THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 4, 1923. ITALY'S OUTBURST.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LX, Issue 18495, 4 September 1923, Page 6

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 4, 1923. ITALY'S OUTBURST.

f After the first rush of events winch characterised the culmination of a sudden quarrel between Italy and Greece, there has come a pause. The League of Nations is examining the position to determine its rights and wrongs. It is not very clear, however, what the consequences can be so long as Italy adheres to the determination not to accept any decision the League may make. Meanwhile, there is a certain, amount to be learned from considering the nature of the Government which is directing Italian policy at the present time. The temptation to decide that the present crisis represents an application,of Fascist methods to international affairs is irresistible. It would bo too much to expect that the Fascists would follow one . ideal for their internal policy, and another in international dealings. Since the party fought its enemies in Italy by the. niosc direct and primitive methods, to the completo elimination of all ordinary processes 'of controversy, so, when trouble occurs abroad, it is not surprising to find exhibited a similar impatience with ordinary diplomatic procedure, the same tendency to batter down obstacles as they are met. How far this method will be pursued it is difficult to say. It has to be remembered, however, that the Italian Government responsible for foreign relations is different in kind and character from any other European Government of to-day. That fact does not in any degree exonerate Italy where another country would be culpable, but it may force mediators in the quarrel with Greece to adopt methods which would not be necessary were the circumstances more • normal.

Nationalism is the keynote of the Fascist cause. It was because Communism and internationalism were threatening the fabric of the State that Fascism came into being. It adopted violence to meet violence, and catching the nation at a moment of general revulsion against the doings of its opponents, it rode triumphantly to power. A triumph won in a moment of universal exaltation can be consolidated only if the enthusiasm can be kept at the flood, or if, in the alternative, the energy of revolt can be speedily diverted into useful everyday channels. Fascism was irresistible a few months back. : Of late there have been signs of the first fervour waning. While, therefore, it would not be just to suggest that the present crisis was engineeredfor there is no evidence to support such a contention—it is quite legitimate to suspect that rit has been readily seized upon by the present regime to reinfuse with enthusiasm for the national cause those who tended to grow v lukewarm. The immediate task for the new nationalism in Italy was speedily performed, and it is not surprising that the movement threatened to languish, The growth of this crisis may be expected to give it new life. There has not been any development in foreign politics since the Fascist Government came into power calculated to arouse Italian national fervour. ' The ; situation between France and Germany would hardly stir the nation. In his attitude toward it, Signor Mussolini has been quite moderate, and in genera] inclined to favour the British view as against the French. , Now, however, when there has come an international situation where Italy is directly interested, the Government, or Mussolinisines the two are hardly distinguishable—applies to it the methods which have been freely utilised in domestic affairs. When the earlier history of Fascism is recalled, it becomes apparent that the later manifestation is wholly in keeping with the declared objects of the Fascist movement.

As created by Mussolini, Fascism has been described as a creed more akin to . the sixteenth than the twentieth century. It is interpreted as a policy of bold adventure. Deliberately turning to ancient Rome for symbols, the movement can naturally be pictured as longing for the glory and domination of the old Roman Empire. Mussolini himself declared at the outset of his career as dictator that Italy's destiny must eventually be that of ruler of the Mediterranean. That sea, he affirmed, must be controlled by the peoples living on its shores. Enmity to Britain, and in particular a determination to wrest Malta from British control, were openly avowed by him. It has become fashionable to describe him as a would-be Napoleon or Caesar. The comparison is temptingly apt, but probably unjust. It is possibly incorrect to depict him as consumed by personal ambition, for much of'his previous career is inconsistent with such a conception; there is no need to question, however, that he has dreamed of building up Italy as a mighty power in the inland waters of the Mediterranean. Whatever the exact shade of his motive, it is obvious that to pursue either objective, and to apply the methods of Fascism to international differences, is to menace the peace of the world. He has begun in an unfortunate quarter, on the fringe of the everinflammable Balkans. ■ Tho quarrel

■with Greece has been made the occasion of seizing an important naval 'strategic; point. How far ; the trouble may spread ii? not checked, what means can be taken to meet the situation, it fa. yet; difficult to say. Meantime, remembrance of ' Mussolini's openly f asserted desire for Italian hegemony in the Mediterranean, makes it impossible to refrain from uneasiness over the precipitant following up of the quarrel with Greece. ;