THE New Zealand Herald AND DULY SOUTHERN CROSS. TUESDAY, JULY 16, 1918. THE GERMAN VIEWPOINT.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LV, Issue 16903, 16 July 1918, Page 4

THE New Zealand Herald AND DULY SOUTHERN CROSS. TUESDAY, JULY 16, 1918. THE GERMAN VIEWPOINT.

It is not without significance that the change in the German Foreign Ministry has taken place at a time when the continued inaction of the German armies on the western front is raising speculative questions in allied countries. The replacement of a moderate of the Kuhlmann type by a pan-German of the Hintze type is usually regarded as a sign of confidence in enemy countries, but in this instance it has more the appearance of panic. It is not a case of the Government ejecting a moderate, but of a moderate cutting himself adrift from the Government. That was the effect of Dr. Kuhlmann's declaration that it was impossible to end the war by military means. There ' was obviously no place in a War Ministry for a man who had arrived at such conclusions, and that they should have beer- promulgated by a Minister is certainly anything but an indication of German confidence. If Mr. Balfour, who holds the corresponding portfolio in the.British Cabinet, were to use such words they would be a rude shock to the confidence of the allied public. The only conclusions to be drawn from all the circumstances

are that Dr. Kuhlmann, speaking for an influential section of the German people, has lost hope of bringing the present offensive to a successful issue, and that the Government has been forced to weigh the doubts of Kuhlmann against the facile optimism of the pan-Germans, and has chosen the latter. In so doing it has forfeited the support of a section of the moderates and is leaning more heavily on the junkers, and less and less on the people. It does not follow that the German offensive will be abandoned. That would have been the logical outcome of Dr. Kuhlmann's conclusions, but he has been sacrificed, and the militarists who rule the Government will undoubtedly make at least one moregreat effort to obtain a decision, The doubts which are assailing Dr. Kuh'mann and his fellow-thinkers are easily understood if the events of the year be reviewed from the German standpoint. To the allies they have been by no means satisfactory, but to the German who cares to consider them they must appear little less than disastrous. The allies have lost valuable ground, but the Germans have lost, one by one, every hope on which they were instructed to build. For a long time the submarine was regarded as Germany's instrument of victory then the collapse of Russia was hailed as the beginning of the end. This year the failure of the submarine has been demonstrated, not by statistics, which do not reach the German public, but by American bayonets, which have reached the German soldiery. This is the first direct evidence Germany has had of the defeat of the submarine, and it i 3 evidence which can neither be concealed nor distorted. The official claim for the under-water campaign was first that it would starve Britain and later that it would immobilise America. With the futility of this boast exposed hope vanishes of keeping the field clear for a decisive struggle with Britain and France, and Germany is forced to stake everything on such efforts as she can make this year. The extravagant expectations produced by the surrender of Russia have already been falsified, the allies having maintained themselves for the whole of this year against the additional troops brought from the eastern front. The last hope left to the Germans is that Ludendorff will succeed in doing in July or August what hf. failed to do in March. The General Staff is now preparing its still powerful machine for the attempt, but Dr. Kuhlmann has let the world know beforehand what a

responsible, educated German, who is neither traitor nor "defeatist," thinks of the prospect. Since movement ceased in France there have been developments in the other theatres which must lessen the momentum of the forthcoming German offensive. The western front is the decisive theatre, but it is sensitive to the reactions of other fronts, and these have been uniformly unfavourable to the German plan. The result of the Austrian offensive was to leave Italy relatively stronger than she was, and to make Austria a drain on German reserves rather than a source of new strength. Recent operations in the Balkans will have the same effect, and suggest that the German concentration in France has left the enemy in all other theatres in a position of inferiority. It is certainly so on the Asiatic fronts, where the Turks, in spite of the great relief they obtained by the cessation of hostilities with Russia, have been unable to do more than maintain a defensive, which has not always been successful. With the land campaigns doubtful or unfavourable, and submarine warfare turning against them, there is no aspect of the struggle from which the Germans can derive confidence. Certainly they cannot regard developments in the air with any satisfaction, since the allied air offensive in Germany, increasing I constantly in violence and effect, is a clear intimation of the relative strengths in this arm. It will be a long time before the allies can claim command of the air in the sense in which they now hold command of the sea, but it is certain that when they are reinforced by the American air men, now only commencing to arrive, they will have such a superiority as will aid powerfully the other factors of victory. The air offers a broad highway into the heart of Germany which can be traversed in proportion to the material available for the allies. It may be that, as some experts maintain, aerial supremacy would of itself guarantee victory where the forces were otherwise equally matched. That theory is hardly worth considering since the allies are building up superiority in all arms, but it is certain that they will rely on their airmen to make a substantial contribution to the victory for which all the fighting services. are striving.