THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. THURSDAY, MARCH 25, 1920. BRITAIN IN MESOPOTAMIA

New Zealand Herald, Volume LVII, Issue 17428, 25 March 1920, Page 4

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. THURSDAY, MARCH 25, 1920. BRITAIN IN MESOPOTAMIA

. _< - The anxiety with which Mr. Churchill regards the military position of Britain in Mesopotamia and the Middle East will not surprise those who have studied the post-war frontiers of the Empire. Expansion

brings increased responsibilities and in Asia at all events we have assumed control of territories which on military grounds are most unwelcome. Hitherto the British Empire has been easily defended from the sea. Where it had ' long frontiers there were special circumstances which rendered these frontiers secure, as for example, the friendly relations with the United States which made the artificial Canadian boundary safe without fort or gun, the. mountain barrier which protected India, and the desert which secured the flank of Egypt. In the present readjustment the good fortune which hitherto has set the bounds of the British Empire appears to have deserted it. We have been compelled to step into the open as a continental Power and for the future we cannot rely so implicitly on the navy because we have set the Union Jack where the navy cannot reach. Palestine may be made safe if the boundaries are drawn upon military advice, but Mesopotamia is necessarily an exposed flank and must be held in considerable strength if it is not to become the Achilles' heel of the Empire. Mesopotamia is a basin lying in an amphitheatre of tablelands. Its history is a sinister warning of its weakness. It is not only exposed to danger from every quarter, but it has the reputation of having been invaded more often than any other country of Asia or Europe. From Persia, from Arabia, from Trans-Caucasia, from Anatolia, its conquerors of the past have come. The British came from the sea, but they have travelled far from the guns of their warships and in almost every direction they look out upon possible enemies.

The possession of Mesopotamia must mean a modification of British policy in Asia. As long as India was our only heavy responsibility there was no need to interfere in Central Asia. We did, in point of fact, wage two wars in Afghanistan and one in Persia, but in the last resort we were well able to wait until any enemy entered the passes leading to India confident that we could meet him there on advantageous terms. We are no longer able to do so. The possession of Mesopotamia gives us a tar more intimate interest than -mo

•have yet had in Persia and , Afghanistan. Persia is on the flank of Mesopotamia and- Afghanistan is on the flank of Persia. The security of the British position: in the Middle East demands that.both countries should be under strong and friendly governments. A recent agreement secures this-in Persia. Britain -,: has con-.j traoted to -. supply; experts for the J Persian administration and officers and equipment .for the Persian armyand to co-operate in the construction of« railways.'. This'was; necessary to save Persia from the Bolsheviks who threatened her: frontiers, But' it was hardly less desirable in the interests, of Mesopotamia. In Afghanistan,' unfortunately, the. attitude of the Government towards " Britain is far less satisfactory. In 1880 we used force to compel the Amir to agree that ..he would "follow the advice of Britain in matters affecting the external relations of Afghanistan." . In 1919, after defeating an impudent Afghan attack upon India, we gratuitously relieved an untrustworthy ruler of this obligation. The motive' underlying this decision is difficult to estimate, it can hardly have been reached on military advice since it is far more* necessary now than ever that we should exclude hostile influences from a State which may be used equally well as a base against "India and Persia and through Persia Mesopotamia.

The ultimate test of the new position of Britain in %he Middle East will not come for some time, not, indeed, until Russia recovers something of the military and economic strength she has dissipated during her period of anarchy. The threat to which Mr. Churchill refers is temporary and local but it is by no means negligible. The Bolsheviks, having practically destroyed General Denikin's forces, are now awaiting the spring to advance into TransCaucasia, whefe they would be welcomed, by the insurrectionary Turkish forces under Mustapha Kernel. Mr. Churchill assumes that they would be joined by the Georgians .and the Azerbaijanis, and this possibility must be considered, not because the two republics love Russia, ' but because they are drawn together by a common hatred of the Armenians and from motives of self-interest they- prefer a Bolshevik to an Imperial Russia, Such a Combination, if it received any Arab support, would be formidable. Mustapha Kemal controls not only, the former Armenian provinces of Turkey but ; the whole interior of Anatolia up to •the zones occupied by Greek and Italian troops in the west and southwest. He has been joined by soldiers discharged from the Turkish army, and though he is incapable of resisting a serious Allied offensive he has enough equipment to maintain a guerrilla war'for an indefinite period. Until the Allies fix the full terms of the Turkish settlement it is hazardous to forecast what action, if any, they will take against Mustapha Kemal, but it is undeniable that his presence in Anatolia necessitates the maintenance of considerable British forces in Mesopotamia. Mr. Churchill's hope of defending Mesopotamia primarily ' through the agency of the air .does not inspire confidence. Aeroplanes are a valuable auxiliary in . frontier warfare but the Afghan campaign proved that they are no more than an auxiliary, and Mr. Churchill will come into conflict with his military advisers if he attempts to make an air force responsible for the safety of Mesopotamia. The new responsibilities of the Empire in the Middle East will always be unsound militarily and for a time must be unsound financially. They are the price of our moral leadership of the world, a leadership we must continue to bear alone' owing to the refusal of America to share it. Nowhere will this leadership be more severely tested than in the arena which has proved fatal to so many of the great empires of the past.