ALLIED STRATEGY.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LV, Issue 16823, 13 April 1918, Page 1 (Supplement)

ALLIED STRATEGY.

THE COURSE OF THE BATTLE.

BY LIEUT.-COL. A. A. GBACb, N.Z.F.A. RES.

Jt;sT as tho carefully conceived German plan of campaign has unfolded itself, so tho Franco-British method of meeting tlio German offensive gradually makes itself plain. Hiudenburg and I.udeiidorff's first move was made with a view to separating tho British from tho French. Had that aim been accomplished, the next move was to be made with a view to destroying the isolated British armies by striking them a terrific blow from Flanders, and simultaneously with this second offensivo stroke it is to bo surmised there was coupled an attempt by the High Seas Fleet to block communication between England and Franco. However, the British and French Armies remain homogeneous, there has been no isolation of the British. The stroke" from Flanders may fall, but, if so, it falls as a forlorn attempt to accomplish the destruction of the British forces before their isolation has been accomplished. There has so far appeared no sign of activity on the part of the High Seas Fleet.

It will have been noticed that, when in great strength, the German hordes attacked on the line Arras-St. Quentin, and the British first lino armies gradually retired, fighting every foot of tho way, and killing the maximum number of Germans possible, no attempt was made on tho part of the Allied High Command to hurry up the armies of reserve. Such armies as were in supporting distanco of the retiring armies were, no doubt, ordered forward, but the great mass of the reserve armies was held in leash. Even at the present time, though the Germans are within seven or eight miles of Amiens, General Foch appears to have employed but a small portion of his vast armies of reserve. But it will also have been noticed that, while tho first-lino armies between Arras and St Quontin gavo ground, and no decisive attempt was made to stop the Germans from advancing in tho direction of Amiens, yet when Ludendorff and Hindenburg made a strenuous attempt to carry Arras and the heights of Vimy by assault they were resisted strenuously, and were flung back with great loss. There was no giving way by the British on that sector. The Allied Plan.

The Franco-British plan, then, appears to be to lure the Germans in tho direction of Amiens and the coastline near Abbeville, but to resist on tho line Arras-Armentiores-Ypres-Nieuport, and if, as appears possible, the German offensive from Flanders should materialise, to oppose it on the entrenched line between Arras and the sea; and this without depleting the Franco-British armies of reservo to such an extent as to prevent them from being able to make a powerful counter-offensive which shall complete the Germans' defeat and possibly drive them out of Northern France. Naturally there is much speculation as to where that great counter-stroke will fall, but just as prior to the Battle of the Marne the Germans were unable to penetrate the strategy of General Joffre, so now it is to be hoped that they will be unable to penetrate the strategy of General Foch. Perhaps they are ablo to perceive tho fact, plain to tho rost of tho world, that the tardiness of their armies' advance towards Amiens and the sea has given the Allies ample time in which to manoeuvre their armies of reserve into such positions as will not only give them the best chance of blocking the Germans' offensives altogether, but will enable them to retaliate by means of effective counter-offensives when the Germans have spent their strength. Reinforcement from England. There remains to be considered the great strategical value of the lines of communication connecting England with France, and the use which the British War Council can make of them to strengthen their menaced armies in Northern France. There is no exact knowledgo as to tho size of the armies in garrison, in, reserve, and in training in Britain, but it may be confidently anticipated that every division which can safely be sent out of the country is in, or on the way to, France. Mr. Lloyd George has declared that for every British gun and man lost during the German advance, ten would take their place. This means that the fullest possible use is being made of tho Allies' command of tho Straits of Dover, and of the English Channel. Now that it is evident that the British and Belgium Armies defending the battlefront from the sea to Arras may be cu'.ed upon to resist a stupendous offensive, no doubt not only will reinforcements havo been sent by General Foch by rail, via Abbeville and Amiens, but across the Straits of Dover a constant stream of transports will bo bearing troops, guns, munitions, and supplies. Anglo-French strategy has successfully aimed at engaging and punishing a maximum German forco with a minimum allied force. It aims at a stubborn and unyielding resistance along tho northernmost sectors of tho battle-front, and at the conserving of a great army of manoeuvre, drawn from the armies of reserve, which shall, at the right time, and at the right plate, deal the Germans suih a blow as shall demonstrate to them, and the world the tremendous military strength of the Great Alliance. At this great moment, when tho scales of Fate tremble in tho balance, the hearts of all free people go out to tho troops of Fiance and Britain, and to tho great strategist who guides their movemonts, as wo pray and trust, to victory! Written April 8, 1918.