THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 24, 1923. MILITARY DEFENCES.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LX, Issue 18565, 24 November 1923, Page 10

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 24, 1923. MILITARY DEFENCES.

The projected visit to Australia and New Zealand of the Chiof of the Imperial General Staff is calculated to prove of service in placing the military defences of these Imperial outposts on a better footing. There is need for a thorough overhaul of these defences. Hitherto, there has been a general lack of definiteness about the policies' controlling them. Loose organisation has been the rule. Arrangements for military training, equipment, and mobilisation have been more or less haphazard. There have been spasms of activity: the Great War occasioned some of the most notable. But such [ intermittent enthusiasm is more than ! unsatisfactory. It is perilous, and anything likely to bring it to an end is to be welcomed. It is true that Lord Cavan will have no instructions to report on antipodean defences. In view of the accepted practice of leaving each of the overseas territories to its own devices in military affairs, no such instructions could very well be given. Nevertheless, his acceptance of the invitations of Australia and New Zealand will make his expert advice available to the Governments of these territories, and so, without implying any right of British dictation in these affairs, minister to a heightened efficiency in them. So far as New Zealand goes, the country has hardly known its own mind for any period long enough to achieve anything of high value. Our part in the war was no ignoble one. When the crisis came, there were courage and enthusiasm waiting for the recruiting officer, and our men wrote a name for themselves and their great little country,in letters of gold on the scroll of fame. But those who came back to us from the early perils of the war spoke plainly of the need for more serious regard for military training of an up-to-date and thorough-going kind. No playing at soldiers, after the manner ' of infantile days, could in their view meet the need. To have a system less haphazard and inefficient was their hope and the hope of many others, in spite of the war-weariness that was general. That hope, attenuated but not forsaken, will greet Lord Cavan.

There may be some who will see no virtue in the projected visit. The insistent preachers of pacifism . will be disposed to deride and condemn it as part of a plan to propagate militaristic ideals. These critics we i have always with us, and they show an obstinate obtuseness whenever defences are discussed. They have survived the war — of them by discovering ingenious methods of avoiding its without learning its lessons. Britain's lack of military preparedness cost untold lives. In the frantic efforts to place an army in the field to oppose Prussian aggression, irregular units all too ill prepared and equipped had to be rushed across the Channel from Britain and despatched to the zone of war from the far corners of the Empire. Theirs is the greater honour for the stand they made against a fighting machine elaborately con trived to overwhelm all opposition; but their peril was made unconscionably great by reason of their lack of preparedness for so terrible a test. Nor does this lack affect only the men who bear the brunt in such a crisis. It undermines the influence of the nation that is* so neglectful. The words of a British admiral given utterance recently set out this position clearly. " A common mistake is often made," he averred, !' in not appreciating the great advantage a. country possesses in peacetime by being thoroughly prepared for war," and he added in explanation —" the voice of a nation is never adequately respected in the councils of the world unless that voice has power behind it." ... Idealists—and we are all idealists more or less— forecast a time when swords shall be beaten into ploughshares and spears into pruning-hooks, because then no nation need learn war any more. But that time comes slowly; and it will be postponed by reckless disregard of the will to war eager to pounce upon defenceless peoples. -Wise organisation of defence, without thought of aggression, will encourage calm rather than disquiet, and c'reate an atmosphere in which sane peace policies may become strong. There are : also some disposed to make light of military defences on the ground of the Navy's importance. They would put all their eggs in one basket. It is undeniable that the Navy is the Empire's first line lof defence, and that, to cite the I Articles of War, the peace and prosperity of our nation mainly depend,

under God, upon it. But it is ; not the only line of defence. It is fairly obvious that, to capture our outposts of Empire, military invasion must - follow naval attack. What is required is a defensive organisation efficient and sufficient in all three branches of the united service—navy, army and air force.

• The fact that Britain, with her overseas Dominions and dependencies, was able, in a period incredibly short to the Prussian war-makers, to put an army in the field by no means contemptible," should not blind onvhnrlv to the tremendous risk that was taken by being unprepared. An army can, it is true, be created in far less time than it takes to build and equip a navy; but even armies cannot be created in a day, and it takes a long time to train a thoroughly efficient army. There was no doubting in 1914 the fact that the most efficient army is the one that has been longest in training; our enemies made open admission that,, in everything but numbers and machine-gun organisation the British regular army was the finest- in the world. The superb little expeditionary force that met the first shock of battle could not have accomplished its task unless it had undergone intensive training under a system of long service. Had there been a thousand, even a hundred, times their number as well equipped the story of the war would not have taken so long to write. There may be no immediate German menace, nor any particular war-cloud in Britain's sky and this to the uninformed public mind may seem sufficient reason for taking no immediate precautions. Consultation with the Chief of the General Staff will be welcomed, however, by those who know how quickly a cloud as little as a man's hand may become as potent. Desiring peace, they will wish to learn how to maintain it, and to have the help that the practical wisdom of a distinguished general and a trusted administrator will surely bring.