THE NEAR EAST PROBLEM.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LIX, Issue 18192, 11 September 1922, Page 6

THE NEAR EAST PROBLEM.

A little more than a month ago it was reported that the Greeks had strengthened by four divisions their army corps in Thrace and were preparing to march on Constantinople in defiance of the Allies. Possibly as a result of a warning by the Allied Commander-in-Chief at Constantinople that such an advance would be repelled by force of arms, the intention did not materialise. From Smyrna, however, Greek advances were made, but with such dire consequences that the forces of the Turkish Nationalists have utterly routed the army, Smyrna has been surrendered and haaty evacuation is now proceeding while the Turks advance upon the town. The Paris representative of the Turkish Nationalist Government announces that its forces will clear the Dardanelles no matter what troops are in occupation, and that it will insist upon the possession of Constantinople, Adrianople and Thrace. Already an action against tho Greeks, possibly a preliminary to this end, has taken place at Gemlik, on the east shore of the Sea of Marmora. In a remarkably short space of time the whole situation has become disturbing. It is apparent that the Turkish Nationalist Army is well led and well equipped, and in the flush of triumph bold assertions of what the fruits of victory are to be are not surprising. The " clearing of the Dardanelles," however, could never be permitted unless the Allies retreated from one of the basic principles laid down at the armistice. The Treaty of Sevres prpposed a number of changes which were modified in March of this year, when an-effort was made by Britain, France and Italy to prevent hostilities between Greece and the Angora Government. It was originally intended that Greece should administer Smyrna and the surrounding district for five years, when a plebiscite should bs taken upon the question of annexation. In March the All'** a.w»»ri' to the return of Smyrna to full Turkish sovereignty, but instead of withdrawing the Greeks became aggressive. At the same time Adrianople and part of Thrace were offered to Greece, a partition which the Turlcs

now verbally challenge. But no departure was made from the broad principle of the demilitarisation of the Dardanelles zone, the Allied occupation of Gallipoli and the international control of the Straits, although in regard to the lastmentioned exaction the presidency of a Turkish representative was conceded. With the control of the Straits, the Sea of Marmora and the Bosphorus in the hands of the Alliod fleets, the Nationalists' aim could not mature, although action by the victorious army against, the land forces of tho Allies, possibly involving Allied residents, might create an ugly situation. Another problem is created by the position in Thrace. Seeing that Greece declined to evacuato Smyrna as proposed by tho Powers, it is possible that she may continuo to show an aggressive attitude in Thrace, partioularly in view of her defeat in Auia Minor. Britain having continued to recognise the Sultan's Government as the Government of Turkey would havo good grounds for preventing tho crossing of the Bosphorus, but both Franco and Italy have had relations with the Angora Government by which they havo practically rocognised it as the sovereign government of Turkey. Thus, at a time when absolute unity is needed by the Allies, there are elements of discord.