TEUTON STRATEGY.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LV, Issue 16895, 6 July 1918, Page 1 (Supplement)

TEUTON STRATEGY.

KUHLMANN'S SPEECH.

DV LIECT.-COL. A. A. CRACK, N.Z.F.A. RES.

As was anticipated, the results of the Italians' victory were manifold. It demoralized the Austrian army and brought its offensive to a slandsill. It accentuated the chaotic condition of Austria-Hungary. It invigorated the Italian Army and nation. It heartened up all tho armies and nations of the Great Alliance. It upset the Teutons' plan of campaign; necessitating a partial redistribution of their armies. But perhaps the most remarkable result, because it was tho most unexpected, was the effect which it had upon the German Government, as disclosed by the extraordinary speech made by Von Kuhlmann, the Kaiser's Minister of Foreign Affairs. Though the published reports of that speech were expurgated, as was said by Kuhlmann himself, nevertheless enough of the truth remained to furnish the outside world with a vivid impression of the perturbation created in the German Government's mind by tho Austrians' defeat. The Foreign Minister told the Eeiechtag in so many words that

tho entire plan of campaign had broken down and would have to be recast, that the idea of breaking tho strength of the Allies by means of a decisive offensive would have to be given up, and that tho Teutons would be obliged to resort to a strategy of defence, if not of passive defence. Now, that meant that their great offensive, 60 much vaunted during the early months of the year, had been launched in vain, that the hundreds of thousands of their troops lost through that offensive had been lost in vain. It meant that Hindenburg's promise of tho capture of Paris, and Ludendorff's promise of the breaking of the Allied Army and the speedy termination of the war could not be fulfilled, and that tho German nation might expect an indefinite prolongation of the war. It meant a reversion to the strategical plan propounded by Falkenhayn in the autumn of 1916, when he proposed to the Kaiser the adoption of a strategy of defence and tho shortening of the Teutons' lines on every battlefront, a suggestion for which he was dograded to a subordinate post and was replaced by Hindenburg, with Ludendorff as Quartermaster-General of the German Army. His Master's Voice. But it must be recognised that when Kuhlmann made his extraordinary speech ho did not speak meroly for himself. Ho spoke for Hertling, the Chancellor, and for the Kaiser, the master of the Chancellor. The German Government is appointed by the Kaiser, and its members ore responsible to the Kaiser, and to the Kaisor alone. So that it was impossible for Kuhlmann to make his speech without tho approval of the Kaiser, and retain his office for a single day. Therefore, the conclusion which must be arrived at is that the Kaiser, frightened by tho terrible failure of the Austrians, had concluded that tho great offensive campaign, of which such marvellous results had been expected, had failed, and must be abandoned. Evidently Kuhlmann was put up in the Reischtag to break the unpalatable truth to tho German nation, but the effect appears to have been to instigate the military and Junker castes and all tho ebullient elements of the Pan-German party to renewed energy and vociferous demands for the continuence of the offen- ■ sive campaign. It is reported, with how much truth is uncertain, that Mindonburg's opinion of the matter coincides with that of Kuhlmann, and therefore with that of the Kaiser, though nothing is stated as to the attitude of Ludendorff, who was so loud in his demand for tho commencement of the great offensive operations. The military chiefs of Germany appear to be divided in their councils. I The Crown Prince is credited with con-1 demning Kuhlmann and therefore with supporting the continuance of the offensive. Austria's War-Weariness. It seems pretty clear that the Austrian? have shot their bolt, eo far as a general offensive against the Italians is concerned. Their visions of a conquered Venice and a prostrate Italy have suddenly faded away. Their offensive energy has collapsed. They are in dire straits, at home, and their war-weariness begins to threaten

paralysis of the nation and, therefore, of the army. The Germans' offensive operations which began so forcefully on March 21, havo accomplished nothing of much military value, at enormous cost. Unless they are carried through to a successful termination they will have been merely a prodigal waste of life, to no purpose. The thing which is evident to Kuhlmann and the Kaiser, is that in view of the little help which Austria can afford, the operations in France cannot succeed, and it remains to be seen whether this opinion or tho opinion of such hot-headed fireeaters as the Crown Prince will prevail. But there is another factor In the case, and that is the altered ratio of strength between tho Central Powers and the Allies, A ratio which lias been detrimentally affected for the Teutons by their recent heavy losses, and by the unexpected arrival in Franco of heavy reinforcements of Americans. What with the Teutons' losses and the Americans' advent, it may safely bo estimated to-day that the relative preponderance of the Allies has improved by nearly one million troops since March 21. It may be conceded that the American divisions recently landed in France are not sufficiently trained to be placed immediately in the forefront of the battle, but they will allow General Foch to liberate from his general reserve a like number of fully-trained British or French troops. It is this American influx, as much as the Auetrians' defeat, which compels the German General Staff to take stock of tho situation. The Factor of the Aeroplane. While any strategist who wishes well to the cause of the Allies will hope that the Teutons will persist in their hazardous offensives, yet it is plain that there is a possibility of their deciding to resort to the very strategy which lias proved so efficacious on the side of the Allies. In that case there might ensue a condition of stalemate, until such time as General Foch feels himself strong enough to assume the offensive with a hope of forcing a decisive issue. That great strategist might seek to weaken the Teutons' strength by many different means, but he would not be likely to forco a decisive issue by adopting major offensive operations until America's full strength is developed in Europe and until the air-services of the Allies have reached their greatest possible size. The Teutons aro in a desperate hurry to end tho war. The Allies aro in no such hurry. Consequently, if, as Kuhlmann's speech seems to foreshadow, the Teutons should elect to act henceforth generally on the defensive, we may see a comparative lull on tho battle-fronts until such time as the aeroplane may be brought decisively into play. The Teutons have apparently demonstrated that the battle-fronts as at present held, by millions of troops, cannot be broken even by sacrificing holocausts of dead. But the potentiality of tho aeroplane has not yet been demonstrated, because the air-services of the Allies have not by any means yet reached their maximum strength. What tho rifle, the machine-gun, and guns of every calibre have been unable to effect, perhaps may be accomplished by the aeroplane loaded with high-explosive bombs, by tens of thousands of aeroplanes loaded with hundreds of thousands of high-explosive bombs. All other military factors being more or less equal, the aeroplane may become tho deciding factor. With the help of America, the Allies possess the power to dominate Germany from the air.— [Written Juij 2.J