LIMITING ARMAMENTS.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LIX, Issue 18171, 17 August 1922, Page 8

LIMITING ARMAMENTS.

WASHINGTON CONFERENCE:. THE NAVAL PROBLEM. CUTTING DOWN THE COST. SIGNIFICANCE OF TREATY. [BY TKLEGttAPH. —SPECIAL BEPOBTEB.] WELLINGTON. Wednesday The report of Sir John Salmond, New Zealand's delegate to the conference at Washington on the limitation of armaments, was tabled in the House of Representatives this afternoon. It gives a remarkably lucid account of what the conference actually accomplished. On the subject of the Naval Treaty a good deal of what appears in the report ha 8 already been made public in the newspaper press of the world. Interesting reference is made to the proposals regarding destroyers and submarines. " The treaty contains no restrictions either in respect of their size, numbers, or aggregate tonnage. It was proposed by the British delegation that the submarine should be abolished altogether and declared an illegal weapon of war. This proposal gave rise to a discussion, which excited much public interest and disclosed a wide divergence of opinion between the Powers concerned. " Tho argument of the British delegation, based on the experience of the 'ate war, was that the possession of a fleet of submarines leads inevitably to a form of warfare against non-combatants, which is inconsistent with the dictates of humanity. These arguments did not prevail at the conference, but they made a considerable impression on public opinion and it is not unreasonable to hope that at some future time before tho memory of tho Lusitania has faded from the public mind, the total prohibition of submarine warfare may find a place in the law of nations. " In the meantime, although the unrestricted building of submarines is still allowed severe restrictions upon the ru*e of such weapons have been imposed by ;m----other of the Washington Treaties, to which reference is made la'ter in.this report on the failure of the British propo&il to abolish the submarine. It was intimated by the British delegation that so long as such weapons existed it was impossible for the British Empire to agree to any hmkation upon the mumber of "cruisers, destroyers, or other auxiliary craft available for anti-submarine warfare. The fact was disclosed in the course of this memorable debate that, although the average number of German submarines operating at any one time in the neighbourhood of the coasts of Great Britain had not been more than nine or ten, it had been necessary for the British Government to maintain an average of not less than 3000 antisubmarine craft to meet the menace so created. A Menace to Civilisation. "It is a matter for regret that it was not found possible to impose any limitation upon the' construction or use of aircraft. The discovery of the art of flying and the terrible possibilities involved in its future developments for the purposes of war constitute a. menace to the cause oi civilisation, and humanuity in particular. It is to be observed that the progressive in the power of these aerial weapons is & growing danger to ships of war, and renders uncertain the future efficiency of those fleets to which the naval; treaty relates. i ." The notwithstanding all its advantages, is open to the criticism that, while restricting the further development of tho battleship, it leaves unrestricted the growth of the most formidable enemy which that chip may have to encounter in the'future '' ;;. After reference to the provisions arrived at in regard to submarines and poison gas, Sir John adds this conclusion :—" How far these or any other rules of warfare will prove adequate to restrain belligerent States from doing in the grim necessity of war whatever their interests may be thought to require, is a question to which no confident answer can be given. At all events, this is clear,, that ifany signatory or adherent Power violates these rules in any future war lit will stand convicted before the civilised world aa guilty of a grave breach, not only oj humanity, but of public honour." . / Primary Purpose Finance. " The primary purpose and significance of the treaty," Sir Salmond states, •' is financial. It is designed to put an end to the ruinous coat of competition in navi.! armaments. Even before the war this cost was serious, but since the war it has become intolerable. The experiences of the war, and particularly the lessons learned at the battle* of Jutland; have shown the need of very important and very expensive changes in naval architecture in order to give adequate protection against gunfire, torpedoes, mines, and aerial bombs, fTo < meet these new requirements, the British Government was preparing before the Washington Conference to build fdoip, hew-battleships, which would have beeh'*the most powerful vessels in the world. ,:Each of these would have had a tonnage approaching 50,000 tons, and would, have cost about £10,000,000. Similarly, the American Government was at the date 61' the conference building no less than fifteen capital ships ol: the latest type, while Japan was building, or was ready to build, no less than fourteen of these formidable «ngines of destruction. No nooner are such ships built than they begin to grow obsolete by the advance-of scientific invention and by the building of more powerful vessels by rival States. This process of ruinous competitive expenditure goes on indefinitely. The Washington treaty has put a happy ending to it. Warfare Hot Discouraged. "The treaty is not an agreement to preserve the peace, nor is it designed for that end. Nations are not prevented, or even discouraged, from going to war with each other by a mutual and proportionate reduction in the scale of their armaments, nor would the treaty, save in respect of certain minor details, have any continuing operation in the event of an outbreak of war. In such a case there is nothing in the tireaty to prevent each belligerent State from fighting at sea with, all the instruments within its reach. The'treaty in 'no way limits the weapons with which States may fight and defend themselves. It merely limits the weapons which they may prepare for that purpose in time of peace. Ho Ethical Significance. "Still less may the treaty be properly regarded as a step toward total naval disarmament. No such impracticable idealism inspired tho Washington Conference. The agreement of the great Powers to destroy a-large part of their existing fleets and to impose strict limitations on the building of new ships of war is not a confession of wrongdoing or a promise of amendment. It has no ethical significance. The right and the duty of every State to make proper provision for its national (safety by land and sea remain as undisputed and as imperative as before. "The Washington naval treaty doubtless has behind it, more especially in the United States of America, a considerable volume-of pacificist public opinion which regards that treaty as a>tftep toward the total repudiation of any such right or duty of national defence and as a practical recognition of the wrongfulness of military and naval preparations in time of peace." It is not on any such ground as this, however, that the treaty in to be justified. It is based on tho reasonable and practical consideration that the purposes of national defence are better served by an agreed scheme for limitation of armaments in fixed proportions than by a scheme of unrestricted and ruinous competition in times of peace. The abolition of such competition protects the nations not only from an insensate 6' waste of their financial resources, but also from that permanent risk of war which results from temptation to Btvike before it is too late at the growing power of a dangerous enemy."- • 1