GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LX, Issue 18567, 27 November 1923, Page 4

GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN.

CHMCHILE MEMOIKS. DISSENSION IN COALITION. $ —- HEAVY COST OF BELAYS. NEW FORCES FOR DEFENCE. BY THE RT. HON. WINSTON S. CHURCHILL. (Copyright). The conclusions of the Dardanelles Committee of June 7 were brought before Vie Cabinet on the 9th ; and a very hot discussion arose on the general principle of whether the Dardanelles enterprise should bo persevered in, or whether we should "cut our loss" and come away. This was, in fact, going over the wuole process by which the Dardanelles Committee had arrived at their conclusions. The sense of the Cabinet on the whole was, however, clearly with the committee, and in the end it was agreed that the three divisions should go as reinforcements to Sir lan Hamilton. There was, however, from the outset to the end, a duality of opinion in the Cabinet which, although it did not follow party lines, resembled a party cleavage, and at every stage in the rest, of the Dardanelles operations caused serious embarrassment. Had the Prime Minister possessed or been able to acquire plenary authority, and had he been permitted to exercise it during May and June Without distraction or interruption, it is my belief, based u-.on daily-acquaintance with these transactions, that he would have taken the TOCMcrw, which even at this stage would have r-vulted in securing a decisive victory. Put from the moment of the lorraaticn of the Coalition power waS disbursed .wnd counsels were divided, and even military decision had to be carried bv tie same sort of process of tact, temporising, and exhaustion which occurs over a clause in a keenly-contested Bill in the Ho.*;e of Commons in time of peace. These- facts are stated not with a view oi maki:,v reproaches where all were equally sincere 0 and equally well-meaning, but to explain the melancholy turn of events.

Rapidity Vital to Success. Wo had now at length got on June 9 the kind of decisions which were necessary to carry the ei».erprise through to ■ success. There was no military reason of any kind why the decisions which were reached on June 7 and June 9 should not have been taken within forty-eight hours of Sir lan Hamilton s telegram of May 17. But from causes in which the enemy had no part, which arose solely from" the confusion into which the governing instrument in this country had been thrown, from a fortnight to three weeks were lost for ever. The consequences were momentous. Time was the dominating factor. The extraordinary mobility and unexpectedness of amphibious power can only be exerted in strict relation to limited periods of time. The surprise, the rapidity, and the intensity of the attack are all dependent on the state of the enemy's preparations at a given moment. Every movement undertaken on one side can be matched by a counter-movement on the other. Force and time in this kind of operation amount to almost the same thing, and each can to a very large extent be expressed in terms of the other. A week lost was about the same as a division. , Three divisions in February could have occupied the Gallipoli Peninsula with little fighting. Five could have have captured it after March 18. Seven were insufficient at the end of April, but nine might have just done it. Eleven might have sufficed at the beginning of July, fourteen were to prove insufficient on August 7. Moreover one delay breeds another.

