THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. MONDAY, MAY 13, 1918. THE RAID ON OSTEND.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LV, Issue 16848, 13 May 1918, Page 4

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. MONDAY, MAY 13, 1918. THE RAID ON OSTEND.

The second attempt to lock up Ostend Harbour would increase the prestige of any navy other than the British. The action having been undertaken by the successors of Nelson, all that can be said is that his tradition lives and inspires. To attack once the heavily fortified bases on the Belgian coast, daring mines, submarines, enemy warships and land batteries, was a naval enterprise of the first order, demanding vision, initiative, and courage above the ordinary. To return and repeat the affront a fortnight later betokens an audacious spirit in British seamanship, and a morale infinitely superior to the enemy's. The Americans have justly made a national hero of their Hobson, but here is an epic which by comparison makes the Santiago affair appear simple. Every man on the six blockships which have been sunk at Zeebrugge and Ostend carried his life in his hand, but the whole personnel of the British Navy would have boarded the blockships had permission been given. Both enterprises were carried out with the white-hot enthusiasm with which the British sailor, whether of the navy or the mercantile marine, embraces any opportunity of retaliating against those who have debased warfare at sea and stooped to the murder of women and children as an approved policy. Both actions will rank among the major incidents of the naval war, and both are dissimilar from any others. The nearest approach to them was the cutting-out of a German flotilla from the shelter of Heligoland in August, 1914, but that aimed at the destruction of enemy forces, not at making a port useless. The new naval offensive, of which we have seen the opening moves, has for its object rendering the Belgian coast untenable for submarines, which will then be compelled to use ports in Germany proper, and in doing so expose themselves to considerably greater risks than they now run.

With the candour which inspires confidence in all their statements, British naval officers admit that the latest attempt did not entirely block the exit from Ostend Harbour. The Vindictive lies between the. piers, but she sank at an angle of 40 degrees, and this doubtless accounts for the space left for navigation. In the previous raid two blockships were sunk at Ostend, and although the Vindictive was-shorter than the width of the channel it was doubtless hoped that, together with the two blockships already sunk, she would completely obstruct the fairway. Although this has not been accomplished, valuable results have been obtained. Enemy destroyers will use the port with difficulty, and will be unable to rely on a quick return to the protection of the shore guns if pursued by the British. Both Ostend and Zeebrugge are subject to rapid sitting. It is unofficially claimed that this has already rendered Zeebragge impracticable as a submarine base, and the same \ thing may happen at Ostend, which the British are apparently able to bombard with impunity from the sea and air. Both ports have been attacked by airmen with a persistence which disposes of any suggestion that the Admiralty was not alive to the importance of striking the submarines at their bases.. These aerial bombardments did not drive submarines from the ports, but it- is possible that the airmen may be able to stop blasting and dredging long enough to allow Ostend to silt up and fall into disuse, as Zeebrugge has apparently done.

It is not wise to assume that the complete locking up of Zeebrugge and Ostend is required to justify the raids. The temporary closing of Zeebrugge and the partial obstruction of Ostend may materially affect the course of the war. Freedom of sea communications was never more vital to the allies than now. The battle on the western front has reached a stage when the interruption of the flow of reinforcements and munitions to France would have serious results. It is the time when Germany would desire her submarines to be most active, when she might well decide to sacrifice the destroyers based on the Flemish coast on the chance of sinking a few transports. It is at the very moment when an increase in the German submarine offensive might have been expected that the British Navy has struck, forestalling the enemy, confusing his plans, and increasing his difficulties. It is apparent that the enemy's submarines are now being put to a test thai has never been imposed on them before. Those in the Atlantic will find the northern entrance to the North Sea barraged as the southern entrance has long been. The only way home is along the Norwegian coast, and doubtless steps have been taken to prevent the abuse of Norwegian neutrality by the constant use of her territorial waters. Submarines in the North Sea will be compelled to return to German ports, running the gauntlet of the allied craft watching for them, or to use Ostend under conditions which are now unfavourable and which further attack from the sea or the air may render dangerous. Much secret work is doubtless being done, in conjunction with the mining of the North Sea outlet and the raids on the Belgian coast, to destroy and limit the operations of submarines. It is practically certain that the North Sea is being sooured as never before, and that the entrance to the Baltic is closely watched. The submarine campaign is failing visibly, construction is drawine- level with sinkings, and the British Admiralty has apparently commenced a . counteroffensive which it has long had in preparation and which may be expected to give important results.