Article image
Article image
Article image
Article image
Article image
Article image
Article image
Article image
Article image
Article image
Article image
Article image
Article image
Article image
Article image
Article image
Article image
Article image
Article image
Article image

THE CHURCHILL MEMOIRS

BY THE RT. HON. WINSTON S. CHURCHILL.

(COPYRIGHT).

IX-RETREAT FROM ANTWERP. .

I now found myself suddenly, unexpectedly, ami deeply involved in a tremendous and hideously-critical local situation which might well continue for some time. I had also assumed a very direct responsibility for exposing the city to bombardment and for bringing into it tho inexperienced, partially-equipped and partially- battalions of the Royal Naval Division. I felt it my duty to see the matter through. On the ether hand, it was not right to leave the Admiralty without an occupant. I therefore telegraphed on the 4th to t*io Prime Minister, offering to take formal military charge of the British forces in Antwerp and tendering my resignation of the office of First Lord of. the Admiralty. This off or was not accepted. I have since learned that Lord Kitchener wroto proposing that it should be. But other views prevailed; and I certainly have no reason for regret that they did so. I was informed that Sir Henry Rawlinson was being ient to the city and was requested to do my best until ha arrived. October 5 was a day of continuous fighting. The situation fluctuated from hour to hour.

Tho general result of the fighting on that day raised our hopes. A counter- ■ attack by ono British and nine Belgian battalions drove the enemy back. All the positions that had been lost wen regained, and tho lino of tho N>the was almost reestablished. At midnight at tho Belgian Headquarters, General de Guise received in my presence by telephone a favourable report from every single sector. The ~+* enemy had, however, succeeded in toainteining a foothold across the rtor, and it seemed certain they f would throw bridges in the night. v Gorieril 'de Guise therefore resolved j to* rcG-ko a further conntar-altack under ii» cover of darkness in the hope of driving the enemy altogether across the I /tver. vAt 1 a.m. I telegraphed as fol- * lows: _ _ , Antwerp. October 6, 1 a.m. Firit Lord to Lord Kitchener and Sir E. drey:— "All well. All position* are held alenß the Netke. I hope you will not decide fin- ' ally on plan of operations till I fan give you my views. 1 have met Ministers m Council, who resolved to fii:ht it out here ' whatever happens. "No 9.2's have armed yet. even at Oateud."

It -was tvro o'clock before I went to bed. I had been moving, thinking, and acting with verr brief intervals for nearly four days in Council, and at the front in circumstances of undefined but very direct responsibility. Certainly the situation seemed improved. The line of tho hethe was practically intact and tbs front unbroken. The Naval Brigades, already a day behind my hopes, were arriving in the morning.. By tod and trot>ps •were hastening forward. All the -various personalities and power* were now losing the' sams way and -working for he same object. Prance and BntaJri, the Admiralty, and th* Wax Office, the Belgian Government »nd the Belgian Com-, mand -were all feeing in the same direction. Rawlinson would arrive to-morrow and my task would be concluded. But ■what would the morrow, bring forth. 1 was now very tired, and slept soundly for some hours. All through tho night the fighting was continual, but no definite reports were available up till about nine o clock. At the Belgian Headquarters I w&» to.d that the Belgian , night attack had miscarried, that the German* were counter-attacking strongly, that the Belgian troops were very tired, and the situation along the >*ethe obscure. General , Paris and the Marine Brigado were also heavily engaged. The Naval Brigades had arrived, and detrained, and wero now marching, to their Msigncu positions in the line. But where was the line? It was one thing to put these partially-trained and ill-equip-ped troops into a trench line, and quite another to involve them in the manoeuvres of a;moving action. Solidly dag in with their rifles and plenty of ammunition, these ardent, determined men would not be easily dislodged. But they were not capable of, manoeuvre. It seemed to me that they should take up an intermediate position until wo kri»w what was happening on the front. General Paris was involved ip close fighting with his brigade, and had not been able to take over any command of tho whole v force.. It was necessary, therefore, for me to give pensonal directions. I motored to the Belgian Headquarters, told General de Guise that theso new troops must have fixed positions to fight in, and would be wasted if fiunjj in piecemeal. I proposed to stop them about four miles short of their original destination as a support and rallying lins for the Belgian troops, who were falling back. Ha agreed that this was wise and right, and 'I went myself to see that the orders were carried out The moment one left the city gates the streams of wounded and of fugitives betokened heavy 'and adverse fighting. Shells from the enemy's field artillery were falling frequently on roads and villages which yesterday were beyond his range. We were by no means sure at whit point the flow of refugees would end and tiio wave of pursuers begin. However, by about midday the three Naval and Marino Brigades were drawn up with ] the Belgian reserves astride of the Ant-werp-Lierre road on the line ContichVremde. In this position we awaited the next development and expected to be almost immediately attacked. The Germans, to our relief, did not molest the retirement of the three Belgian divisions. They waited to gather strength and to bring lip and use again the remorseless artillery upon which they were mainly relying. As 110 German infantry appeared, arid no heavy bombardment began, the Naval Brigades moved forward in their turn and took up posit : ons nearer to where the enemy had halted. I remained in the line on the T.ierre road. Hero at about 5 o'clock Kir Henry Rawlinson joined me. The General took, as nvght be expected, a robust view of the situation, and was by no means disposed' to give up the quarrel either on the Antwerp front or on the line of communications which were already being more severely pressed. * At 7 o'clock a council of war was held in the palace under the presidency of the King. We affirmed the readiness and ability of the British Government to execute punctually and fully the engagements into which we had entered two days earlier. But the Belg'ian chiefs were convinced that, even if the Antwerp front along the line of the Nethe could be restored, the danger of their communications had become so great that, they must without delay resume the movement of their army to tho left bank of the Scheldt, which had be?n interrupted three day 3 previously. Here they conceived themselves able to join hands with any Anglo-French relieving force, . while at the same time securing their own retreat on Ghent, which they had already on September 4 reinforced by a brigade. It. was not for us to contest their view further, and events have 3hown

