cf Sir lan. Mrs. Pollen, wife of the general's military secretary, and Lady Cunard were also present. Found Lady Hamilton verv much worried about the lack of success in Gallipoli, and I tried to cheer her up by telling her the Government had decided to see the expedition through at all costs, and would send out the necessary reinforcements Finished my memorandum and sent it off to Mr. Asquith. It was as follows: JIEMORAJOJTJM FOR THE CABINET, The Fleet. For the tim 6 being, the Fleet can play no active part in the reduction of the Straits. In fact, our ships now never at-

tempt to be beyond Tott's Battery. The enemy's mine field is intact, the damage to the fortii at the Narrows has been made good, and the existence of concealed torpedo tubes on shore is perhaps the most serious obstacle of all. In addition, the presence of the enemy's submarines has greatly complicated the difficulties. The lighter vessels can, however, assist in keeping down the fire of the enemy's batteries, and from time to time battleships will have to be employed for this purpose, / especially in searching- the ground behind the Kum-Kale Yc-ni-Shehr Ridge on the Asiatic shore. It is a fundamental error to assume any longer that, if we are able to occupy the southern extremity of the peninsula so as to embrace Knlid Bahr and the European shore of tbo Narrows, we have openecl the gate to Constantinople for the Fleet. The enemy has been engaged for two months in fortifying the longer reach of waters 6tretching from the Narrows to the entrance of the Sea of Marmora, by placing heavy guns in field works on both shores'; in preparing new mine fields and torpedo tubes; and, :in addition, he is reported to be prepared to sink ships to guard the passage—a scheme, however, of doubtful Titility. Therefore even with the Kilid Bahr in our possession, wo shall have to tackle the longer reach of waters beyond. Therefore, any operations limited in their objective to the seizure of the Kilid Bahr Plateau can lead to no decisive results. They will merely carry us a certain distance forward and enable us to make a fresh survey of the further task ahead. At the present time our operations both from the Southern Gallipoli and from the Anzac "positions are being directed toward the obtainment of this limited objective, which will not open the gate to Constantinople. Neither is there even a reasonable prospect of their succeeding. v Anzac Position. The Australians at Anzac hold the most extraordinary position in which an army has ever found itself, clinging as they are to the face of the cliffs. Roughly the position consists of two semi circles of mils, the outer higher than the inner. They are extremely well entrenched and cannot be driven from their position by artillery fire or legitimate attacks, ss was shown in the utter failure of tie Turks on May 18 and 19. But a successful use of gas might render their position precarious. The, Turks are entrenched tip to their recks all round them. Toward tha north they are on higher ground, hut toward the south on lower, and in one place thay hold ground which cut? right into our outer lino and enables them to snipe right down Shrapnel Valley. The Australians cannot advance, as anv attempt at a general attack would probably only lead to much the same slaughter as the Turks suffered when making their last. efToft, to which I have referred. The position is he'd by five brigades, and will not hold another man. being already overcrowded. We cannot develop a wider front along the low ground toward the south as long as the' enemy holds the small promontory of Gaba Tepe, which has been transformed into a regular fortress and has defied all our efforts in *pite of the terrific fire to which it has been' subjected by the Fleet. The position at Anzac is, therefore, a complete Stalemate. Position at Seddul Bahr. Here we occupy the»plain at the foot of the Achi Baba position and cannot get in. All our lines are exposed to full View and to the enemy's artillery fire, lie has made the lvrithia-Achi Baba-Kere-ves-Dere position a regular fortress, which rati only be taken trench by trench. Our assaults have repeatedly failed. The position is thoroughly uncomfortable. Our trenches are, however, very strong, and 1 do not think we could be driven off the peninsula bv legitimate attacks. But Once again the employment of gas might render our lines untenable, and Ihe wind P.lrnos-t invariably blows off the shose.

.Again, it is an error to suppose that the possession of Achi Balsa would ?pen fhero ad to Kilicl Bahr. The enemy, according to all information, has been busy making a network o! trenches on the two

lines of hills behind, and all these positions will have to be slowly sapped against nnd then stormed. This will involve heavy joss and great delay. On the ground we hold there is only room for the employment of a limited number of troops, but the reserve divisions can be kept in the neighbouring islands. In time, given sufficient reinforcements and a large supply nf field howitzers, we might slowly work titir way forward and occupy the Kilicl Bahr Plateau. But again I would repeat, this means a vast operation of war, endless delays and then only the attainment cf a limited objective. There, it would se-:m, we must abandon our early objective, and seek for another which should lead to decisive reSuits. We should eliminate any idea of active assistance from the Fleet, except fcuhmarines, and regard the situation purely from t'.ae military standpoint. The

