POPULAR PSYCHOLOGY.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LX, Issue 18374, 14 April 1923, Page 1 (Supplement)

POPULAR PSYCHOLOGY.

BY A. ERNEST MANDER.

ACCOUNTING FOR TASTE.

There is an old saying to the effect that "there's . no . , accounting for taste," a saying . -which suggests that our tastes are quite outside any law of cause and effect. Most people still suppose that there is "no accounting" for the fact that they like one colour or one kind of music, one style of house or one sort of • landscape, better than another. Yet modern psychology proves that these tastes can, most assuredly, be fully accounted for: they are as natural and inevitable in any given case, when all the facts are known, as the sum of two and two. If all a man's relevant experiences were known, it would be possible to predict exactly what type of woman would seem to him most beautiful, what kind of novel he would find most enjoyable, what sort of dress he would consider most attractive, his favourite colour, his favourite town, his favourite dish, and all his "pet aversions." Contrary to the popular notion the law of cause and effect holds good in the mental, just as in the physical, realm: contrary to-the popular saying, even our tastes can be accounted for. There are three chief ways of , accounting for - individual tastes. The first relates to physical conditions, ■ though it is not possible to deal with it at all in such an article as this.' X may, however, mention one ' or two facts concerning the effect which different colours have upon usupon our bodies; and the reader may gain from these a hint of the line of. research which modern psychologists are following. A Frenchman, Tere, made certain experiments with an , instrument which recorded the strength of the handgrip., First, he ascertained the normal handgrip of various persons' in ordinary daylight, and then tested them again in various coloured lights. In one case the normal grip was represented by the number 23, in a blue , light it was slightly stronger 24; in a green light 28 j( in yellow light 30; in orange 35; and in red 42. It was shown, too, that the circulation of the blood was affected; and from these " and countless other > experiments it is seen that different colours nave different effects in soothing or stimulating the circulatory and muscular systems. This bears on the universally recognised fact that some colours are "warmer" than others. One person actually shivered involuntarily whenever he was shown a particularly "cold" blue; and so different persons prefer, say, reds or greens, according to whether they need to be physically stimulated or soothed. . There is one remarkable case recordedthat of a boy who had been blind from birth, but who eventually v.*as given his sight by a surgical operation; he actually vomited on first being shown a particular shade of yellow. ' Imitation and Tradition. Many of our personal likes and, dislikes are "picked up" by unconscious imitation, especially in early childhood. An intelligent parent can trace the origin of most of the mannerisms and expressions, likes, and dislikes, of his (or her) own child. As we grow older we continue "picking up" fresh mannerisms, senti/ments, prejudices, and opinions by conscious ■; and unconscious unconscious—imitation. Thus we may become appreciative of sunsets or prejudiced against the Chinese, inclined to ■ republicanism or hostile, to some religious sect, pleased or displeased by people who pay us complimentsaccording to the attitude toward -these things of the people,, among whom we have lived. , .

■"""Again,:, we may refer ,to the ever-chang-ing fashions in clothes. But here we must guard against ' a'• common errorthat of supposing that the average woman will wear a hat or a dress she does not like, merely because it is i decreed by ; fashion. She will not. Psychologically, the process is quite "different: her likes and t dislikes are altering as the imitative instinct works within her. ' She may not like a -new fashion at first, and" will not adopt it; but gradually, under the influence of » the instinct of imitation, she does come to like it. Then, when her "taste" has changed, she adopts J the '■ new ' fashion. (Note: This process may be remarkably rapid!) V Only a ■ bare reference is t necessary to the way ' in; which men•;■- prefer for a period >to keep themselves cleanshaven, • and then gradually come to prefer beards, as the. new .'fashion ; spreads, and after a; while again prefer :v to be clean-shaven. ;In J the same way, ; purely by unconscious imitation, women-'change their : preference from broad to narrow wedding rings and then, as * another ten or '■; twenty 'years go by, back to broad ones again. ''.'". . '--~': ; Associations. .'The remainder of our personal tastes can be accounted for by reference to our : pleasant and unpleasant experiences in the ■ past. 1 Without going ,v into the theory; of complexes, we may say that any idea which has become associated in \ our minds with the memory of-some : pleasant experience '■:■ tends to give us a sort of echo of that earlier pleasure.' If we r are not going to discuss ' theories, perhaps the best way of making this clear is by giving some instances of it. Let us take, for example, the case of a man who is passionately in love with a certain woman; and let us suppose that the memory of her is strongly associated-in his mind with the memory of a white tam-o'-shanter she was wearing when first he saw her. j In such a case the man may have a lifelong "fancy" for white tam-o'-shanters. Dr. Walsh suggests another example. Suppose. I am in the garden gathering roses with a friend to whom I am very strongly attached. An exceedingly painful quarrel occurs and ends in the severance of our friendship: we part in bitterness and hatred. Then, says Walsh, it may be that henceforward I shall have an unreasoning prejudice against roses and a dislike of rose-gardens. Perhaps in the course of years I shall forget, the original incident, but I may never again develop a "taste" for roses as long as I live. Or, to take another instance, I may What we usually i miscall ran "intuitive" /; or "instinctive" dislike for;; Welshmen or Londoners; and the cause of my prejudice may be the fact that in my boyhood I was bullied by a Welsh boy or a Londoner. In this way many of our preferences and prejudices, our tastes, can be accounted for. "Intuitively" (as we say) I distrust men with a certain type of face— real reason being that I was once "let down" by a man with a face like that. Dr. Morton Prince quotes another typical case. A certain . lady had an intense, "and unreasoning tfi'ead of white cats, which she could not; account for. It was eventually traced, however, to an incident of 35 years before, when, as a child of five, she had been badly frightened by a white kitten,' which had a fit while she was playing with it. ; Often on? hears people discussing their respective . tastes ; but nearly - always they .seem to miss the essential point. One man likes Wellington ' better than Christchurch, while another prefers the City of the Plains; and each can give a score of "reasons" to support L his own preference. But such arguments are futile and absurd: nine times out of ten the true cause of the preference is the simple fact that one of them has his happiest associations with one place, and the other with . the other place. It is almost impossible to like any place if one has been thoroughly unhappy there; while if one has had a thousand pleasant ' experiences in one town or country, not only does one like that particular spot, but . also one develops a "taste',' for all other v places that tend ;to : remind ; : one of it. Almost all our preferences—in everything from towns to, motor-cycles ■ and from flowers and • trees to types of ';= men and women be C attributed either i-to. unconscious imitation or else to pleasant experiences and the consequent happy associations they have formed - in our minds.