THE New Zealand Herald AMD DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. THURSDAY, APRIL 6, 1922, THE IRISH SITUATION.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LIX, Issue 18059, 6 April 1922, Page 6

THE New Zealand Herald AMD DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. THURSDAY, APRIL 6, 1922, THE IRISH SITUATION.

The Irish Government is already discovering the disadvantages of its bargain with Mr. tie Valera under which the elections are set back till May. Not till the Government receives a mandate from the people j will it have real moral as well as ! legal authority to establish order in its house, and the interregnum must necessarily be a period of considerable anxiety and disturbance. It has been clear ever since the Peace Treaty was signed that delaying the appeal to the country could only embarrass the Government. Mr. Collins and Mr. Griffith are fighting hard for the settlement provided by the treaty, but so far they have failed to establish their authority in any striking fashion. Lawlessness and disorder are spreading in the south and west, the extremists arc apparently becoming bolder, and there- i s a risk that the elections will be hold under .conditions highly unfavourable to the result which Ireland needs and the majority cf Irishmen presumably desire. Moreover, the terms of the election are calculated to arouse anxiety. The treaty will be submitted along with the Constitution of the Free State, and any unpopular feature of the Constitution will tend to prejudice the agreement on which it is based. In spite of the continuance of a formidable republican agitation it is still a fair inference that the majority of the Southern Irish approve the settlement. Unfortunately the postponement of the election and referendum tends to complicate the issue with every domestic quarrel which may in the meantime arise, and make the result depend less on the treaty than on the success of Messrs. Collins and Griffith as administrators.

Of them it is fortunately possible to hope for the best. Their sincerity is beyond question, their honour has come unsullied through a very trying ordeal, and their policy already shows the sobering influence of responsibility. There is nothing like responsibility for steadying meu, and one can believe of the Dublin Government that the more outrageous is the conduct of the irreconcilables the cooler and the more capable it will become. If at this distance its judgment appears to have been not altogether sound, one must make allowances for the extraordinary difficulties of its situation. It would be as idle to pretend that it controls the Republican extremists in Southern Ireland as it would be futile to suggest that Sir James Craig can at the moment curb the extremists in Ulster. The best that either government can hope to do is to wear down resistance gradually and to re-establish the ascendancy of the law by slow stages. This common task already forms a bond of sympathy between them which may insensibly draw the two Irelands together. The Northern and Southern Irelands will act and react on each other. If, for examplo, Mr. Collins and Mr. Griffith are able to prove before election day that friendly co-operation with Sir James Craig is practicable, it is impossible to suppose that will not tell in their favour. It is equally impossible to suppose that Ulster will not be greatly influenced by the triumph of the moderates in the Free State. That is undoubtedly the contingency which the two governments had in mind when they agreed a few days ago that before the time arrives for Ulster to contract herself out there should be a further meeting to consider means to secure the unity of Ireland, or failing this an amicable solution of the boundary question.'

In one respect the situation has been relieved during the past few days. The passage through the British Parliament of the Free State Bill gives the Provisional Government' powers it has not yet enjoyed. Its position has hitherto been highly anomalous. It has been recognised by the Crown but not sanctioned by law, and its administration has been but a convenient continuation of an altogether irregular procedure. Now the Provisional Government is clothed with legal authority, and though it cannot act with quite the same confidence as a government strong in the expressed will of the people, it can at least take stem action, if the necessity arises, to maintain order. It does not follow that strong measures may be looked for immediately. The Republicans command a considerable section of the army, and Messrs. Collins and Griffith may deem it wiser to await a mandate before making an aggressive use of force. For the present j they may prefer to remain on the j defensive, hoping that the extremists ; will encompass their own ruin. The j situation is still confused and dangerouß, but it is a great achievement of British statesmanship to j have converted a substantial body of I Irish opinion, expressed through the ! most competent Irish leaders, to a I peaceful settlement. At the best, | affairs in Ireland will follow the South African analogy. Like General Botha and General Smuts, Messrs. Collins and Griffith are co-operating with Great Britain in all lonour and sincerity, ■ and their friendship will grow with a fuller realisation of the true aims of British policy. Like General Rertzog, there are a substantial number of Irishmen who wish to go back on the bargain with Britain and to maintain a fierce racial fetid instead of accepting an offer of honourable peace. General Hertzog's chief influence in South Africa has been to hasten a rapprochement between moderate Dutch and moderate British. May it not he that the role of republicans; in Irish politics will be precisely the same and that the extremists will ultimately prove the best peacemakers not only between Ireland and Britain, but between the Free State and Ulster! .