whole o'f the Gallipoli Peninsula has, in fact, been transformed into an immense fortress. We are supposed to be besieging it, but, instead of cutting the enemy s communications and consequently stopping his supplies, wo are endeavouring to force a way forward through the entire length of his successive lines of works. This must be wrong, judged from almost any military standpoint. Therefore, there is only one alternative plan, namely, to concentrate all our efforts to get astride the peninsular, either at, or, rather, north of Bulair. I cannot speak from personal knowledge of the character of the landings available, as I have never been so far north; but all such information is in possession of the naval and military authorities. There will be no need for us actually to storm the lines of Bulair if they are considered too strong. We can establish a fortified line across the peninsula north of them. For this purpose a force of five divisions should ensure success, provided at least two of these divisions are troops which can he absolutely depended upon without a preliminary trial, which has so often proved necessary with our new formations. As far as I know, the landing can be covered and assisted most materially bv the trtins of the Fleet right across to the Straits. This force may seem very large, but it must be borne in mind that the exact numbers of the enemy are not accurately known in Thrace, and we must, ho prepared to meet anv formations he micht send acainst us from the nor*h, in pdd'Hon to those who are now in +he OaP'noli Peninsula. These are, T hdieve. r>sfirnafed to nmonnt to nnvthincr from 70 000 to IOQ.OOO. Personally. T am inclined toward tlje lownr figure, after the heavy losses he has suffered. Suggestions for New Landing. This fresh landing north of BuJair will force the enemy to conform to our plan of campaign, more especially if it can be carried out as a surprise. The Turks are now entrenched in fixed positions opposite Anzac and at Achi Baba. You cannot move troops thus entrenched rapidly. All his guns are in fixed positions, and would take days to move north to meet the new me.iace. I would not advocate using the troops now at Seddul Bahr and Anzac for this new movement, but it might be desirable to takes off three of the Australian brigades, and placo new formations in their trenches. These Australians, who have been brought up to strength, are now experienced and extremely good in enterprises which require dash and initiative. The troons at Seddul Bahr should bo left. The 29th Division and the Naval Division have had a very rough time, and probably the East Lancashire Division have lost heavily by now. The Lowland Division might, however, be spared to form one of the five. Confidence of Succoss. If our estimate of the enemy's numbers is correct, he cannot possibly have enough men available successfully to oppose a landing on a 'broad front. He must, therefore, weaken his forces in front of Anzac, and draw men from Achi Baba. But he dare not weaken his lines very considerably in the face of the troops we are keeping on these positions. At both points no must be prepared to take the offensive the moment he shows si'jns of withdrawing. Once firmly established and entrenched across the neck of the. peninsula, the campaign is at an end. The Turkish armies in Gallipoli could not hold.out for ten days. Tliey would have no reserve of supplies on the peninsula. Everything is brought by sea from Constantinople, or comes across the lines of Bulair from Thrace. Already the task of feeding their troops is difficult enough. The presence of a few more of our submarines in tho Sea of Marmora would render the task impossible, once we are astride the neck. Torpedoes arid stores and oil could be supplied to the submarines by land, and thev would no longer have to run the dangerous passage of the straits. The demoralising effect on the Turkish armies in Southern Gallipoli of a new force landed right in their rear across the lines of communication should not bo forgotten.

Diversion by the French.

It would also be desirable to allow the French, if they can spare the available troops, to make a fresh landing at Kum Kale, and occupy the Kum Kale-Yeni Shehr Ridge. This would have the effect of diverting the enemy's attention, forcing him to keep his troops on the Asiatic coast, and would also prevent him harassing the beaches of Southern Gallipoli by erecting new batteries, which he is constantly trying to do. Only a small force is reouirod for this purpose, and the French staff have always favoured its reoccupation. Quite apart from the broader aspects of its effects on the war as a whole, there seems to me to be two local reasons why it is highly desirable-to make some decisive move in Gallipoli. The one, the ever-constant fear that the enemy may resort to the'use of gas, in which case we might easily be driven into the sea; secondly, the fear of an outbreak of cholera among the Turkish troops, which might spread to our own. In November, 1912, they lost 19,000 men in ten days along the lines of Chataldja. This outbreak was brought by the troops coming from Asia Minor. *

In conclusion, once you get astride the peninsula the campaign is won. You have only then to clear the minefield and get your fleet through to Constantinople. The real obstacle to success'is the presence of submarines, and we must be prepared to lose some ships. Lord Balfour's Attitude. In the evening I dined with Lady Elcho to meet Mr. Balfour. Encountering him in the n.idst of a crumbling world was like arriving in a beautiful green, well-watered oasis, after struggling for mouths amid the storms and desert sands. Hi 3 outward mien showed complete detachment from the war, politics, intrigues and the* world around him. Having been appointed First Lord of the Admiralty, ho was particularly interested in the naval side expedition, and he made me describe, in great detail the operations of the fleet up to date, the loss of the Goliath, the Triumph and the Majestic, the state of the crews, and the general military situation. I soon discovered he was determined to see the expedition through, was convinced of its paramount importance. lie then spoke very" freely of the war and of his colleagues When I told him the military authorities deliberately suppressed the truth from their chiefs at home he said, "Yes, I find the greatest difficulty in getting all the information I require. I hope you will tell them out there they neod not be afraid of me. But I do not know about my predecessor." Of K.tchener. he said, "Everyone seems afraid of him I cannot understand what they are frightened of. You will find him a harmless enoufh old centlemnn. somewhat slow in grasping points when they are placed be fore him, but; far from inspiring this vag-no terror." I banded him a copy of the memorandum T had prepared for the Prime Minister, and he read it with grent care, roing through every detail with me Then he had had enough of the war, and tallied on a preat many other subjects with deliirhtf"! charm n<vl en e o, w.*<; evid<»ntlv resting his brain before confronting the problems of the morrow. (To be Continued , Daily.)