INNER HISTORY OF THE WAR

that they were right. The arrangements set out in the following telegram which I sent to Lord Kitchener were made: — lExtractl (1) That while the town en •lures bombardment _ General Pans witn naval division and Be.gian support will defend, inner line forts to the utmost. (2? That the rest of the . Belgian Field Army shall be withdrawn across the Scheldt to what they caU the entrenched camp of the left bank, This area is protected by the Scheldt and various for:.? and entrenchments, lar>;e inundations and here they hope to. find time to recover and re-iorm. From this position they will aid to tho best of their ability any relieving movement which may bo possible from the west. . .... * (3* Rawlinson will organise relieving force ! at Ghent and Bruges and prepare to move 1 forward as soon us possible. But I shall hope to-morrow to convince you that it should be strengthened for the *We are all agreed that, in the circum--1 stances, there is rio other course open. . ! I return with Rawlinson to-night to I Bruges, and early to-morrow morning ah«Li be in London . , Ibe in London and heavy guns will be Aviat.on v*rk and heavy guns will be moved from Antwerp.

General Rawlinson and I left tho city together that night, and after an anxious drive over roads luckily infested hy nothins; worse than rumour, I boarded the Attentive at Ostond, and returned to England. , .t, . So far as the personal aspect of this story is concerned, I cannot feel that deserve the reproaches which have been so long freely and ignorantly heaped upon me. I could not foresee that the mission j I undertook would keep me away from the Admiralty for more than 48 hours, or that I should find myself involved in another set of special responsibilities outside the duties of the great office which 1 held. No doubt had I been ten years older I should have hesitated long before accepting so unpromising a taskBut the events occurred in tho order I have described, and at each stage the action which I took seemed right, natural, and even inevitable. Throughout I was held in the grip of emergencies and of realities which transcended consideration of praise or blame. But, after all, it is by th© results and as a whole that the episode will bo judged; and these, as will be shown, were certainly advantageous to the Allied cause. _ , . " After the departure of the Belgian Field Army the further defence of the remaining lines of Antwerp was left _to the fortress troops, the 2nd Belgian Division, and the three British Naval Brigades, vho held on their front the equivalent of more than five complete German divisions. At midnight on the 7th, the Germans, having advanced their artillery, began to bombard the city and the forts of the inner line. The forts melted under the fire, and a great porportion of the civil population fled through the night, lighted bv conflagrations, over tho bridges of the Scheldt to the open country, along the roads toward Ghent or into Holland. The enemy's attack was pressed continuously, and "the enceinte of the city was con* sidered to bo untenable by the evening of the Bth. The Belgian Division and the British Naval Brigades evacuated Antwerp that night, crossed the Scheldt safely, and began their retreat by road and rail on Ghent and Ostend. Two naval airmen, as a Parthian shot, blew up after long flights a Zeppelin in its shed at Dusseldorf and bombed the railway station at Cologne. German patrols, after many precautions, entered Antwerp toward evening, and on tho IOtH the stout-hearted Governor, who had retired to one of the surviving forts, capitulated'. The resistance of the city had been prolonged for five days. (To bo continued daily-)

This article text was automatically generated and may include errors. View the full page to see article in its original form.
Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/NZH19230306.2.7

Bibliographic details

New Zealand Herald, Volume LX, Issue 18341, 6 March 1923, Page 4

Word Count
1,822

THE CHURCHILL MEMOIRS New Zealand Herald, Volume LX, Issue 18341, 6 March 1923, Page 4

THE CHURCHILL MEMOIRS New Zealand Herald, Volume LX, Issue 18341, 6 March 1923, Page 4