THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. MONDAY, AUGUST 12, 1918. THE ALLIED ADVANCE.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LV, Issue 16926, 12 August 1918, Page 4

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. MONDAY, AUGUST 12, 1918. THE ALLIED ADVANCE.

The offensive launched by Sir Douglas Haig east of Amiens on Thursday is developing into a victory which, promises to be comparable with the German advance in the last week of March By whatever test it be judged, the allied achievement is momentous. The attack, at first Smited to a front of twenty miles, now extends over nearly double that distance. The maximum advance at the end of three days' fighting is over twelve miles. The number of prisonj ers and guns captured is significantly large. The great railway junction of Amiens has regained its former military value through the enemy being driven beyond effective range, and the use of this route, apparently abandoned while the Germans were uncomfortably close, has been resumed. The important pivotal point of Montdidier has been captured by the French, and patrols are near Chaulnes., the distributing centre for the front from Amiens to La-ssigny. • The battle shows a tendency to spread along each face of the salient, north and east, to Arras and beyond Montdidier, and the disorganisation of a wide stretch of enemy front is so complete that rapid movement may be expected for at least some days. The developments between Montdidier and Lassigny are of special • interest because they represent the threat against the southern flank of the salient which was expected to follow an advance from Amiens, This open flank is one of the penalties suffered by the enemy for his failure to prevent the British repairing their line during the March retirement. The Germans broke the British front near St. Quentin, and in the "subsequent advance their left flank had the protection of the Oise all the way to Noyon. Their intention was to sever the British from the French, and having done this to roll up the British line while 1 their ' left flank faced the French defensively on the heights overlooking the wide and marshy valley of the Oise. The German plan broke down in two respects. The enemy failed to separate the British and the French, and, being compelled to follow the French west of Noyon, he lost the protection of the Oise, which at this point turns to the south-west. The front finally became stable at Montdidier, 20 miles west of Noyon, and this 20 miles forms the exposed face of the salient, more difficult to defend than the flanks which General Focb. drove in north of- the Marne. The portion between Montdidier and Lassigny, which the French are now attacking, is more vulnerable than the sector farther east, because the Germans succeeded, after their Aisne offensive, in pushing their line south of Noyon and establishing themselves on the Lassigny heights, thus considerably strengthening themselves in this region.

The Allies are advancing into the very heart of the salient created by the retirement in March. To the south of Amiens they have already crossed the line of the front as it existed prior to . the first battle of the Somme. The angle of the salient has been considerably flattened and, if Chaulnes is captured, the enemy will be under an immediate necessity of sacrificing a considerable proportion of the ground he gained at such cost in March and April. The German staff knows by experience the difficulty of holding the great elbow of the line under pressure. It was unable to do so after the battle of the Somme, although the angle was not then so acute as it is now, and a second retreat to the Hindenburg line is one of the possibilities of the present situation. It is, indeed, probable that Ludendorff would feel relieved if he could withdraw his forces to St. Quentin without serious losses, but he will find the operation by no means easy. The whole front, from Arras to Rheims, has been disintegrated, a fact which places the side acting on the defensive at a constant disadvantage. Mobility has been restored, and retreat will prove no less perilous to the Germans than it was to the British in those d-rk days of March and April, when only the magnificent fighting qualities of Sir Douglas Haig's soldiers averted a disaster which might have proved irreparable.

More important than geographical gain, but often under-estimated because it cannot be shown in such tangible form as a map, is the wasting of the German reserves. It is certain that the new attack will put such a severe strain on them as practically to remove the danger of a further enemy offensive this year. Marshal Foch has always placed a

high value on the initiative, as his lectures and books prove, and he is evidently determined that for the remainder of the year the enemy will follow his lead. From first to last he passed one-third of the German army through the Marne salient, and before the enemy has completely extricated himself from that position the allied generalissimo has commenced an attack on the larger salient in Picardy, where he will be able to force on Ludendorff an even greater defensive concentration. The Germans still have enough men to play the game which Foch is imposing on them, and they may be able to retreat, as they retreated from the Marne to the Aisne, without sensational losses in prisoners. What they do not lose in prisoners they will lose in casualties. The present fighting is of a character which is entirely unfavourable to the Germans, and they can avert more serious consequences only by throwing in troops regardless of the reserves which stand between them and utter defeat. By depleting these reserves they may be able to tide off disaster this year, but this mortgaging of man-power will have fatal results when the campaign of 1919 opens. German newspapers are already discussing defensive strategy, but the events of next year may prove that the enemy has lost the power not only of offence, but of defence, in his reckless effort to force a decision in 1918.