THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 16, 1927. DEADLOCK IN CHINA.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXIV, Issue 19563, 16 February 1927, Page 10

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 16, 1927. DEADLOCK IN CHINA.

■ 11 The prospect of a settlement of the perturbing trouble in the East cannot be said to brighten.. Against the report that Mr, O'Malley's communication to London during the week-end has raised hopes there of the early completion of a satisfactory agreement must be set the news from Hankow that the negotiations between him and Mr. Chen have as yet come to, nothing. There is room . to fear that these negotiations have broken down. The Cantonese representative has achieved so sinister a reputation for bad faith that it requires an undue measure of optimism to believe that he will facilitate an understanding. The position is still complicated by the internal situation, which shows no convincing evidence of union, for any pacific purpose, among the competing iactions. They are each so ambitious of dominance that it is not to be expected that any one of them will forego hope of that for the sake of coming to terms with the treaty Powers. It is significant of this that China's permanent delegate at Geneva has declared that he will represent both Peking and Canton at the next meeting of the League Council, justifying this announcement by the statement — " We may have internal differences, but we are united in our external policy." The announcement offers but cold comfort. He has made no secret of his own virulent antipathy to foreign intervention in general and British policy in particular. The only union he can promise is one of bitter antagonism to the foreigner, and, even were Mr. Chen content to let Mr. Chu speak for Canton as well as for Peking, it would only be to voice a belligerently hostile intent toward the foreigner. A Hankow agreement is worth every effort that Mr. O'Malley can make, for it would restore normal conditions of commercial intercourse at a critical point and pave the way for further negotiations; but the likelihood of its early achieving is slender. It must be remembered that, even if the warring factions present a fully united front in external policy, and be willing for the nonce to employ this unanimity in negotiations, the Powers would have only a meagre guarantee that those negotiations would be worth conducting. So long as there persists the rivalry that has rent China in domestic there remains a grave risk of any understanding being repudiated by one or other of the war-lords. A settlement on this basis to-day would, probably be upset to-morrow. Such a settlement, the only one immediately practicable, is not to be despised altogether; but China's overcoming of her seemingly quenchless quarrels is essential to any settlement having permanent value, and it is this black background of doubt that dwarfs the hopes recently raised by the negotiations between Mr. O'Malley and Mr. Chen. Nor ought it to be forgotten that this grave un-certainty—-whether any spokesman of China can give the requisite pledges that an agreement will be honoured—strengthens tlfe necessity I for precautions lest foreign nationals j be further perilously harassed. Too much has been made of the prejudicial effect of sending defensive forces. It must be agreed that military inaction on the part of the British Government would have been culpable. Perhaps too little care was earlier exercised to prevent an aggressive meaning being read into these military measures, but latterly it has been made abundantly clear that the Government was taking barely minimum precautions. That the immense

crowds of Chinese 'lining thef route of the troops landed at Shanghai have, evinced.no open hostility gives answer to those sections of the British press and those party politicians who have condemned the Government. These Chinese are part of the four hundred millions that'these eager critics have said would be provoked by the presence of augmented British troops to rise in murderous hate. They have calmly seen the forces arrive. Apparently, they scen£ no aggressive intent. If requisite care be exercised, nothing untoward should happen. But that foreign nationals have been imperilled is so certain that at least a defensive demonstration has had ample warrant, and so long as lawlessness is rampant that risk persists. The present deadlock cannot be overcome by League intervention. The League is expressly precluded from meddling with the domestic affairs of any nation, and it can take no hand in dealing with the internecine rivalry that is the most vexatiously disturbing factor in the present position. Even the Hankow negotiations can do no more than offer an approach to a satisfactory settlement of the whole trouble. They have never been more than an effort by one Powes to get into friendly relations with a section of divided China. What is required is an understanding between a united China—or at least a China governed by an authority sufficiently strong and stable to be able to keep promises of good government—and all the Powers with interests .in the East. There was an understanding of this sort five years ago at Washington. It. failed to achieve its purpose. Its first practical essay —the Peking Tariff Conference—was wrecked by China. But this method ought to be tried again. " Back to Washington " offers more hope of a stable settlement "than anything yet attempted.