THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. TUESDAY, OCTOBER 6, 1925. BRITAIN AND MOSUL.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXII, Issue 19141, 6 October 1925, Page 8

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. TUESDAY, OCTOBER 6, 1925. BRITAIN AND MOSUL.

The Turks are growing increasingly .truculent concerning their claim to the vilayet of Mosul, that stretch of disputed territory lying to the north of Irak. Consequently there has been a searching of hearts to determine what should be the British attitude in the event of a deadlock, with threats of action accompanying it. The frontier has been in dis- | pute since the Treaty of Lausanne was signed. At that time Britain —as mandatory for Irak —and Turkey, being unable to agree on the dividing line, agreed instead that the question should be referred to the league of Nations. It has been sub judice since that time. In October last year the Turks were raiding into the debated land. The Council of the League then declared a provisional frontier, a few miles south of the line which Britain | claims. This boundary, known as | the "Brussels Line," has been reasonably well respected until recently, when the Turks were detected massing troops behind it. There have been raids, accompanied by ugly incidents, so that it is being asked seriously whether Britain does not risk facing a real crisis owing to her responsibilities in Irak. The frontier question was before the recent League Assembly. It has been deferred until December, legal questions having been referred to the International Court meantime. The League had for its guidance the report of a commission which investigated the frontier dispute. Its findings, curiously indecisive in some respects, in the main approved the retention of Mosul as a part of Irak. The case which Britain presents has much to support it. A straight-out declaration for it would probably settle the question. Delay and hesitation are in favour of the Turkish method of bluster carried as far as it can be taken.. What should not be forgotten is that the point at issue is not really between Britain and Turkey. If Mosul is denied to the Turk, it will not become British territory. It will become a permanent part of the independent State of Irak. Britain holds the mandate over that country. Even the impermanent role of mandatory Power has been lessened in scope and period by voluntary British action. A treaty has been made, designed to supersede the relationship of ward and guardian which a mandate implies. Under its terms Britain undertakes, if conditions are favourable, to hand the administration of Irak over to its King and people with a few reservations, by the end of 1928. One of the points on which it is necessary to be very completely satisfied is the safety of the country. So long as this Mosul dispute remains unsettled, the stabilisation necessary as a condition precedent to the fulfilment of the treaty terms must be delayedf. Should the Turks gain their objective and establish themselves on the line they demand, Britain will have to reconsider very seriously the question of relinquishing responsibility for the remainder of Irak. The frontier contained in the British proposal is strategically valuable, as favouring easy defence in the north. The "Brussels Line," i favoured by the League Commission, is almost as good from that viewpoint. If the Turks gained the day, they could establish themselves behind a boundary offering no barrier to ready invasion. This is admitted in the commission's findings. Therefore Britain cannot readily accept the Turkish demands. Strategic considerations would not necessarily over-ride all others, but there is a case to be made against Turkey on racial and economic grounds also. At the League Assembly all factors pointed to the decision going against Turkey. That probably explains the hectoring tone used by the delegates from Angora both &t Geneva and since the Assembly sittings ended. It is against Britain that Turkey is making veiled threats, designed to influence the Mosul decision, but basically the responsibility does not rest on Britain alone. Irak is actually a charge of the League of Nations, placed in Britain's care. If Turkey, having agreed to accept the arbitrament of the League on the frontier issue, makes threats and moves troops, the threats are against the League and all that it represents. Yet in concentrating on Britain Turkey is, possibly hoping to see repeated what happened immediately before the Lausanne Conference, Having defeated Greece in the field, and recaptured Smyrna, the Turk moved his forces against the troops in occupation at the Dardanelles. Britain was left to face this demonstration of force with little moral and no material support from the other nations which were equally concerned in enforcing conditions placed on Turkey as the result of defeat in the war. Much was then conceded in the desire to preserve the peace. The Turk was allowed to gain by a policy of trucu | lence. What is now threatening over Mosul can be traced directly back to the events of that critical ti.m-3. Having succeeded once Tur key is evidently prepared to try again the suggestion of military action against war-weary Europe.

Alarms have ferten sounded in Britain to an extent which led MrL. C. S. Amery, Secretary of State for the Dominions, to utter a bitter protest a few days ago. The inference behind the dismal prophecies is that Britain runs the risk of being embroiled in war, and that Britain should withdraw from Irak. But if Britain is left alone this time to face the Turk, the League of Nations will be stamped for all time as impotent. Britain's prestige is involved, but so is that of all Europe and of the League. The exact point in dispute at Mosul may or may not be vitally important. The implications of the situation are wide and serious. Britain to the lesser degree, and the League much more, are conl cerned in establishing a settlement | which shall show that everything ' does not go the way of a nation pre--1 pared to be as truculent as the Turk is proving himself.