THE New Zealand Herald DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. SATURDAY, APRIL 13, 1918. THE SITUATION IN THE WEST.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LV, Issue 16823, 13 April 1918, Page 6

THE New Zealand Herald DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. SATURDAY, APRIL 13, 1918. THE SITUATION IN THE WEST.

The events of the past three weeks have raised many questions regarding the plans laid down by the War

Council at Versailles and the allied

staffs in tho field for the campaign

of 1918. In his review of tho position Mr. Bonar Law referred to the

"repeated" inquiries by members of Parliament why we did not exercise the initiative, and explained in

reply that "a successful offensive

against entrenched positions was

only possible with the whole weigh:

of the allies," his meaning obviously

being that while Germany has

already reached her maximum

strength, and could not hope to increase her chances of success by delay, tne- allies have the assured

prospect of continually adding to their strength as the military re-

sources of America are developed. As the spring approached it became

certain that the Germans would make a desperate effort to end the war before America's weight could affect the situation. There were at least three courses open to the allied generals and Governments. They might have decided to meet the German offensive on* the battlefront they then held, in the same manner as the French decided to fight to a finish at Verdun. They might havo anticipated the German plans by exercising the initiative, and launching a general offensive. They might havo elected to fight retiring-actions while their armies of refebrve manoeuvred for the purpose of preventing the Germans from "breaking the battle-line, and preparatory to making a counter-off enshe with tho maximum possible strength. The first course was probably very quickly dismissed. It would have involved an extremely costly campaign, in which the armies would be so exhausted by the task of breaking down the German offensive that a counter-stroke X°uld be almost impossible. The second method, the forestalling of the German offensive, presumed the ability of the allies to force a decision before America could participate fully, and, therefore, while the allied strength was below the maximum.

It was the third plan which was adopted. It was decided to meet the German offensive with medium force on the front attacked, and to fight a series of retiring actions in order to commit the enemy irretrievably to a definite lino of action which would use up all or at least most of his armies of reserve, while leaving the largest part of our own armies of reserve fresh and free to art on tho off< nsive when the Germans had exhausted their surplus strength™ and the psychological moment arr./ed to make the counter-stroke. This policy was adopted because it was believed that there was "no danger of anything fatal happening." and the allies having at their command forces at least as large and equipment at least as good as the enemy's, there were very good reasons for believing that tho offensive could be checked, and the enemy worn down to such an extent that with augmented forces the allies might resume the offensive and gain the final decision. But what did happen "was unexpected." The first shock of the offensive was generally met in tho manner that had been anticipated, but at ono point, west of St. Quentin, it succeeded. There the British line was broken, and although the extent of the rupture is not yet known it was clearly very serious. That danger introduced a now obviously not unforeseen, but considered reasonably remote. The situation was retrieved, but the allied plan was very materially disturbed, and instead of arresting the German advance on a line conforming to the course of the Somme south of Peronne, the generals in the field were compelled to restore the security of the defence at the cost of a retirement to the Ancro and the Avre. At the outset "the balance of forces was not against the allies," and so far as numbers are concerned it is probably still in their favour. But the result of that unexpected weakness has been to change the strategical situation in the west to their great disadvantage. They have been forced back from positions selected for the defence upon an important centre of communications used by them in the conduct of their operations. They have defeated tho enemy's ultimate purpose by maintaining an unbroken defence against him, but strategically the balance has been turned against them, and one of the first measures required to secure their safety is to establish a decided preponderance in numbers. Tho need for immediately increasing the forces in the field by creating ; now reserves to replace those already available, and likely to be

required at any time, is emphasised' by the course of the new offensive in Flanders. For the time being the Germans . have relinquished their efforts to break the defence before Amiens, and have thrown their offensive against the flank of the British position in Flanders. Although the attack was expected, it required little weight to carry it across the level plain between Armentieres and La Basseo and the open country north of Armentieres. But as the battle was extended it struck against the curving ridges of tho Ypres salient and broke upon the heights of Messines, Wytschaetc, and Ploegsteert Wood. To the southwest the British troops arc making a stand upon the River Becque, which flows due south to the Lys, along the Lys, and thence south-east on the Lawe, to the unyielding flank at Givenchy. The Armentieres salient has been extinguished, and the menace to Lille transformed into a positive threat to the British positions in Belgium, so hardly won during the long campaign last year. Sir Auckland Geddes has declared that the great battle "might end with the German occupation of the French Channel ports.'' Such a contingency may seem remote, but the warning cannot be ignored. A decision by the German High Command to make another bid for the Channel ports involves a radical alteration in their plans, for the success of a thrust in Flanders would clearly result not in tho division but the massing of the allied armies, since the British would fall back to the heights in northwestern France and still fight shoulder to shoulder with tho French. On the other hand, an advance to Calais would obviously afford more substantial encouragement to the German army and people than the indefinite results which have been gained in Picardy. The view taken by the British Minister is probably an extreme one. It presumes iv capacity for success in the Germans which they have not yet proved, and it clearly does not pretend to estimate all the factors in the situation. While recognising all the chances of failure, we are still fully justified in relying upon the quality of the allied defence and the resourcefulness of the allied commanders to break the German offensive and destroy its possibilities of success.