THE GREAT WAR.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXIV, Issue 19563, 16 February 1927, Page 15

THE GREAT WAR.

CHURCHILL'S MEMOIRS. FAILURE OF NIVELLE'S PLAN. CRITICAL SITUATION ARISES. FRENCH ARMY DEMORALISED. jpr THE TIT. HON'. WINSTCN CHURCHILL. (Copyright.—By arrangement with tho Times, London.) No. IX. The retrograde movement of the Gcrjnan army on the Western front, rumoured for some clays, was first detected on the front of the British Fifth Army. On February 24 suspicion -was aroused by the Herman artillery shelling its own trench lines. -British patrols found the hostile trenches empty. The Fifth Army operations order said: "The enemy is believed to be withdrawing." Immense clouds of smoke and the glare of incendiary fires by night proclaimed the merciless withdrawal of the enemy. On the 25th lie was reported as much as 18,000 yards back in certain sectors, and on February 28 the British Intelligence spoka of a retirement to the Ilindenburg lines. However absorbed a commander may be in the elaboration of his own jt is necessary sometimes to take the enemy into consideration. Joffre's plan had been to bite the great German salient jn February; and whether it would have succeeded or not no man can tell. The Nivelle plan was to bite it with still larger forces in April. But by March the Calient had ceased to exist. Three out of Nivelle's five armies, which [were to have been employed in the assault, were now separated by a gulf of devastated territory from their objective. All their railroads, all their roads, all their magazines were so far removed from the enemy's positions that at least two months would bo required to drag tliem forward into a new connection with the war. The remaining two armies were left with no other possibility before them than to deliver disconnected frontal attacks on. the strongest parts of the old German line. Nivelle's Plans to Proceed. , In these circumstances Nivelle's directive to tho British armies under his control is of great interest. Time, distance, numbers, direction—all were changed. Yet it was decreed that the principle was unaffected, and that the enterprise should proceed. Painlevo became Minister of War on March 19.. The hour was now imminent. The vast preparations were everywhere moving forward to explosion point, iho British Cabinet had been won over. The British Headquarters had been persuaded. The co-operation of England, the great ally, had by a tremendous effort been obtained, and once obtained would be given .with crude and downright force. To resist the plan, to dismiss the commander, meant not only a Ministerial and a Parliamentary crisis—possibly fatal to the Government—but it also meant throwing the whole plan of campaign for the year into tlio melting-pot and presuniably, though not certainly, resigning the initiative to the Germans. So Nivelle and Fainleve, these two men whose highest ambitions had both been newly and almost simultaneously gratified, found themselves in the most unhappy positions which disillusioned mortals can occupy; the commander having to dare the utmost risks with an utterly sceptical chief behind him; the Minister having to become responsible for a frightful slaughter at the bidding of a general in whose capacity he did not believe, and upon a military policy of the folly of which he was justly convinced. Such is tho pomp of power! Hopes and Confidence Withered. ' I shall not attempt to describe the course either of the French offensive which began on April 16 or of the brilliant preliminary operation by which the British Army at the battle of Arras captured the whole of tho Vimy Ridge. By the evening of the 16th Niv.elle's high hopes and confidence had withered, and his orders for the resumption of battle on the 17th implied not merely tactical modifications, but the substitution of far more moderate strategic aims. The later phases of the battle were in pome respects more successful than its beginning; nor were the losses of the French so disproportionate to those of the Germans as in Joffre offensives. In fact, Hie Nivelle offensive was tho least costlv, both actually and relatively to the enemy's loss, of any ever undertaken by the French. But the general could never escape from the consequences of his sanguine declarations. Again and again ho had affirmed that, unless the rupture was immediate and total within 24 or 48 hours, it would be useless to continue the operations. He had predicted such a rupture with many circumstances of detail. Almost every one had doubted before. Now ah doubts were certainties. The slaughter, woeful to the shrunken manhood of France, was fiercely exaggerated. Disturbances broke out among the troops, and in the capital a storm of fury arose ■ against the general. His wish to convert the great operation into a more modest enterprise was brushed aside. On Aprili 29 Potain became, as Chief of the General Staff, tho adviser of the French Cabinet on the whole conduct of the military operations. British Army's Insistence. The Prime Minister's power to restrain the British High Command had been compromised by his facile and even enthusiastic acceptance of General Nivelle's schemes. The British Headquarters, on the other hand, were in a strong position. For the first time they had found tho "politicians" eager advocates of a great offensive in the West. For their part they had for once been the more cautious. They had concealed their misgivings about Nivelle s farreaching aims. They had actually been subordinated to him against their will for the purpose of the operation, and the operation had failed in tho most obvious manner. It was their turn to shake their heads about rash endeavours to pierce "the German front, and to plume themselves upon the caution they had recently observed. Now that the offensive had been opened thev were resolute to persevere. The British Army should be thrown ungrudgingly into the battle of attrition, and every effort must bo made to induce the French to exert themselves unceasingly to the utmost. They found in Mr. Lloyd George at this juncture a strong supporter. His action cannot be judged apart from the situation. Tho hour was tragic. The U-boat sinkings for April, surpassing all previous records, had reached the total of 800,000 tons. The'fatal curves was still rising, and in British minds it dominated everything. " Let the armies fight while time remained." Or in Lord Fisher's challenging phrase, " Can the Army win (he war before the Navy loses it?" The 3'rime Minister, tho Commander-in-Chief and Sir William Robertson proceeded "together to Paris, and in conference on May 4 and 5, Mr. Lloyd George addressed to Messieurs Ribot and Painleve, General Petain somo of the most strenn-* oiis exhortations to continue the offensive that have .ever passed between Allips But the demoralisation of the French 'Army was proceeding apace. Want of confidence in their leader, cruel losses, -and an active defeatist propaganda had produced an intense spasm throughout its Jwxks.

Mutinies—some of a very dangerous character—occurred in 16 separate army corps. Some of the finest troops were involved. Divisions elected councils. Whole' regiments set out for Paris to demand a peace by negotiation, and more home leave. A Russian force of about 15,000 infantry had, before the revolution, been sent to be armed and equipped in France. These men were affected by the political developments in their own country. They had put it to the vote whether they should take part in the battle of April 16, and had decided by a majority to do so. Thej l were used by the French in a ruthless manner, and nearly 6000 had been killed or wounded. The survivors went into open revolt. One sentence of the manifesto reveals the propaganda of a master hand. "We have been told," ,so the complaint begins, "that we have .been sent to France to pay for munitions sold to Russia." It was not until prolonged artillery fire had been employed against these troops that they were reduced to submission and disbanded. The spirit of the French nation was not unequal to this perilous trial. On May 15, Nivelle, refusing to resign, was dismissed, and Petain became Commander-in-Chief. Loyal troops surrounded those who had fallen from their duty. Old Territorials, the fathers of families, pleaded with the infuriated linesmen. The disorders were pacified or suppressed. Over all a veil of secrecy was thrown so impenetrable that, though scores of thousands of Frenchmen were concerned, no whisper ever reached the enemy. In a very few days it became clear to the British Headquarters that there could be no continuance of the French offensive. The French Army would require all its life-strength to regain its discipline and self-confidence. Nevertheless, proiiting by Mr. Lloyd George's encouragement and no doubt deeply concerned by the condition of the French, the British High Command decided to persevere singlehanded with their Arras operations, and lost without attaining any further strategic result 9367 officers and 178,416 men between April and June. (To be Continued Daily.)