Month's Needless Delay. The date of the next great attack on the j Gallipoli Peninsula was governed by two factors—the arrival of the new army, and to a lesser extent by the stato of the moon. It was considered that a surprise landing at a fresh point could best be effected on a moonless night. If, there- j fore, the dark period of July was missed, j the operation in the particular form adopted must, stand over till the similar period in August. It will be seen by reference to the decision of the Dardanelles Committee of Jim©- 7 that they contemplated an attack in the second week in July, and "believed that the three new divisions would all have arrived by then. This would, have been the moat favourable moment. It could certainly have been achieved if the decision had been taken promptly on the receipt of Sir lan Hamilton's telegram, or if, pending a general decision on policy, the despatch of reinforcements by divisions could have proceeded >while the 'Government were considering the matter. Bui; as it was, the troops that it was now decided to send did not or could not arrive in time for a July attack. The three New Army divisions did' not, in fact, finish arriving until July had ended. Thus the great battle of Anzac and Suvla Pay was fought in the second week v of August, instead of, as would have been perfectly practicable, in the early part of Jvly. During the month that was thus lost, i.<.., :Erom the beinning of July to the beginning of August, 10 new Turkish divisions, or their equivalent, besides in portant drafts, according to our now certain knowledge, reached the defenders of the Peninsula. And thus our new divisions, whteh we had at last decided to send, and which if sent in time would have given us a good superiority, were equated and cancelled out before they got to the spot._ Adverse Circumstances, Moreover, in the interval our land forces were greatly wasted and reduced by sickness and casualties, and the fleet was exposed to continuous danger from submarines. The Germans acquired #an ever-increasing control of the Turkish Army, and the whole' methods of defence were in consequence far better organised. The defeats of the Russians in Galicin during June and July produced a marked change in the fighting spirit of the Turks on the Peninsula. The removal from Batoum of General lotomine's army, which was thrown into the main Russian battlefields, liberated the- considerable forces which the Turks had been forced to keep concentrated at or near Midia to guard against a landing there. Before June was half over it a became clear that the reinforcements could not- reach the Dardanelles in time for a July battle. The second week in August was the esirliest date when the troops would be there and the nights would be moonless. Mr. Balfour by most strenuous exertions was able to undertake the transport of additional troops: For this purpose he had recourse once again to the great liners Aquitania, Mauretania and Olympic. For several weeks everyone had .shrunk from using these giants on acount of the awful consequences if they were sunk with seven or eight thousand men on board. The new First Lord, as he gradually began to measure and appraise the values and hazards in thb terrible sphere, re solved to repeat the action which I had taken, providentially without misadventure, six weeks before. In the end, theretore, the two extra divisions were ordered jo sail, and it was certain they would ESLSi tlm , e tor the August battle. fcX S £ l - ho Turks alB ° n their side ««usi, moving. "War Situation Reviewed. Un i .Tune in. t »8 further E en J, i m P the followCabinet. I l n S ,ne !™>»ndura for the «» ration which «l" d in this to "how *»*Uw took to ?he wl "W* on the Dar«'d concluded the ,o, ° field of the war, 10. However th e9 r morandum «>»«- approached, the doml v ? 1 Problems .are dear sequence, Qonuaan needs emerge in Secondly*, t?Sflv R ?r ia « ,nr 1916 - &."■ npainst Austria SPJH Balk *n State. ?;_ the Central'S^ ? £&*& thus 103 Ife. front, and w tg a new ; ; Italy. aWOe time protecting

Thirdly, to nurse France through the winter* But in order that a voice may ho heard amid the indistinct murmurings or unconvincing assertions of the various Governments, it is necessary that one of the Powers should speak, not only with the consciousness of a clear policy, but with the indespensable prestige of victory. It is open to Great Britain now to take the necessary lead in the Allied Councils. She commands tfio sea. In that respect her primary weapon lias vindicated itself even more decisively than the Gorman army. She wields the power of the purse. She" is becoming an important arsenal of munitions. Her military strength, which has for 'some months been respectable, is growing substantially. # She only requires victory" to give her the ascendancy without which no good common action is to be expected. 11. There can be no doubt that we now possess the means and the power to take Constantinople before the end of the summer if wo act with decision and with a due sense of proportion. The striking down of one of the three hostile Empires against which we are contending, and the fall to our arms of one of the most famous capitals in the world, with the results which must flow therefrom, will, conjoined with our other advantages, confer upon us a far-reaching influence among the Allies, and enable us to ensure their indispensable co-operation. Most of all, it will react on Russia. It will give the encouragement so sorely needed. It will give the reward so long desired. It will render a service to an Ally unparalleled in the history 01 nations. It will multiply the resources and open the channel for the re-equipment of the Russian armies. It will dominate the Balkan situation and cover Italy. It will resound through Asia. Here is the prize, and the only prize, which lies within reach this year. It can certainly be won without unreasonable expense, and within a comparatively short time. But we must act now, and on a scale which makes speeiiv success certain. W.S.C, June 38. 1*915. (To be continued daily.)