THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. THURSDAY, OCTOBER 28, 1926. FRANCE AND SYRIA.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXIII, Issue 19470, 28 October 1926, Page 8

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. THURSDAY, OCTOBER 28, 1926. FRANCE AND SYRIA.

If it is true, as it is reported, that France is making ready to withdraw from Syria, provided this can be done without loss of prestige, it will not be surprising. Administration of the territory as mandatory under the League of Nations has brought the French no profit, little credit, and a great deal of difficulty, danger and expense. The mandatory Power is not supposed to lock for profit. Its duty was expressed by a French official, addressing a session of the Permanent Mandates Commission when it held a special session at Rome last February to inquire into conditions in Syria. M. de Caix, the French representative, theu said: —"The mandate is a provisional system designed to enable populations which, politically speaking, are still minors, to educate themselves so as to arrive one day at full self-govern-ment." The statement is quite in tune with the highest ideals ever expressed concerning the system. If France is conscious of having failed to make any substantial progress toward that objective—and there is plenty of evidence that she has so failed—if French statesmen are without hope of better success in future, to withdraw with as little conviction of failure or loss of prestige as possible would be a natural move. So far all is plain, easy to understand. An extraordinary new issue is introduced by the further report that France is negotiating with Italy, with a view to having Syria placed under Italian care, France to receive concessions over Tangier in return. For a self-confessed failure in the administration of a trust to nominate its successor, and receive a quid pro quo in return, is something entirely novel in international or any other affairs. Syria was handed over to France as a ward, under the League of Nations, by the San Remo Conference of 1920, which apportioned among the Allies, for control, the former Turkish possessions in Asia won from the enemy, it may be noted almost wholly by British arms. Various adjustments of the boundaries there established have been mads since. Cilicia, part of the original mandate area, was handed back to the Angora Government in October, 1921, when France signed the Franklin-Bouillon Treaty with the new Turkey. It was freely asserted at the time that France was not justified in dealing thus with territory held on the terms which the mandate implied. No formal protest was made, and the change has now come to be fully accepted. It is not a precedent, however, applicable in any way to the suggested intention with regard to the balance of Syria. It is neither for France to offer nor for Italy to accept charge of this country. It is said France will return the mandate to the League of Nations. No procedure exists for the abandonment of such responsibilities, but this is correct judged by ordinary common sense. The mandate came from the League. It should return whence it came. The mandate, however, is only the statement of terms under which Syria is held and administered by France. The actual allocation of the territory was made, as stated, by the San Remo Conference. This is in keeping with the whole procedure adopted for the disposal of ex-enemy territory after the war. The League made no apportionment. The Allied Powers did that. Neither can there be found in the Covenant of the League any authority to dispossess the mandatory Power, or to appoint another in its place. If anyone, the Allied Powers should perform this duty. It is certainly not for the nation relinquishing its trust to appoint or even nominate its successor. Because it is not in keeping with the spirit or the letter of existent responsibilities that France and Italy should bargain over the disposal of Syria, it does not follow that France should not abandon the mandate or that Italy should not receive it. The adoption of a wrong preliminary procedure does not necessarily outlaw the end in view. On the present evidence it would indeed be a good thing if France, gave up the unequal struggle to pacify the people and administer the territory successfully. Things have obviously gone so hopelessly awry, the prospect of removing the ill-will created by a long series of preliminary blunders seems so poor, that a complete withdrawal by France would probably be a good move. If some other nation, with no such unfortunate legacy, stepped in, the result might well be an improvement—it could hardly be a worsening—of the present situation. When it comes to considering the successor, there might be a worse choice than Italy. Judged by neighbouring responsibilities and by success as a mandatory, Britain would have a strong claim. But Britain would certainly be very reluctant to accept further commitments in the Near East. There would be certain advantages in holding this connecting link between Palestine and Irak, but to take it over would mean expense, anxiety, and, for a certainty, renewal of that violent controversy which once raged over Irak. Italy has the advantage of propinquity, strong interests in the Mediterranean littoral, and some experience in handling the peoples of the Near East. The decision, none the less, can scarcely be made on the basis of what is most convenient. Stability, tranquillity, and the ultimate good of the Syrian people are much more important considerations. They cannot be neglected even if tne whole settlement of San Remo is to be thrown into the melting pot. Still less can they be disposed of privately and comfortably by Italy and France in exclusive and private -conferences. ft ' '