THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. WEDNESDAY, APRIL 9, 1924. MEDITERRANEAN POLICIES.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXI, Issue 18680, 9 April 1924, Page 8

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. WEDNESDAY, APRIL 9, 1924. MEDITERRANEAN POLICIES.

New currents are astir in. the Mediterranean. They are moving sluggishly at present, but the movement is unmistakable to those who care to read the signs. France, it is just stated, contemplates an extended naval building programme, the vessels being designed with a special eye to Mediterranean service. The reason given is that which is self-evident. France looks to her African colonies as a vast reservoir of man-power in case of war. The shortest sea route for transport is across the Mediterranean. Hence the policy of building so that there may be ships of war to keep that waterway safe for the passage of transports. Italy has made ro secret of her ambition to seize the hegemony of the Mediterranean peoples. A recent rapprochement •with Spain was witnessed, the result of which must necessarily bo, in some degree, a new orientation of policy toward the great inland sea which both nations front. Britain, the keeper of the gateway at each end, proposes to send more ships to these waters when the present Empiro cruise is ended. She must be classed among the great Mediterranean powers. Her territory in this region is not extensive, but it is of mighty significance. The Power which holds Gibraltar and Malta, and guards the Suez Canal, is the Power most to be reckoned with in formulating a Mediterranean policy. Italy knows this. Spain has long known it. France, it may be assumed, realises it, though tho naval expansion described in today's cable messages should not be interpreted as a tilt at British supremacy. It is more military than naval strategy in essence.

Franco is acting. Italy is planning and aspiring- If Mussolini and his Fascists continue long to direct Italian policy, there is likely to be a race for naval supremacy in the narrow waters, a race to which Britain cannot remain indifferent. At present, with the controversy over Singapore, and the necessarily world-wide naval preoccupations of the Empire, little public attention has been given to Mediterranean developments. A few months ago there was signed an international convention denning the status and establishing the government oil Tangier. This port occupies a commanding position at the entrance to the Mediterranean, practically equivalent to that of Gibraltar. The convention categorically forbids the construction of fortifications. One publicist, however, insists that as a deep-water harbour is to be constructed, Tangier will be transformed into an ideal submarine base, from which the Straits could be effectively sealed in time of war— i a time, moreover, when international undertakings are apt to go to the wall. This factor was said to have supplied the motive for Italy's strenuous endeavour to secure representation at the Tangier Convention. Italy, in fact, can be detected showing supreme discontent with the .strategic position she faces. Whoever holds the key to the westward pass— Straits of Gibraltar—jt is not Italy. Turning eastward, she faces wider waters, but the British at Malta, and the French at Tunis, together dominate the vital passage. These circumstances are not likely to smother Italian ambitions. They are calculated to make them more intense and more stubborn.

To all three Powers cited, the importance of the Mediterranean is in the access it gives to territory outside Europe. The role France sees it playing in future has already been explained. For Britain, while the importance of Egypt has diminished, there remains still the Suez Canal- An attempt was made some time ago to prove that, as the speed of sea transport has increased, and as the submarines" have made narrow waters especially perilous in time of war, the old Cape route to India has gained value at the expense of Suez. This view has not been, allowed to pass unchallenged. The probabilities are that in peace or war, the Suez Canal will continue an enormously important waterway to Britain. If India is reasonably accessible by other seas, interests in Palestine and Irak have grown up to reinforce the importance of the Suez route. Italy has not the same volume of material possessions to consider. But Italy has great and growing commercial ambitions. The trade of the East means much to her. The dream of the Mediterranean an Italian lake is partly the result of national pride, partly the product of plans for commercial expansion covering both European and African shores, and, beyond them, the great . potential field of Asia. Thus, apart from smaller nations which must be interested, there are three great Powers with plans, commitments, or ambitions in the Mediterranean. Their policies cannot exist side by side without contact. They must cross and recross. Thus, whatever Britain may think or do amid her crowding preoccupations elsewhere, Italy will not fail to note that France proposes to strengthen her naval forces in the Mediterranean. New developments by one will produce counter-moves by others, despite the League of Nations or naval pacts. Thus the currents now moving sluggishly can be expected to gather force until the Mediterranean witnesses new activities to replace those which languished with the elimination of { Austria as a naval powar.